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THE POLITICS AM) LITERATURE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The interplay of Samuel Johnson*s politics and lit­
erature forms the subject of this dissertation* I will 
examine this alliance by constructing as coherently as 
possible Johnson's political theory out of the many paua- 
phletSy essays, sermons, prefaces,, reviews,, and- the like 
that he produced during his life,, as well as from impor­
tant contemporary sources, particularly Boswell's Life of 
Johnson. The results of this synthesis will occupy three 
chapters, each chapter containing a division of the politi­
cal theory. After eaŵ h division, I will devote a chapter 
to an analysis of a major imaginative work which closely 
embodies this division's principles, calling upon The 
Vanity of Human Wishes and the other poetry whenever they 
are relevant. This analysis will show, I believe, that 
Johnson embodies in fictional form— in concrete situations, 
specific actions, and particular speeches rising out of 
actions--corollaries, analogues, or similitudes of his
2
Dolitical beliefs..
The reason for this soecial kind of identity arises 
from Johnson's emoirical and skeotical temoer, -his inveter­
ate habit of testing all ideas, theories, or soeculations-- 
exceoting a1wavs his religion— in the oractical, exoerien- 
tial world of realitv, Thus, Johnson's fear of anarchv and 
civil war, his insistence upon subordination, his demand for 
forbearance on the oart of subjects of a government--to men­
tion onlv three of his leading nolitical ideas--so me times 
seem, arbitrary or willful when stated abstractly. But when 
these same ideas are clothed in the human action of the 
imaginative works, we see their basis in his painful aoore-
hension of the destructive force of a mob or an army; his - *
sensitive awareness of the hapoiness that mare peace and 
concord afforded, in and by themselves, when achieved through 
obedience to lawful authority; and his clear perception of 
the abuses of power and authority that will inevitably oc­
cur but which must be endured for the greater blessings gov­
erning achieves. Further, Johnson's political views, if not 
validated, are at least made more accessible to the under­
standing than before. The abstract outline of the political 
theory possesses the advantage of all outlines: clarity,
obviousness of relationships, and completeness of design.
The imaginative work possesses equally its own peculiar 
advantages: depth, "solidity of specification," experiential
dimension. V/hen thev are placed side by side, the abstract
3
outline of the politics takes on the color and form of life 
and reveals thereby its value, its possible validity^ and 
most certainly its foundation in life.
It is only in the last decade that much scholarly 
work has been done on Johnson's politics. The 'Tfeunier 
Revolution'^ in eighteenth-century history studies has been 
slow in seeping into literary studies of various figures of 
the age. The first book length study of Johnson’s politics 
was published in 1960--Donald J. Greene, The Politics of 
Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).
This work is, as Greene calls it in his "Preface,'* an "'intro­
ductory sketch— for it can claim to be little more--of the 
political activitiesy ideas, attitudes, and milieu of 
Samuel Johnson,"! and is very valuable for sweeping away 
""the continued currency of the simple old legend of Johnson 
the 'blind reactioneury' . . .  that is an unnecessary handi­
cap to serious s t u d e n t s I t  supplies important and sug­
gestive directions for creating a coherent political theory, 
but its historical purpose leads- Greene away from a thor­
ough elaboration of his general discussion of this issue.
“Two other books published in the last decade supply 
much material for the elucidation of Johnson's political 
theory. E. L. McAdam, Jr.'s Dr. Johnson and the English Law,
iDonald J. Greene, The Politics of Samuel Johnson 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. vii.
2ibid., p. viii.
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(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1951) pro­
vides the Johnson excerpts, and very valuable they are,;^ from 
the series of lectures Sir Robert Chajnbers delivered as 
successor to Blackstone as Vinerian -Professor on the English 
Law at Oxford» Many of Johnson's basic ideas about society, 
government, and law are contained in this material» Ben­
jamin Hoover's Samuel Johnson's Parliamentary Reporting 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1953) is the other important work, and while it does not 
contain so much important material for the student of John­
son's politics as the two previously mentioned books, it 
does call needed attention to the worth and value of the 
Debates Johnson wrote for the Gentleman's Magagine as a 
great seminal source for many of the political beliefs 
Johnson held throughout his life. As Johnson's latest biog­
rapher puts it,. "What had started merely as another journal­
istic assignment for the magazine turned out to be an impor­
tant milestone in the maturing of Johnson's ideas
There are several unpublished dissertations that 
should be mentioned in a study of Johnson's politics. The 
first and what is perhaps the most important is Joseph 
Sidney's The Political Thought of Samuel Johnson (unpub­
lished dissertation. University of Chicago, 1957). Sidney
^See Greene, pp. 192-93 for a discussion of their 
importance.
^James Clifford» Young Sam Johnson (New York: McGraw. 
Hill, 1955), P» 260
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attempts to arrive at Johnson’s political thought through 
an analysis of the political utterances against the back­
ground of the moral and ethical statements about man that 
Johnson made most often in his periodical essays. This 
approach differs from mine both in scope and jnethod, Sid- • 
ney is not interested in finding any concrete embodiments 
of the political ideas in the fictional works, or in relating 
his findings to any particular movements of Johnson’s age, 
as I will attempt to do in the last chapter of this dis­
sertation.
Robert Orlovich’s unpublished dissertation from the 
University of Illinois (1941), Samuel. Johnson’s Political 
Ideas and Their Influence on His Works, is an earlier 
attempt like Greene’s to place Johnson politically in the 
context of his time. Orlovich’s conclusions are often 
opposed to Greene’s— on the whole, it appears to me, mis­
takenly so. Orlovich's work suffers from his inability to 
consult any of the many historical works published after his 
dissertâtionyi and the reconstruction of Johnson’s early 
life by Jaimes Clifford in his excellent Young Sam Johnson.
Even with the new additions to Johnson scholarship, 
much work still needs to be done on Johnson’s political 
position. As the authors of A Bibliography of Johnsoniam
^See Greeney pp. 1-21, 288 for a discussion of the 
value of this new material and a list of the more important 
titles for a student of eighteenth-century history.
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Studies : 1950-1960 ; A Supplement to Johnsonian Studies : 
1887-1950 point out, Greeners "forceful claims (^bout the 
enduring value of Johnson's political beliefs] should arouse 
active opposition in those who cling to traditional inter­
pretations . . .  and there will no doubt be many replies. 
For which let us rejoice» Honest controversy is the life­
blood of serious scholarship,"! The present study is not 
in the nature of a reply, since I agree substantially with 
Greene, but is an attempt at clarification, as Greene's 
work was, of Johnson's politics, utilizing materials and 
interpretations that have only just become available» Al­
though its approach is from within, it employs the light 
cast from without by recent scholarship.
That such illumination is necessary can be illus­
trated by certain facts presented by Bertrand Bronson in 
an article entitled "The Double Tradition of Dr, J o h n s o n , "2 
As Bronson has shown, there are two traditions which find 
their source in Johnson: the learned atnd the popular. The 
popular tradition received its archetypal Johnson, its 
"imago" as Bronson calls it, in the famous descriptive pas­
sage in Macaulay’s review of Croker's Boswell,
!james Clifford and Donald J, Greene, in John­
sonian Studies, ed, Magdi Wahba (Cairo, 1961), p, 278,
2in Eighteenth Century English Literature, Modern 
Essays In Criticism, ed. Jaunes Clifford (New York: Oxford 
University Press, A Galaxy Book, 1959),
Everything about him, his coat, his wig, his figure, his 
face, his scrofula, his St. Vitus’s dance, his rolling 
walk, his blinking eye, the outward signs which too 
clearly marked his approbation of his dinner, his in­
satiable appetite for fish-sauce and veal-pie with 
plums, his inextinguishable thirst for tea, his trick 
of touching the posts as he walked, his mysterious 
practice of treasuring up scraps of orange-peel, his 
morning slumbers, his midnight disputations, his puffings, 
his vigorous, acute, and ready eloquence, his sarcastic 
wit, his vehemence, his insolence, his fits of tempes­
tuous rage, his queer inmates, old Mr. Leyett and blind 
Mrs. Williaons, the cat Hodge and the negro Frank, all 
are as familiar to us as the objects by which we have 
been surrounded from childhood.l
One of the traits of the popular tradition emphasized 
strongly by Macaulay in his essay is a blind Toryism, a 
quality arising, so Macaulay thought, from the ’’character­
istic peculiarity of his intellect which was the union of 
great powers with low prejudices.”2 Johnson in the popular 
tradition is thus anti-democratic, anti-equalitarian, almost 
sentimentally monarchial, either an early Jacobite or a 
late and humble Hanoverian, pugnaciously reactionary and 
fiercely proud.
In the learned tradition, Bronson points out, the 
same view, more cautiously and pedantically stated, was
held until roughly the turn of the century. A reaction set
in, exemplified by Henry Craik’s attack on the popular 
image in his historic anthology of English Prose, in which 
he praises Johnson highly.
^Quoted by Bronson, p. 287.
^Quoted by Bronson, p. 289.
8
It is not too much to say, that all that is .best in 
English prose since his day is his debtor in respect 
of not a few of its highest qualities»!
In the years since Craik’s worky scholars have expended
much time and work on Johnson, the result of which has been
the solidification of Johnson’s high position as a major
figure in English literature. Unfortunately, the commerce
between the two traditions, the learned and the popular,
is slight: the popular tradition remains little modified.
Even within the learned tradition^ the effect of scholarly
studies on Johnson has not modified the Macaulayan figure
completely. This is as true in politics as in any other
area of Johnsonian study.
In speaking of the work done in the past half-cen­
tury and its impact upon both traditions, Bronson states.
So far as concerns the ’’"learned tradition,”" the eidolon 
has been quite re-formed. But it remains to inquire 
whether there has been a comparable alteration of the 
popular image, and whether in fact the work of devoted 
specialists has made any impact on general opinion. It 
might be presumed that the literate public at least 
would be affected; but it appears likely that the folk- 
image still persists on a far higher level of culture 
than the specialist would ever dreama possible. Even 
among the teaching profession, almost certainly on the 
lower levels, and perhaps also at the upper one vdiere 
specialization in other areas of literary study has 
prevented reconsideration, the Macaulayan simulacrum 
probably yet prevails
The continuing need for the reformation of that eidolon,
plus the inherent value of defining accurately the political
^Quoted by Bronson, p. 290.
^Bronson, p. 297.
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views of a major figure of the eighteenth century^ accounts: 
for this paper*
I hopey then, to describe accurately the nature of 
Johnson*s political doctrines and to reveal some of his 
fundamental beliefs about the nature of man. For Johnson 
did not disassociate the political man from general mankind 
and then derive his political theory from that abstraction.
As he says in his review of Jenyns’s Free Enquiry, the account 
of political evil is not difficult if we have discovered the 
"origin of moral Evily • • * polity being only the conduct.
'of immoral men in publick affairs*’̂1 The motivations of 
the political man merely take on a specific political color­
ation, but in outline they remain the same motives that move 
all men. Hence, the relation of the imaginative literature 
to the politics is the relation of a general motive in man 
to its specific form in the political world,
Johnson*s beliefs about the general nature of man­
kind can then ^e contrasted with those out of which several 
intellectual and literary movements of his own day grew—  
sentimentalism and primitivism^ for example* The final 
result of this method will be a more precise definition of 
Johnson *s "rationalism," his ’♦'classicism.** For Some of the 
ideas that he opposed were part of what Arthur Lovejoy calls
Iworks (London: Oxford University Press, 1825),
VI y 74, Unless otherwise noted, all further references to 
Johnson’s works will be to this edition. For convenience, 
the title of the piece, the volume, and the page number 
only will be given.
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the '’characteristic idea-complex which constitutes what is. 
commonly called the ’rationalism of the Enlightenment*’”1 
Hencey the discrimination of Johnson’s rationalism from the 
general features of eighteenth-century rationalism will, in 
effect y define with some precision Johnson’s unique position 
in the general currents of his time»
l'*The Parallel of Deism and Classicism,”’ Essays in 
the History of Ideas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), 
o* 78*
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON: THE STATE OF 
MAN y UNGOVERNED AND GOVERNED
In the course of a debate in the House of Coininons
in -1741y the following principle is announced as self-
evident to all.parties and remains uncontroverted through
the rest of the debate:
In all political questions,, Questions too extensive to 
be fully comprehended by generative Reason^ EScperience 
is the Guide which a wise Man will follow with least 
Distrust* • • *^
This statement embodies one of the most fundamental and 
enduring of Johnson*s beliefs, not only in politics but in 
the whole large and confused arena of human affairs. Life 
as it presents itself to the eye of man is a complex, com­
plicated interweaving of circumstances and movements, of 
ill-defined motives and half understood actions, of far 
reaching consequences and slight motions, of good and evil 
entangled so completely within each situation and context 
that no possible way exists of untangling them.
^’’Debates in the Senate of L i l l i p u t The Gentleman's 




Man’s abilities to comprehend this overwhelming 
puzzle are severely limited, yet he must make decisions, 
act, and become deeply involved within it. .His whole life 
is bound to it, and if he is to achieve any happiness, if, 
what is probably more important, he is to avoid a great deal 
of pain, he must act wisely and discreetly. But it is 
"beyond the power of mortal intelligence," Johnson states in 
Rambler, No. 63, to "take a view at once distinct and com­
prehensive of human life, with all of its intricacies of 
combination, and varieties of connexion."1 If it follows 
then that there is no completely safe or trustworthy guide 
--experience being what the wise man will "least Distrust" 
not completely trust--the advantage must lie with what has 
been submitted to and tested in life, not with a speculative 
scheme that is based on untested hypothesis.
An excellent example of this kind of reasoning occurs 
in Johnson’s "Considerations on the Corn Laws." Here John­
son is investigating a new scheme for lowering the bounty 
on the export of corn. He admits that
It is possible, that if it [the bounty3 were reduced lower, 
it would still be the motive of agriculture, and the 
cause of plenty; but why we should desert experience 
for conjecture, and exchange a knowr. for a possible good, 
will not easily be discovered. If, by a balance of 
probabilities, in which a grain of dust may turn the 
scale--pr, by a curious scheme of calculation, in which, 
if one postulate in a thousand be erroneous, the de­
duction which promises plenty may end in famine ;--if, by 
a specious mode of uncertain ratiocination, the critical
III, 301.
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point at which the bounty should stop, might seem to 
be discovered,, I shall still continue to believe that it 
is more safe to trust what we have already tried; and 
cannot but think bread a product of too much importance 
to be made the sport of subtilty, and the topic of hypo­
thetical disputation*!
The value of the bounty as an agricultural incentive has 
been proven, whereas the new theory, created by the limited 
judgment of one man, quite possibly has dangerous potential­
ities, particularly when something so important as bread is 
involved. This danger* stems directly from the "^inadequacy 
of man* s mind to experience,” of man’s inability to "foresee 
all the Consequences of new Measures, or • • • to know what 
Evils they may create, or what subsequent changes they may 
introduce. * ..
iConsiderations on the Corn Laws, Vy 327,
S^DebateSy" XIIy 522. There is no positive way of 
identifying what Johnson’s own sentiments were in the 
Debates and those that were merely the respective speaker’s. 
There are, however, two methods of testing that indicate, it 
seems to.me, which principles enunciated in the Debates were 
probably approved by Johnson. The first involves a careful 
reading to find those principles which are contradicted by 
other speakers during the debate in question and those which 
are not. The quotation above states a belief about govern­
ment which both sides in this debate accept, but from which 
each draws a different conclusion. I have attempted to use 
only quotations from the Debates which are in this category.
The second method for deciding whether Johnson’s own 
ideas are being presented involves a study of a large part 
of the Johnson canon to determine whether the idea involved 
reappears in some later work in the same form or whether it 
is contradicted. I have again attempted to use only those 
ideas in the Debates which are reaffirmed in later works.
Finallyy the quotations from the Debates are chosen 
most often not for any originality but for the succinctness 
and clarity with which they state dominant ideas in Johnson’s 
political theory, ideas, however, which can also be found in 
various other works of Johnson. The Debates forced Johnson
14
There is a necessary distinction to be made here, 
however, between the speculation. that is utilized in indus­
trious pursuit of new knowledge and the speculation that is 
not solidly grounded in acute observation^ study, and exper­
ience, but which, like Procrustes, cuts off that part which 
does not fit its already formulated belief about reality.
The kind of speculation that Johnson criticizes and which 
he always contrasts with experience is the superficial, unso­
phisticated kind which does not stay close to the level of 
hard fact but takes ’̂ distant views,”" which reduces the in­
evitable difficulties and complexities of life by ignoring 
or blurring them. This kind of speculation is severely 
limited in its value to man, and it is these limitations 
that Johnson always attacks in his criticism.
As Joseph Sidney points out in his unpublished dis- 
sertationl„ Johnson*s distrust of speculation stems primarily 
from three defects he finds in general speculative theory.
It ignores : 1) human limitations; 2’) the complexity of the
to formulate clearly and state precisely what were some of the 
most common political attitudes of the day. This exercise 
undoubtedly helped him solidify his own political beliefs and 
accounts partially for his searching skepticism in all politi­
cal matters. From the time of the Debates on, there would 
be no more ”patriotic”" effusions such as Marmor Norfolciense, 
Johnson’s early attack on Walpole, The Debates forced John­
son to face political reality and in so doing resulted in the 
expression of certain political ideas with a vigor and force 
that he never surpassed,
%The Political Thought of Samuel Johnson (University 
of Chicago, 1957)„ pp, 43-51, The following discussion is 
heavily indebted to Sidney,
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world; 3) the effects of chance.
The first of these limitations has already been
touched upon in the quotation above from Rambler, No. 63,
in which Johnson says that a view "distinct and comprehensive
of human life"’ is "beyond the power of mortal intelligence."'
In Idler* No. 91, Johnson presents this idea more fully.
The difficulty of obtaining knowledge is universally 
confessed. To fix deeply in the mind the principles 
of science, to settle their limitations, and deduce the 
long succession of their consequences ; to comprehend 
the whole compass of complicated systems, with all the 
arguments, objections and solutions, and to reposite 
in the intellectual treasury the numberless facts, ex­
periments ̂ apophthegms and positions, which must stand 
single in the memory, and of which none has any percept­
ible connexion with the resty is a task which* though 
undertaJcen with ardour and pursued with diligence, must 
at last be left unfinished by the frailty of our nature.1
Man is radically limited in his ability to understand the 
world in which he lives, but much theoretical speculation 
ignores this limitation and attempts to encompass an unman­
ageable complexity in one grand scheme. The devastation 
wrought by Johnson on Soame Jenyns’s Free Enquiry Into the 
Nature and Origin of Evil is perhaps the best available ex­
ample of what happens to one of these schemes when it is 
tested against the experientially grounded knowledge of a 
mind like Johnson’s. Evil in the world has always been one 
of the most difficult facts of existence to explain ration­
ally; Johnson usually falls back on faith in Christiauiity 
and the inscrutable Will of God to account for it. Jenyns’s
^IV, 417.
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unhappy attempt to explain it in rationally comprehensible 
terms is actually a result of his failure to take into 
account the limitation of the human intellect in dealing 
with this problem.
Johnson constantly points out this weakness in Jen­
yns’s theory.
This is given as a satisfactory account of the Original 
of moral Evil, which amounts only to this, that God 
created beings, whose guilt he foreknew, in order that 
he might have proper objects of pain, because the pain 
of the part is, no man knows how or why, necessary to 
to the felicity of the whole.^ (*Italics mine.)
The theory breaks down because man must finally admit that 
he simply cainnot comprehend, his mind is not able to under­
stand, the total organization of ejqjerience. Johnson makes
the point again near the end of his review.
Our author, if. I understand him right, pursues the 
argument thus: the religion of man produces evils, 
because the morality of man is imperfect; his morality 
is imperfect, that he may be justly a subject of punish­
ment ; his is made subject to punishment, because the
pain of the part is necessary to the happiness of the 
whole; pain is necessary to happiness, no mortal can 
tell why, or h o w . 2 (Italics mine.)
The same language is used here to point up the same fatal 
flaw in the argument: man is not able to understand some­
thing so anomalous as the presence of evil in a God-directed, 
that is, rational, universe.
Johnson makes clear that he is not criticizing
^Review of A Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin 
of Evil. VI, 73.
2lbid.. p. 75.
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Jenyn*s ability or learning per se, but only his refusal to 
take into account the limitation of the mind. ”1 do not,**̂  
he says, ”taeah to reproach this author for not knowing what 
is equally hidden from learning and from ignorance.** Since 
all men are limited^ there is no disgrace in admitting this 
limitation. **The shame,'* however,** is to impose words, for 
ideas, upon ourselves or other s.**̂ 1̂ Words hide from man his 
inherent inadequacy, and in so doing mislead him onto dan­
gerous ground where only experience should be trusted: **Words 
are,**' as Johnson pointed out in another place, **'the daughters 
of earth ,**' but "things are the sons of heaven.**"2 ( Johnson * s 
italics*)
The second fault Johnson finds in speculation, that
it too often ignores the complexity of the world, receives
explicit comment in Rambler, No. 125.
The works and operations of nature are too great in 
their extent, or too much diffused in their relations, 
and the performances of art too inconstant and uncertain, 
to be reduced to any determinate idea. It is impossible 
to impress*upon our minds an adequate and just repre­
sentation of an object so great that we can never take 
it into our view, or so mutable that it is always changing 
under our eye, and has already lost its form while we 
are labouring to conceive it.3
Thus the involved and complicated actions that make up the
life of men are causally related to man's ability to understand
^Ibid., p. 64.
^Preface to the English Dictionary, V, 27.
3lII, 93.
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fully this world. Our faculties are limited; our problems 
are almost infinite. These two facts must be recognized 
and taken into account in any speculative scheme that attempts 
to elucidate a dark or perplexed area of life, for example, 
Jenyns's attempt to solve rationally the problem of evil, 
Johnson thought that all too many attempts such as Jenyns*s 
ignored these facts and in so doing vitiated much of their 
effect.
The third defect which led Johnson to suspect facile 
speculation was his awareness of the effects of chance in 
men's lives, Man's comprehension is limited, his world is 
intricate and involved, but even that part which he can 
understand and hope.to control is open to forces which he 
cannot regulate or predict.
It is not commonly observed, how inuch, even of 
actionsy considered as particularly subject to choice, • 
is to be attributed to accident, or some cause out of 
our own power, by whatever name it be distinguished.1
Johnson often noted the effects of such chance in political
history.
Forms of government are seldom the result of much 
deliberation; they are framed by chance in popular 
assemblies, or in conquered countries, by despotick 
authority. Laws are often occasional, often capricious, 
made always by a few, and sometimes by a single voice,2
The law lectures which Johnson helped Robert Chambers 
compose for delivery at Oxford as the •*Vinerian Lectures on
R̂ambler, No, 184, III, 359, 
Zidler, No, 11, IV, 182,
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Eïiglish Law'*' were the occasion for the most forthright of 
.Johnson's meiny pronouncements upon the necessity for recog­
nizing the part chance plays in the lives of men»
It may not be improper in this place to caution young 
inquirers into the origin of our government against too 
great confidence in systematical writers or modern his­
torians, of whom it, may justly be suspected that they 
often deceive themselves and their readers when they 
attempt to explain by reason that which happened by chance, 
when they search for profound policy aoid subtle refine­
ment in temporary expedients^ capricious propositions, 
and stipulations offered with violence and admitted by 
compulsion and therefore broken and disregarded when that 
violence ceased by which they were enforced.1
The role of chance in the drama of history is a large one 
and as unpredictable as it is large. Many great events can 
often "be traced back to slender causes,** such as "petty 
competition or casual friendship, the prudence of a slave, 
or the garrulity of a woman,” These slender causes have 
often "hindered or promoted the most important schemes, and 
hastened or retarded the revolution of empires.'*2 No specu=- 
lative theory can hope to account for or to avoid the vicis­
situdes that inhere in life. They cannot be subsumed under 
any provision, and they undermine the effectiveness of any 
abstract formulation. Hence, for Johnson,, the large gener­
alities and abstract schemes of speculation all suffer grave
^Quoted by E. L. McAdam, Dr. Johnson and the English 
Law (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1961)  ̂
p. 92. ATI citations from this work, unless otherwise noted, 
will come from the Tohnsonian part of the Vinerian Law Lec­
tures quoted by McAdam and will be cited hereafter as "Viner­
ian Lectures."
2r ambler. No. 141, III, 168.
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disadvantages through the limitations of the intellect that 
devised them,, through the intricate and complex world of 
human affairs that defied their simplicity and clarity, and 
through the often disastrous, always uncontrollable disruptions 
of chance*
The beneficial kind of speculation, on the other
hand, possesses a solidity and reliability lacking in its
cousin. Its worth shines forth especially in its service
to the advancement of learning*
Knowledge is always promoted by inquisitive industry, 
and almost always retarded by systematic dogmatism,1
"Inquisitive industry" must be based on some sort of specu­
lation, some sort of formulation, untested as yet, about the 
experience which "systematic dogmatism"" refused to reflect 
upon*
One of the political benefits of this fruitful kind
of speculation will be that
Causeless discontent, and seditious violence, will grow 
less frequent and less formidable, as the science of 
government is better ascertained, by a diligent study of 
the theory of man,2
Johnson touches on this point in his ""Introduction" to the 
Harleian Miscellamy when he discusses the value of a free 
press. It should not be inferred that "Political or Re­
ligious Controversies are the only Products of the Liberty
^"Vinerian Lectures," p* 99*
^The False Alarm, VI, 155*
21
of the British Press *'* he writes^ even though the innumer­
able pamphlets of these controversies would make it appear 
so ; for
the Mind once let loose to Enquiry^ and so suffered to 
operate without Restraint, necessarily deviates into 
peculiar Opinions, and wanders in new Tracks, where she 
is indeed sometimes lost in a Labyrinth, from which, tho* 
she cannot return, and scarce knows how to proceed; yet^ 
sometimes, makes useful Discoveries, or finds out nearer 
Paths to Knowledge «.I
The pursuit of knowledge involves by necessity some sort of 
speculation, but it is still e:q)erience that is used to 
sift and test all this speculation, to find the valid and 
true, to reject the shallow and false. In this context, 
then, speculation possesses more of a residual than delib­
erate value.
This residual value lies in the use of the speculative 
faculty to create new and various solutions to man's diffi­
culties. These problems, almost always ethical or moral as 
far as Johnson was concerned, have existed since man's 
beginning, and therefore no new discoveries can be expected 
to replace the time-tested solutions already preserved in 
the recorded wisdom of the ages, such as the Bible, the 
classics, or the church fathers. But if no panacea is to be 
expected, some improvement can be, for, as George Sherburn 
noted, the eighteenth-century man generally had faith in the 
advancement of mankind and Dr. Johnson was no exception.
^The ’Introduction"' to the Harleian Miscellany (1744)- 
in Samuel Johnson's Prefaces and Dedications, ed* Allen T. 
Hazen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 54-55.
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"Even Dr * Johnson believed in progress, and his contempor­
aries in general glorified the idea,"'^ The progress which 
Johnson allowed,, however, was radically different from that, 
say, of R o u s s e a u ^  or William Godwin. Johnson*s kind of 
progress was attained by accretion, by slight additions to 
the accumulated fund of tested knowledge possessed by man­
kind, and these slight additions gave to speculation its value. 
Rousseau and Godwin, on the other hand, wanted to move for­
ward not by inches but by giant strides, made possible by a 
complete revaluation, and demolishment often enough, of the 
institutions, establishments, and commonly held beliefs of 
mankind» They wanted to make new, whereas Johnson wanted 
to refurbish.
ii
Johnson’s refusal to write a formal treatise pre­
senting his political theory originates, therefore, in his 
skepticism about the value of such speculation. There are, 
of course, other possible reasons. Johnson was after all 
a professional writer, a man who lived by his pen. He would 
not value his writing cheaply since it was his livelihood.
^George Sherburn, The Restoration and Eighteenth 
Century, in A Literary History of England, ed. Albert C.
Baugh ( New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), 
p. 968.
2por an excellent and concise discussion of Johnson 
and Rousseau’s contrasting approach to progress through 
reform see Richard B* Sewall, "Dr. Johnson, Rousseau, and 
Reform,"" The Age of Johnson, ed. W. S. Lewis (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 307-317.
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(No man "but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money."!) 
Hence, he was not likely to expend his energies composing 
formal treatises that would not bring immediate cash. Even 
though Johnson managed to live by his pen, he actually did 
not know a comfortable life until he received his pension 
in 1762 from George III. He seldom had time for the neces­
sary study involved in a thorough, philosophical treatment 
of any subject (it took Locke sixteen years to complete his 
Essay on Human Understanding); consequently he was directed 
neither by inclination nor by occupation to formal or ex­
tended _ speculation about complex matters.
But even though Johnson wrote no formal.treatise, 
there is no reason to assume that he acted merely from 
irrational bias (Macaulay's "union of great powers with 
low prejudices"^) or that he simply consulted his partic­
ular feelings at the moment, on the assumption that all 
political spéculation was ineffectual or worthless. John­
son too muck appreciated and sought the "grandeur of gen­
erality" to act in such an important area as politics with­
out arriving at some fundamental political principles first. 
He had thought hard about political matters most of his life, 
mainly because, as Donald J. Greene has shown in his recent
^Quoted by Boswell in The Life of Johnson, ed. G. B. 
Hill, rev. L. F. Powell (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936- 
1950), III, 19. All further references will be to this 
edition.
^Thomas Macaulay, Works, ed. Lady Trevelyan (New 
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897), V, 526.
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book on Johnson»s politics^, he was deeply involved in 
almost every period of his life in political activity. From 
his earliest publications— a translation of Father Jerome 
Lobo’s A Voyage to Abyssinia (1739)y A Complete Vindication 
of the Licensers of the Stage (1739), and Marmor Norfoiciense 
(1739)— to the end of his life when he wrote for Boswell a 
short dissertation entitled ’**of Tory and Whig**" (1781) and 
the many miscellaneous political comments in the Lives of 
Poets (1781), Johnson was writing and thinking about politi­
cal matters. These facts concerning Johnson’s political 
involvement plus his belief in the meliorative potentiality 
of human reason, that is,, speculation, add up to a positive 
belief, heavily salted with skepticism it is true, in the 
necessary and beneficial work of political activity.
In this connection a popular argument has been that
Johnson never considered politics a very important matter
and that this supposed unimportance implies a lack of any
consistent thought about fundamental principles on his part.
Such statements as this one in the Life of Lyttleton are
often used to support this belief.
Politicks did not, however, so much engage him (Lyttleto^ 
as to-withhold his thoughts from things of more import­
ance
Johnson’s addition to Goldsmith’s poem ’The Traveller,”
T̂he Politics of Samuel Johnson (New Haven^ Yale 
University Press , 1960), p. 21.
2VIII, 490.
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How small of all that human hearts endure
The part which laws or kings can cause or curel^
(11. 429-30)
several comments in his letters, like this one to Robert 
Chambers,
The State of the Publick, and the operations of govern­
ments have little influence upon the private happiness 
of private men nor can I pretend that much of the 
national calamities is felt by me^S
and this one to Baretti
The good or ill success of battles and embassies ex­
tends itself to a very small part of domestu.c life: we 
all have good and evil, which we feel more sensibly than 
our petty part of public miscarriage or prosperity,3
and various other similar comments found throughout his work 
do support the idea that he found politics and its effects 
upon the private happiness of individuals negligible. If 
Johnson did feel that political affairs were insignificant 
in matters of individual happiness, if he thought attempts 
to achieve happiness through involvement in political prob­
lems and activity unavailing and fruitless, then it would 
appear illogical for him to bother writing or discussing 
anything of a political nature, and the illogicality would 
be especially blatant if he became passionately involved.
Macaulay, in his review of Croker^s edition of Boswell’s
^The Poems of Samuel Johnson, ed. David Nichol Smith 
and E. L. McAdam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1941), p. 380,
2r , w . Chapman, ed., The Letters of Samuel Johnson 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), III, 17.
3lbid., I, 145.
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T i fg. of Johnson, argues exactly this point. He quotes
Johnson’s statement to Adam Fergusson, 'H: would not give
half a guinea to live under one form of government rather
than anothery"' which Johnson follows almost immediately by,
**Sir„ I perceive you are a vile Whig, Why all this childish
jealousy of the power of the crown? The crown has not power
enough.'*^ Macaulay then goes on to say.
If the difference between two forms of government be 
not worth half a guinea, it is not easy to see how 
Whiggism can be viler than Toryism, or how the crown can 
have too little power» If the happiness of individuals 
is not affected by political abuses, zeal for liberty 
is doubtless ridiculous. But zeal for monarchy must be 
equally so. No person would have been more quick sighted 
than Johnson to such a contradiction as this in the logic 
of an antagonist.2
Bertrand B r o n s o n ^  has attempted to answer Macaulay’s 
charges by reconstructing Johnson’s political philosophy and 
by examining the practical political situation to which 
Johnson refers. Johnson’s political philosophy revolves, 
according to Bronson, around the necessity for an ’’’impartial, 
absolute authority,” which must exist in the state and to 
which all contestants can appeal; in the British system the 
King is the embodiment of this principle. Johnson felt the 
Whigs were attempting to undermine the Kings’s authority and 
thus disrupt society by the ensuing struggles for power which
^Life of Johnson, II, 170.
^Macaulay, pp. 529-30.
3’’The Double Tradition of Dr. Johnson,’* in Eighteenth 
Century English Literature: Modern Essays In Criticism, ed* 
James Clifford (New York: Oxford University Press, A Galaxy 
Book, 1959)»
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must follow its displacement from him. In this light, John­
son* s statement about the Crown not having power enough refers 
to a cardinal doctrine of his theory of state and. is not 
simply the result of an emotional or irrational longing for 
authority.
Since his desire for the authority is based on a 
simple extension of his political theory, the logical dilemma 
complained of by Macaulay must come from Johnson * s earlier 
statement about his lack of concern for the form of govern­
ment under which he lives. Bronson explains this contradiction 
by completing the quotation, something Macaulay failed to do «
When I say all governments are alike, I consider that 
in no government power can be abused long. Mankind 
will not bear it. If a sovereign oppresses his people 
to a great degree, they will rise and cut off his head. 
There is a remedy in human nature against tyranny, that 
will keep us safe under every form of government.t
For Johnson, the present form of English government was not 
an oppressive one, but one which was acceptable to the 
people because it provided them with a certain amount of 
security and let them pursue their private lives more or 
less as they pleased* These basic conditions are all that 
any government can provide, but when government fails to ful­
fill these principal obligations, when, in England’s case, 
the king attempts to become a tyrant, then the people can
^Life of Johnson. II, 170. Cf. an earlier statement 
made to GoldsmTTh" "if the abuse be enormous. Nature will 
rise up, and claiming her original rights, overturn a corrupt 
political system.** (Johnson* s italics.) Life of Johnson, I,
424.
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'"rise and cut off his head.”' Hence the form of government 
is unimportant, since if it is a bad government it will be 
unable to survive, and if it is a good one it provides the 
same service all good governments do. If it is an accept­
able government, consequently, which Johnson considered the 
present English government, there is nothing contradictory in 
trying to maintain it, for the proved good should be pre­
served, whatever its form. The benefits of political activity 
are to be derived not from a transformation of society 
through political change but through the maintenance of the 
security and peace already established by the accepted form 
of English government, Johnson’s attitude could perhaps be 
called negative in that it does not propose changes in search 
of better social conditions, but it cannot be classed as the 
negativeness which opposes change because of anxiety or in­
security. Johnson opposed change but he opposed it on 
rational principles*
iii
Bronson’s argument seems to me to be at least ten­
able y especially when he discusses the place of sovereignty 
in Johnson’s political theory, but there is another way to 
approach this problem of the importance of politics for John­
son, which will, I believe, explain why Donald J. Greene is 
right when he insists that
it is not true, as some writers have maintained, that 
politics played a relatively insignificant part in 
Johnson’s life, thought, and writings, or that he was
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a mere inept dabbler in the surface of politics, to be 
dismissed with a patronizing smile.1
In Idler, No. 36, Johnson says.
The great differences that disturb the peace of mankind 
are not about ends,, but' means. We have all the same 
general desire,, but how those desires shall be accom­
plished wi11 for ever be disputed. The ultimate purpose 
of government is temporal, and that of religion is eternal 
happiness. Hitherto we agree ; but here we must part„ 
to try, according to the endless varieties of passion and 
understanding combined with one another, every possible 
form of government, and every imaginable tenet of 
religion.2 (Italics mine.)
The contrast between the respective ends of government and 
religion explains -Johnson»s emphasis upon the value of relig­
ion and his consequent depreciation of the importance of 
politics. For there cante no comparison when it comes to the 
relative significance of what shall last" forever and what 
shall last only a short span. When we consider not relative 
importance but importance within the life man alone, however, 
then politics has a major significance. Johnson maikes this 
clear when he says that Apolitical affairs are the highest 
and most extensive of temporal concerns.**̂3 Within the tem­
poral sphere, the desire for happiness is the paramount 
motive for all human actions, and since, as Johnson constantly 
reiterates, »*Fublick Happiness is the End of Government,’»''̂ 
government becomes an essential, albeit temporal, concern of
^Greene, p. 21.
2lV, 254-55.
3idler. No, 48, IV, 292. 
4«*Debates,” XI, 351.
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man. Man in his desire for happiness has instituted govern­
ment, of seemingly infinite variety, but all with this same 
goal# Granting the insignificance of this merely temporal 
happiness when compared to eternal happiness, an individual 
can still occupy himself with political affairs without any 
inconsistency in his actions and beliefs# Man becomes in­
consistent only when he finds happiness on this earth the 
only goal, and devotes all his time and energy to searching 
for the form of government which can best deliver it#
Those who attack the English monarchial form of government 
by shouting liberty and crying out for the rights of the 
people, even if they are sincere in their belief, are still 
doubly mistaken# First, they exchange religious for merely 
human goals, since they already receive from that monarchy 
adequate liberty and privileges# Their fractious insistence 
on human happiness, which they mistakenly believe will come 
from the almost total liberty they demand, blinds them and 
their followers to the subordinate rank human happiness has 
in relation to eternal, and finally lures them into invert­
ing their stations# The amount of attention diverted to 
temporary happiness and the means to attain it meant for 
Johnson an abandonment of the proper balance between pgli—  
tics and religion. The latter, instead of occupying its 
legitimate cardinal place, was then in danger of being re­
duced to the inferior position, and such a condition was both 
intolerable and tragic.
31
Secondy the men bitterly attacking the government 
fail to see that there is a limited amount of happiness here 
on earth and that it will not be much enlarged or more 
equitably shared by change of government* For government 
does not and cannot promise happiness* It can, at best, 
provide a certain amount of security and order in which man 
is free to pursue happiness, but this rather negative func­
tion is about all government can contribute. Johnson thought 
that liberty which was seemingly in danger from the encroach­
ment of the King was often, **to the lowest rank of every 
nation” at least, ”'little more than the choice of working 
or starving”’;, a choice he ”supposed equally allowed in 
every country*”^ Liberty is not happiness; a certain amount 
of it is necessary, but no amount of it can either equal or 
promise happiness* (That Johnson thought his country had 
sufficient liberty is evidenced by his comment that the 
English should talk of it less and use it better*)
Thus y Johnson* s statement about the unimportance of 
politics must be understood, it seems to me, in the light of 
his whole attitude towards happiness, the goal of both govern­
ment and religion* Since eternal happiness is the highest 
possible good, all else is unimportant in comparison to 
it* From this unimportance comes Johnson*s statement con­
cerning the insignificance of politics* But if the individual
l”On the Bravery of the English Common Soldiers,”
VI y 151*
3Z
recognizes the essential value of religion and religion’s 
promise, then he can devote both time and effort to politi­
cal affairs. The matter of emphasis and proportion is crucial, 
however, aoid if the temporal concerns about happiness through 
government y such as Adam Fergusson*s fears of the monarchy, 
seem to overflow their proper bounds, then the proper course 
must be restored by a blunt restatement of respective value: 
eternal felicity versus temporal happiness.
This dichotomy between religion and politics influ­
ences Johnson’s attitude within politics itself as well as 
toward-the relative significance of each. If religion is 
the central fact of life, it is a fact which dictates in 
broad outline the activities of men in political tffairs but 
not the specific mode or manner. Although Johnson believed 
that the political activities of men must be judged by 
religious standards--”̂ olity being only the conduct of im­
moral men in publick affairs”^— he was aware of the impossi­
bility of applying literal Christian doctrine to the state.
He consequently saw the necessity for using reason in the 
study and administration of government. Although man is”by 
the laws of his Creator howsoever promu1 g ated . . .  natur­
ally and necessarily bound,” he can know the Will of God 
only ”by the revelation or the light of r e a s o n . ”2 Now in
^Review of Free Enquiry, VI, 74. 
2”Vinerian Lectures,”" p. 82.
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"'what way, or by what means the patriarchial dominions of 
the first ages was actually exchanged for civil government" 
is unknown, "since even the most ancient and authentic of 
all histories, the Sacred Books of Moses, do not with pre­
cision inform us*" We must, then, "be content to conjec­
ture."^ The available evidence is thus not capable of in­
forming mankind how civil government started, how it is to 
be constructed, or how it is to function, Man must use his 
reason in determining how best to reach civil society's goal 
of temporal happiness, and then judge, by religious standards, 
whether tlie means are acceptable* This procedure is just an­
other way of saying that we can achieve happiness only through 
virtue, since religion will approve only right measures of 
conduct* Johnson always assumed that "the only uniform and 
perpetual course of publick happiness is publick virtue*"^
Thus it is that when he speaks of government and 
religion in a sermon written for John Taylor to deliver, 
he states that "the first duty • • * of a governor is to 
diffuse through the community a spirit of religion, to en­
deavour that a sense of the Divine Authority should prevail 
in all orders of men, and the laws should be obeyed, in 
subordination to the universal and unchangeable edicts of 
the Creator and Ruler of the W o r l d , ( I t a l i c s  mine* ) A
^Ibid*
Ssermon XXIV, IX, 510.
3lbid,, p* 513*
34
’’spirit”’ of religion and a ’•'sense” of the Divine Authority 
refer to inner states of men and not the external form of 
the one under which they live. Johnson knew that the outer 
form cannot confer upon government any assurance of stabil­
ity or virtue, since government exists only in the actions 
of the men who make it up. Hence, any attempt to form a 
government upon literal Christian doctrine cannot but fail, 
since Christian doctrine was meant for the inner state of all 
men, man in his feelings, attitudes, and relationship to 
his Maker, and not for the political structure of a specific 
nation or state. If Christian doctrine is misapplied in this 
manner it can lead to a disastrous Civil War such as Eng­
land endured, in which ’•laws were overruled, . . .  [ân^ 
rights were abolished,”
The usurpers gave way to other usurpers; the schis- 
maticks were thrust out by other schismaticks; the 
people felt nothing from .their masters but alternatives 
of oppression, and heard nothing from their teachers 
but varieties of errour.l ..
It was this knowledge of Civil War that led Johnson to be­
lieve that war
is one of the heaviest of national evils, a calamity in 
which every species of misery is i n v o l v e d . 2
Since religion provided no formula for the construc­
tion of the proper form of government, reason must be the 
guide in determining this proper form, with the utilitarian 
standard of the most happiness for the most people as its rule,
1Sermon XXIII, IX, 505.
^The Patriot. VI, 220.
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iv
 ̂ »Although Dr. Johnson refused to -set up a state of
nature and trace men’s emergence from it to the'blessings 
of civilized society as Hobbes and Locke didy he often used 
the contrast between the savagery of nature and security 
of civilization in discussing the value of government. His 
use of this contrast was for predominantly rhetorical pur­
poses; he was usually more concerned to persuade an audience 
than to erect a logical or philosophical structure of poli­
tics. Nor was Johnson normally referring to a remote age 
when he spoke of the dangers of the ”pretty state of equality”"̂ 
in which no government existed. For him, government was 
daily threatened by the forces of brutality and malignity.
The return to the chaos of ungoverned society was only one 
step away, that step consisting of prolonged disobedience on 
the part of citizens to their government. The practical 
facts^ dismissing such metaphysical notions as ’’'compacts”' 
and contractsy” were simply this: the state of nature from 
which man escaped into artifical society was- an ever pre­
sent potentiality that would become a reality the instant 
government failed.
As early as 1742 Johnson stated his belief about 
the ’’'natural state”' of man.
The Punishment of Wickedness, My Lords, is undoubtedly 
one of the essential parts of good Government, and in
^Life of Johnson, II,. 219,
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reality the Chief Purpose for: which Society is insti­
tuted; for how will that society in which any individ­
ual may be plundered, enslaved, and murdered without 
redress and without Punishment, differ from the State 
of Corrupt Nature, in which the strongest must be abso­
lute, and right and Power always the same.1
Unless men are checked and train.- nto patterns of civil­
ized living, they will resort to power and force to settle 
any dispute, to enforce any demand, or to satisfy any desire.
Were all distinctions Qx.e., different ranks in society 
abolished, the strongest would not long acquiesce, but 
would endeavour to obtain a superiority by their bodily
strength.  ̂ • . Were we all upon an equality, we should
have no other enjoyment than mere animal pleasure.2
In a non-political state,.then, where no government 
sets up law and rules for men to follow, and where no govern­
ment enforces by penal sanctions, unfortunately necessary, 
the moral prohibitions and admonitions of religion, there 
exists no safety or real freedom, i.e., freedom from anxiety
and freedom to live more or less as one chooses. In this state
there is no security, only confusion.
The great benefit of society is that the weak are pro­
tected against the strong. The great evil of confusion 
is.that the world is thrown into the hands, not of the 
best, but of the strongest; that all certainty of posses­
sion or acquisition is destroyed; that every main's care 
is confined to his own interest; amd that general negli­
gence of the general good makes way for general licen­tiousness.^
The state of nature which Johnson sets up often
1"Debates," XII, 513.
2Life of Johnson. I, 442.
^Sermon XXIII, IX, 504.
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results from the misuse of government, rather than from its 
absence. Since his concern was with practical government and 
its influence and since he distrusted speculative theories as 
a matter of course, Johnson naturally focussed his attention 
on the actual form of the civil state and the disastrous con­
dition which would arise from its abuse and deterioration.
The results of this mistreatment are two:
Nor have Communities suffered more, when they were ex­
posed to the passions and caprices of one man, however 
cruel, ambitious, or insolent, than when all restraint 
had been taken off the actions of men by public con­
fusions, and every one left at full liberty to indulge 
his own desires, and comply, without fear or punishment, 
with his wildest imaginations,1
The weakness or failure of government usually leads 
to anarchy, "this pretty state of equality" in which " men 
soon degenerate into brutes,"2 %n this condition the "end 
of all civil régulâtions"--which is "to secure private hap­
piness from private malignity; to keep individuals from the 
power of one another,"3--is defeated, and soon out of this 
confusion rises the stronger, and finally out of the 
stronger rises the strongest. In either case, no individual 
has any hope for security or happiness, for without govern­
ment the life of man is passed in either anarchy or tyranny, 
complete freedom or complete dependence.
Now anarchy, where every man may act as he pleases
J-Sermon XXIV, IX, 507.
^Life of Johnson, II, 219,
3ldler, No. 22, IV, 214.
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and take what he likes if his strength is sufficient, and tyr­
anny, where every man must act as a single man dictates, are 
conditions of life without security or safety. Without free­
dom from anxiety or concern, happiness is impossible.
Man is, for the most part, equally unhappy, when sub­
jected, without redress, to the passions of another, or 
left, without control, to the dominion of his own.l
Many men fool themselves into thinking that, while
all other men must be restrained from asserting themselves
at the expense of others, they are.capable of living above
the law, in accordance with only their own wishes:
. . .  all boys love liberty, till experience convinces 
them they are not so fit to govern themselves as they 
imagined. We are all agreed as to our own liberty ; 
we would have as much of it as we can get; but we are 
not agreed as to the liberty of others ; for in propor­
tion as we take, others must lose.2
This belief that only oneself is "fit to be set free
from the coercion of laws, and . . .  abandoned entirely to
his own c h o i c e , w o u l d  be practicable if
every man were wise and virtuous, capable to discern the 
best use of time, and resolute to practice it,4
In such a case, "it might.be granted, . • . without hesita­
tion, that total liberty would be a b l e s s i n g . J o h n s o n  was 
not, however, a believer in the perfectibility of man, either
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 507.
2ULfe of Johnson, III, 383.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 507,
4Adventurer, No. Ill, IV, 106.
^Ibid.
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with or without institutions:
No man thinks laws unnecessary for others; and no man, 
if he considers his own inherent frailty, can justly 
think them unnecessary for himself.1
If, therefore, man cannot be happy when he is a 
possible prey to all men stronger than he or to one man more 
powerful than all others, then, some institution must be 
created which will protect him from other men. This pro- 
.tection can make possible the achie\enent of at least some 
happiness.
While mankind continued in the state of gross barbarity 
in which all were eager to do wrong and all unwilling 
to suffer, it is apparent that every man’s fear would 
be greater than his hope; for an individual, thinking 
himself at lib'erty to act merely for his own interest, 
would consider every other individual as his enemy who 
acted only by the same principle. When they came to 
deliberate how they should escape what many had felt 
and all dreaded, they would soon find that safety was 
only to_be-obtained by setting interest on the side of 
innocence, by such a scheme of regulation as should give 
every man a prospect of living more happily by forbear­
ing than by usurping the property of another, and which 
should repress the passions of anger and revenge by 
making their gratification the cause of immediate m i s e r y . 2
In. this way government erected ’’penal laws” to make 
•*’every man’s danger . . .  every man’s safety,.”" so that,
’’though all are restrained; yet all are benefited•”'3 The 
basic function of government is then the protection of the 
individual from those more powerful than he. By thus pro­
viding a fundamental liberty for the individual (hedged as
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 515.
2”Vinerian Lectures,” pp. 109-10.
3Sermon XXIV, IX, 507.
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I will point out later by what Greene calls ’*Tory quali­
fications'*) , government also provides for the happiness of 
the whole society*
When Johnson writes that
Society implies in its nature an interest common to 
many individuals, a pursuit of the highest degree of 
happiness that can be obtained and enjoyed by any num­
ber y great or small, which that society comprises,^
his point is that the happiness of society can be assured
and achieved, if at ally only by attention to each individual
who maJkes up that society* This attention should be devoted
mainly to protecting the individual from attacks by others,
for this basic protection which only government can provide
is probably the one essential condition for man's happiness*
Government is, therefore, necessary, in the opinion 
of every one y to the safety of particular njen, and the 
happiness of society*2
V
If government is essential to the happiness of
mankindy then it must be invested with power to protect and
to maintain itself, and to fulfill its function of providing
the security necessary for men to achieve happiness*
To the happiness of the whole, it will be frequently 
necessary to sacrifice the happiness of a part, and as 
no man is naturally willing that his happiness should 
be diminished to increase another's, or that the profit 
should be divided among many when the labor or the danger 
is all his own, it is apparent that some public authority
l'*Vinerian Lectures,'* p. 83.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 507.
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must be necessary to overrule single opinion or private 
interest.^
Thus, government must enforce its demands upon those unwill­
ing to contribute their, necessary share to the general happi­
ness.
Such curtailment of individual liberty is bound to
be distasteful to some aoid to raise an argument like this
against the authority of government:
Liberty is the birthright of man, and where obedience 
is compelled, there is no liberty.2
Johnson* s answer is equally short.
Government is necessary to man, and where obedience 
is not compelled,, there is no government.^
It is by limiting the prerogatives--the liberty--of others
that a share of liberty for all can be assured. If some men
refuse to give up voluntarily some of their liberty, then
they must be deprived of it by force for the sake of the
whole; otherwise, government becomes ineffectual and anarchy
follows.
Recognizing this fact, every ’*"new society”" has re­
course to what Johnson calls ”the unwritten law of social 
nature, . . .  the great auid pregnant principle of political 
necessity," which states that "all government supposes sub­
jects , all aithority implies obedience., To suppose in one
^"Vinerian Lectures,” p. 83.
^Taxation No Tyranny, VI, 257.
^Ibid.
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the right to command what another has the right to refuse, 
is absurd and contradictory
The basis of all political unions, consequently,, 
must ultimately rest in power* This power need not emd should 
not be utilized simply because it is there* Even when govern­
ment is threatened by ”̂ open defiance,,”'— as it was for example 
by the poor who had become desparate by the scarcity of corn 
at one period in England-—the ”^necessity of ruling by immedi­
ate force” can only be called ”bne of the greatest of politi­
cal e v i l s . Y e t  evil as it is to rule by force, it is none­
theless better to do so than through negligence to permit 
mob ruley which is in reality only the shifting of power frpm 
a constituted authority, government, to an unconstituted 
one, the mob* For
There must, in every society, be some power or other, 
from which there is no appeal, which admits no restric­
tions, which pervades the whole mass of the community, 
regulates and adjusts all subordination, enacts laws or 
repeals them, erects or amnuls judicatures, extends or 
contracts privileges, exempt itself from question or con­
trol, and bounded only by physical necessity*3
Johnson does not deny that this power can be abused, 
for it is, after all, given to men who suffer certeuln inevit­
able imperfections. As he noted early in his career, ’•’every 
man that has the Power of Action, may sometimes act ill.”4
^False Alarm, VI, 161.
Considerations on the Corn Laws, V, 322*
% ‘axation No Tyranny, VI, 234*
4 M D e b a t e s X I I ,  234*
43
But even if this power •*'is not infallible, for it may do 
wrong, . . .  it is irresistible, for it can be resisted only 
by rebellion, by an act which makes it questionable, what 
shall be thenceforward the supreme power.”!.
When Johnson says, ”In sovereignty there are no 
gradations,'^ he is defining the term, not advocating an 
authoritarian form of government: sovereignty can reside in 
any established government, just as it can reside in a mob, 
a tyrant, or an army. Hence, it is better, in the long run, 
to locate and maintain this sovereignty in a government that 
has grown up through long generations and has been accepted 
by the people, than to shift power from one group to another . 
and cause a great deal of insecurity and distress by the en­
suing uncertainty as to where rule and authority are to be 
located. Thus Johnson can say:
If the subject refuses to obey, it is the duty of auth­
ority to use compulsion. Society cannot subsist but 
by the power, first of making laws, and then of enforcingthem.2
In another context Johnson makes clearer.the danger to the 
existence of government end the necessity for the use of 
power .
Laws which cannot be enforced can neither prevent 
nor rectify disorders* A sentence which cannot be ex­
ecuted can have no power to warn or to r e f o r m . ”3
^Taxation No Tyranny, VI, 235.
Zibid., p. 257.
3palse Alarm, VI, 162.
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Without power, government cannot perform its duty of pro­
tecting the weak from the strong; once government is only 
nominal,, it is for all practical purposes nonexistent»
Hence, if any government is to exist and function it must be 
"tiltimately and essentially absolute,although the people 
can, if necessary, destroy it by denying by force its abso­
luteness .
if civil society is in reality based upon power-- 
authority of a few men over mainy--then society must by its 
nature consist of a graded series in which some are superior 
to others.
Political society is that state of man in which some 
govern and others are governed; it therefore necessarily 
implies subordination, and ranks those of which it is 
composed in different degrees.2
Without this kind of subordination there would be no clearly
drawn lines to guide men in their duties and prevent them
from clashing over precedent'and possession.
"Thus, Sir [Boswell reports Johnson as saying, there 
would be a perpetual struggle for precedence, were 
there no fixed invariable rules for the distinction of 
• rank. . . ."'3 ,
Since these "Pontentions for ' superiority"’ are '*Very
dangerous" to society
mankind, this is to say, all civilized nations, have 
settled it [precedenc^upon a plain invariable principle.
^Taxation Tyranny, VI, 234.
2itvinerian Lectures," p. 102.
3^Life of Johnson, I, 448.
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A man is born to -hereditary rank; or his being appointed 
to certain offices, gives him a certain rank.1
Although rank and position thus gained generally **crea.tâ J.
no jealousy, as • • • ^hey ar0 allowed to be accidental,”2
there is still bound to be some unhappiness and misery at
simply being in an inferior station. This misery is actually
the price paid for the advantages of civilized society; it
is the cost of subordination,
, , . it is better that some should be unhappy, than 
that none should be happy, which would be the case in 
a general state of equality,3
Without this subordination,
all would be losers. . . .  We would have no intellectual 
improvement. All intellectual improvement arisses from 
leisure: all leisure arises from one working for aaiother.4
While this leisure cannot be obtained without subordination, 
it is equally true that it cannot be enjoyed or used without 
the same subordination, since "^order cannot be had but by 
subordination,”"5 and without order society cannot exist.
Johnson did not believe that this necessary subor­
dination was an artificial condition imposed upon man* s 
natural equality.
So far is it from being true that men are naturally 
equal, that no two people can be half an hour together, 
but one shall acquire an evident superiority over the
 ̂ other.6
J-Ibid., p. 442. 2ibid., p. 448.
3ibid., Ill, 2b. 4ibid., II, 219.
Sibid., Ill, 383. 6ibid.. II, 13.
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Men are simply not naturally equal on this earth. If one 
measures not by physical, intellectual, or social standards^ 
but by religious standards^ all men are equal since all men 
possess an incorruptible soul. But for the practical purpose 
of running society efficiently, this equality of spirit must 
give way to the subordination of men by talent, rank., or 
position. In this temporal sphere the easily ascertainable 
truth is that ""mankind were never all equally wise or equally 
powerful»,"'^ Thus subordination is an actual condition of life 
and not an artificial one created by society.
The need for subordination and the inability of man to
live, as it were, reasonably, adjusting his needs to the
general good, arises from the individual temperament of men.
This same contrariety of impulse [as seen in the force 
which keeps the planets in their orbit^may be perhaps 
discovered in the motions of men: we are formed for soc­
iety, not for combination; we are equally unqualified to 
live in close connexion with our fellow-beings, and in 
total separation from them; we are attract *d towards 
each other by general sympathy, but kept back from con­
tact by private interest.2
Johnson*s insistence on subordination^ stemming from
his observation of the contradictory nature of man, is based
finally on practical reasons.
Nothing is more evident from daily experience tham that 
in every undertaking in which many are employed there 
must be one presiding and superintendent mind. Some will
^"Vinerian Lectures,"" p. 115.
^Adventurer* No. 45, IV, 18.
3**vinerian Lectures,’* p. 83.
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waoit diligence and some skill; and men equally skillful 
and equally diligent, if they are all left to their own 
direction, will counteract one another.^
Johnson's refusal to compose a treatise setting forth 
his political philosophy can thus be traced, at least in 
part, to his skepticism about the value of such speculation. 
While recognizing this skepticism, one can still uncover in , 
Johnson's work a definite attitude toward government: 1) it 
is absolutely necessary for the protection of society's 
peace and security; 2) it is capable of assuming any number 
of acceptable forms, so long as it does not violate the 
standards and principles of religion. To insure the first 
condition, men must give power and obedience to government; 
to guarantee the second, they should never forget that 
political acts and measures must always play a subordinate 




J o h n s o n o n l y  play, Irene, was performed at the 
Drury Lane Theatre in February of 1749 and ran, thanks more 
to Garrick the manager than to the intrinsic value of the 
playy for nine nights. It had been composed much earlier than 
1749. Of Johnson’s longer and more important works it is 
the earliest ; according to the editors of his poetry, the 
’’’completion and revision of the play • • • can be assigned
to the spring and summer of 1737.’*'̂ He was at this time 
twenty—eight and was still in the ’’'youth of terrific storm and 
stress’”̂  that Bertrand Bronson believes strongly influenced 
his treatment of the Irene story.^ He was also just starting 
his long and arduous career as a man of letters in London, 
which began by his doing mainly hack work for Edward Cave^ 
editor and publisher of the Gentleman’s Magazine, and
T̂he Poems of Samuel Johnson, ed* David Nichol Smith 
and Edward L. McAdam (Oxford: The Clarendon ^resSy 1941), 
p. 239.
2feertrand Bronson, Johnson Agonistes and Other Essays 
(Cambridge: The University PresSy 1946)y p. 128.
3cf. Sectionlll, ’’•Johnson’s Irene,” in Bronson, ibid.
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publishing, separately such strongly political works as London, 
Marmor Norfolciense, and Vindication of the Licensers. John­
son* s writings were never again so^involved and saturated 
with political matters as they were from 1737 to 1744, the 
year he stopped composing the "Lilliputian Debates’* for the 
Gentleman ’ s Magaz-ine. The beliefs and ideas expressed in 
Irene-were to be tested through the next seven years by 
close and extensive involvement in the day to day political 
life of London. That many of them proved valid, as it appears 
to me they did, is a tribute to Johnson’s clear insight into
»
the workings of the political animal; yet it is not too sur­
prising, since the activity of the po-litical animal, as was 
noted earlier, is only the ’’conduct of immoral men in public 
affairs.” ^
Even though Irene was written before Johnson’s im­
mersion in the agitated political waters of London of the 
late 1730’s and early 1740’s, and even though its political 
attitudes did not directly arise from observations of a 
large variety of men deeply engaged in politics, there was 
still an environmental force that was pushing him towards 
specific political considerations of society. As Bronson notes,
. . .  the eight or ten years vdiich preceded the compo­
sition of Irene must in many ways have been the most
difficult years of his life. Everything in him was in
ferment. His poverty, under the conditions of that
time and place^ was necessarily a matter of profound 
concern, forcing fundaanental consideration of the structure
iReview of Free Enquiry, VI, 74.
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of society* His father died in that period, and Johnson, 
upon receiving the f20 which was his from the effects^
wrote • • • ”T now therefore see that I must maJce my
own fortune. Mean while, let me take care that the powers 
of my mind may not be debilitated by poverty, and that 
indigence do not force me into any criminal act.^
The distress about his own place in society and his concern 
for the future forced him to observe and inspect the nature 
and methods of men as they made their way in the world. And 
even at this early date, Johnson's great respect for the law, 
and the concomitant need for submission to it-r-a fundamental 
premise of his political theory— is expressed in his fear 
lest indigence force him to break the laws that bind men to­
gether in political union.
Johnson took his story from The Generali Historié of 
the Turkes, by Richard Knolles. The story is different in
this work from the form in which it appears in Johnson’s
play. In Knolles, Irene, a beautiful Greek, was taken cap­
tive at the sack of Constantinople in 1453 and was given to 
Sultan Mahomet II y who immediately fell in love with her.
He neglected his empire until a general discontent threatened 
his throne and forced him to make a drastic decision. Calling 
together all his military and diplomatic advisers y Maihomet 
let Irene come into their midst, where he asked of them 
whether they, too, would not neglect an empire for her. Struck 
by Irene’s beauty, they all answered yes, whereupon Mahomet 
drew his “"falchion, . . .  at one blow strucke off her
^Bronson, Johnson Agonistes, p. 129.
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head, to the great terror of them all."2 in this manner did 
Mahomet prove he could control his passions as a true leader 
of the faith should do.
Johnson changed the story considerably. In his play, 
Irene and another beautiful Greek, Aspasia, have both been 
captured at the sack. Although Mahomet is first infatuated 
with Aspasia, he transfers his attention to Irene when she is 
brought to him* Aspasia has refused to marry Mahomet and be­
come apostate; her life is saved by Irene, who, as the .center 
of the play, waivers between accepting the offer of Mahomet 
to be the Queen of Turkey or remaining true to her Christian 
faith.
Cali Bassa, the chief courtier of Mahomet, whom 
Johnson, despising the type, describes as "The Vet'ran 
Courtier/ . . .  That of-̂ ' had practis'd Fraud, and oft' de­
tected, "1 fears that Mahomet intends to murder him. Cali 
had been responsible earlier for the return of Amurath, Mah­
omet's father, to the throne after some years of retirement, 
which return deprived Mahomet of this power and left him 
with a bitter hatred of Cali. Cali plots with two Greek 
heroes, Demetrius and Leontius, who had escaped captivity 
by disguising themselves in Turkish robes, to assassinate 
Mahomet in Irene's chambers. After the assassination, they 
plan to flee to the coast of Asia, where Cali Bassa hopes
^Samuel Johnson, Irene, I, ii, 131-32, in Smith-McAdam, 
All further citations from Irene will be taken from this 
edition of the Poems.
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to set up a separate state and free the Greeks from Turkish 
rule.
Involved in the conspiracy is Ahdalla, a disgruntled 
Turkish captain, who feels Mahomet has slighted him. Through 
some plot machinations, the assassination attempt fails, but, 
by what.is implied as Heaven’s intervention, Irene is impli­
cated in the attempt and executed by Mahomet’s orders. Deme­
trius and Aspasia escape in the general confusion and Mahomet, 
when he finds,that Irene was really innocent and had in fact 
attempted to save him and trap the plotters, decides to re­
nounce his throne and retire forever from public life.
Irene’s death is attributable to ’’poetic justice,” since she 
had rejected her own Christian faith, in contrast to Aspasia 
who remained virtuous, and through her rejection and death 
she provides the tragic element of this play.
This brief summary of the plot fails to do justice to 
the symmetrical structure of the play, attained mainly by the 
pairing of the characters. Irene, the apostate, contrasts 
with Aspasia, the faithful; Abdalla, the disgruntled captain, 
with Hasan and Caraza, the loyal captains; Cali Bassa, the 
traitorous minister, with Mustapha, the loyal general; and 
Aspasia and Demetrius, the faithful lovers, with Mahomet and 
Irene, the base lovers. The balance and antithesis of char­
acter was used by Johnson to drive home the truth or moral of 
the play: failure to maintain religious faith can lead only 
to destruction. The play is thus, as the editors call it.
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"a drama of the struggle between virtue and w e a k n e s s , b u t  
Johnson, in his concern with the moral, failed to give any 
kind of life to the characters who must embody that moral.
For the purposes of embodying in some kind.of concrete 
form the abstract ideas of his political philosophy,-however, 
Irene is not seriously damaged by its artistic weakness. The 
play presents characters whose actions are susceptible of 
general application in the political world and who therefore 
illustrate or exemplify more substantially than his essays, 
pamphlets, reviews, or criticism, Johnson's political beliefs. 
A study of the play pointing out the kind of situation con­
taining within it an element of Johnson's political thought 
gives a dimension to that thought which an abstract formula­
tion cannot give. It is, in a sense, doing to Johnson's poli­
tical theory what Johnson often insisted be done to any 
theory: test its validity by its performance in the empirical 
reality of men's lives. This kind of particularization also 
helps to place Johnson in the various intellectual movements 
of his day, since it presents in minature an important inci­
dent in the experience of man; Johnson's observation and em­
phasis of what is important in the incident; and, finally, 
the generalization that he drew from his observation. Seeing 
this process clearly can clarify Johnson's specific position 
within or without such movements of his own day as Deism, 
Primitivism, Sentimentalism, and so forth. In brief, a study
^mith-McAdaa, p. 234.
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of this kind can lead to Johnson's deepest beliefs about 
man and nature®
ii
Scene seven of Act P“our consists of a soliloquy by
- '
Mahomet after he has just persuaded Irene to abandon her
Christian faith and become his wife* Immediately after he
announces Irene's capitulation, Cali Bassa, whom Mahomet now
knows to be a traitor, professes great happiness at his
future and vows his fidelity to the throne. As.Cali leaves,.
Mahomet sends his general, Mustapha, to find the men who have
been spying on Cali Bassa* Left aloney Mahomet speaks *
Whome'er the Hope, still blasted, still renew'd.
Of Happiness, lures on from Toil to Toil,.
Remember Mahomet, and cease thy Labour*
Behold him here, in Love, in War successfuly. 
Behold him wretched in his double Triumph ;
His Fav'rite faithless, and his Mistress base* 
Ambition only gave her to my Armsy 
By Reason Not convinc'd^ nor won by Love*
Ambition was her Crime, but meaner Folly 
Dooms me to loath at once, arid doat on Falshood, 
And idolize th' Apostate I contemn*
If thou are more than the gay Dream of Fancyy 
More than a pleasing Sound without a Meaning^.
O HappinessI sure thou art all Aspasia's*
(1-14)
This apostrophe to blasted happiness states one of the main 
themes of the play, a theme which is related closely to a 
distinction Johnson makes in his political theory between the 
respective search for happiness through religion and through 
politicsr religion attempts to attain eternal happinessj 
government attempts to achieve temporal happiness* Johnson 
thought any number of differing forms of government could
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maintad-n order and stability within a given society and 
assure a minimum protection to its citizens. This protective 
function of government was its primary one, and was the most 
it could dp in providing happiness. The recognition of this 
limitation was important, as it saved men from making fools 
of themselves^ in political affairs and by reminding them of 
the danger of losing those gains by a ’♦Lust for Innovation,*"^ 
Johnson’s description of that desire to find happiness by 
changing forms of government. Change in itself was to be 
mistrusted, since the limitation of government was often 
overlooked .through ignorance or naivete, by those advocating 
the,change.
Only religion could lead to the enduring happiness 
sought by all men. And religion could promise this happiness 
only after death. Hence, only a life of virtue, a life 
guided by religion, was capable of achieving eternal happi­
ness. As far as temporal happiness was concerned, any meas­
ure not violating the standards of religion, any political 
gesture or movement, was allowable if it helped man attain 
happiness or avoid misery. But the two kinds of happiness 
must be kept ̂ distinct, and the less important one--temporal 
happiness— must not be allowed to usurp the importance and 
attention due eternal happiness. Thus although Johnson's 
concept of the state was hedonistic and utilitarian, it was 
still justified and subsumed under a Christian order.
Irene exemplifies in her actions in the play the
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temptations to confuse the two kinds of happiness and invert 
their order of importance. The temptations of Irene to apos­
tasy, to an abandonment of the true meams to happiness, are 
couched in terms of earthly, that is, political happiness.
Irene recognizes this herself when she begs Aspasia, who 
makes the proper .distinction^between the value of the two 
kinds of happiness, to help her as she fights these tempta­
tions,
Irene. Aspasia, yet pursue the sacred theme;
Exhaust the stores of pious Eloquence,
And teach me to repel1 the Sultan’s Passion.
Still at Aspasia’s Voice a sudden Rapture 
Exalts my Soul, and fortifies my Heart.
The glitt’ring Vanities of empty Greatness,
The Hopes and Fears, the Joys and Pains of Life, 
Dissolve in Air, and varnish into Nothing,
(II,-i,l-8)
Mahomet, when he tempts Irene, speaks of the pleasures
of authority and power, for Johnson the twin pillars of all
political structures.
Wilt thou descend, fair Daughter of Perfection,
To hear my Vows, and give Mankind a Queen?
AhI cease, Irene, cease those flowing Sorrows,
That melt a Heart, impregnable till now.
And turn thy thoughts henceforth to Love and Empire.
• How will the matchless Beauties of Irene,
Thus bright in Tears,.thus amiable in Ruin,
With all the graceful Pride of Greatness heighten’d. 
Amidst the Blaze of Jewels and of Gold,
Adorn a Throne, and dignify Dominion,
(II,vii,l-10)
A little later, Mahomet succeeds in breaking Irene’s resolve 
by describing in explicit terms the benefits and happiness 
she will be capable of bestowing through the possession of
the political power that she will possess as his Queen.
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Will it not charm a Mind like thine exalted.
To shine the Goddess of applauding Nations,
To scatter Happiness and Plenty round thee.
To bid the prostrate Captive rise and live.
To see new Cities tow’r at thy Command,
And blasted Kingdoms flourish at thy Smile?
(II,vii,67-72)
The power to obtain temporal happiness for mankind is very 
appealing to Irene, much as Cornus's arguments about the beauty 
and virtue of following natural desires are meant to be to the 
Lady in Milton's masque. But in both cases the appeal is 
specious, arid indicates a weakness or aberration on the part 
of the tempter in failing to see that this kind of happiness, 
attained through political means in one and sensual in the 
other, is neither enduring nor intrinsically vital. In the 
soliloquy quoted earlier, Mahomet bitterly recognizes the 
hollow foundation upon which this kind of happiness is laid, 
but, pagan that he is, he cannot change, and suffers the 
misery at the end of the play that is the fate of those who 
place temporal happiness ahead of eternal. His fault is not 
that he values temporal' happiness, but that he overestimates 
the ^ount of it available on earth and ignores the meauis of 
eternal happiness--the life of virtue.
Irene resorts to the ssune argument that Mahpmet used 
when she attempts a halfhearted justification of accepting 
the Crown.
Irene. OJ did Irene shine the &ieen of Turkey,
No more should Greece lament those Prayers rejected, 
Again should golden Splendour grace her Cities, 
Again her prostrate Palaces should rise.
Again her Temples sound with Holy Musick:
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No more should Danger fright, or Want distress 
The smiling Widows,, and protected Orphans*
(III,viii,51-57)
Irene is setting up the temporal happiness that she can 
create when she is Queen in opposition to and as more impor­
tant than the eternal happiness which she will lose in apos­
tasy. Johnson*s point is that while the protection and re­
lief of widows and orphans are both good and important goals, 
to achieve them requires action in the political world. This 
action, while it is not dictated specifically in any one 
form, must be sanctioned by religion. Aspasia uses this ar­
gument in her attempts to dissuade Irene.
Be virtuous Ends pursued by virtuous Means,
Nor think th * Intention sanctifies the Deed:
That Maxim publish’d in an Impious Age,
Would loose the wild Enthusiast to destroy.
And fix the fierce Usurper * s bloody Title.
Then Bigo. try might send her Slaves to War,
And bid Success become the Test of Truth;
Unpitying Massacre might waste the World,
And Persecution boast the Call of Heaven.
(III,viii,58-66)
An important element of Johnson’s political theory 
which will b^iscussed in the next chapter is involved here. 
Briefly stated, this idea is the following: Johnson believed 
a certain amount of competition and strife among men in 
civil society was inevitable, since the prizes were few but 
the contestants many in life. His fear was not, however, of 
competition— his own indulgence in conversational contests 
indicates a healthy love for it— but for the unlawful means 
men might resort to in order to attain the prizes. By 
refusing to strive within the sanctioned forms of competition
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for wealth, honor, and position, man broke the laws of society 
and caused strife and dissension within it. This kind of • 
unlawful strife generally arose from several sources, one of 
which was the use of unlawful means to attain lawful ends. 
Johnson’s point is voiced through Aspasia’s warning to Irene, 
whose failure to heed the warning results not in the achiev- 
ment of temporal happiness for herself and suffering Greece, 
but in her own death. This kind of personal disaster has 
its equivalent in the disorders in the state when unlawful 
means are used to gain beneficial ends.
Donald Greene says, speaking of the effects upon
Johnson of the destruction of his home town Lichfield during
the "Civil War , that
At the bottom of Johnson’s political thinking . . .  there 
would always have been a vivid awareness of the events 
of 1640 to 1660.
If he is correct, then the strife that Johnson fears will 
destroy the order and security of civil society is the kind 
that swept over England during the Civil War. Although John- 
did not indiscriminately condemn all Puritans, he was critical 
of the passion of that movement which sent it over the boun­
daries of law into the most extreme form of unlawful strife--* 
civil war. It aroused in him, quite possibly,
an indignation at wanton destruction by narrow-minded 
doctrinaires of memorials of the continuity of the human 
intellect ^he Cathedral at Lichfiel^» & healthy fear of
^The Politics of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960X7 P» 27.
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the crueltyy anarchy, and eventually despotism entailed 
by violent subversion of the civil order.^
Thus the kind of decision meditated upon by-Irene and 
rationalized by her through the old argument of the end 
justifying the means is an embodiment of the same idea that 
appears: in the political beliefs of Johnson when he points 
out the dagger to society of the actions of men operating 
under the sane slogan of the end justifying the means.
The mistake made by Irene when she surrenders to 
Mhhomet* s pleadings, and by the Puritans quite possibly, is 
a failure to distinguish between the relative importance of 
temporal and eternal happiness and the means to each* For 
neither Irene, nor Puritans would have resorted to such de­
structive methods in the political world had they remembered 
the limitations of the government in securing the felicities 
of life*
Mahomet and Cali Bassa are led astray through a similar 
confusion* Each in his own way is mistakenly pursuing a 
happiness by political means which only religion attaiins fin­
ally* From the first meeting in the play between Cali Bassa 
and Mahomet, the distinction Johnson draws between religion 
and government in their respective pursuits can be illustrated 
especially clearly, since in this meeting there is a specific 
conflict of religion and political intentions*
Cali Bassa*s plan is to assassinate Mahomet in the
^Ibid*. p. 33.
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chambers of Irene and. then flee to the coast of Asia, "Which 
lately bless'd my gentle Government." (I,ii,75) With the 
Sultan dead, these coastal people would follow Cali Bassa in 
fighting the Turks and in this way Constantinople would be 
freed. The need for a ship to carry him to freedom prompts 
Cali Bassa to take Demetrius and Leontius into the plot, along 
with a hundred loyal Greeks to man the ship. In order to 
calm any suspicions about the ship, loaded with supplies 
and fully manned, Cali Bassa intends to ask Mahomet for per­
mission to make his pilgrimage to Mecca in it. "Which granted, 
hides my Purpose from the World,/ And, though refus'd, con­
ceals it from the Sultan." (I,ii,88-89)
Cali Bassa first reveals his complete absorption with 
temporal happiness in his secret meeting with Demetrius and 
Leontius. They are eager to attempt the assassination and 
free their country from the despot Mahomet. Cali Bassa ex­
plains that Mahomet spends most of his time in Irene's apart­
ment trying to persuade her to abandon her religion and 
accept his Crown.
Cali. In her Apartments
He lives—-
Leon. And there must fall.
Cali. But yet th' Attempt
Is hazardous.
Leon. Forbear to speak of Hazaxds,
What has the Wretch that has survived his Country, 




In the word “'Life’* Cali sums up his total absorption in his 
earthly destiny and his total preoccupation in the means of 
attaining his goal, regardless of the morality or ethicality 
of those means. Because the cause is just and the methods 
proposed to achieve freedom legitinratey Leontius is willing 
to hazard his life without hesitation. Life, in other words, 
for Leontius is not important unless it is used and lived 
properly. For Cali Bassa, life is the only important thing, 
and. therefore justifies any means of prolonging it and creating 
for it all possible pleasure;
Demetrius immediately contradicts Cali Bassa in his
assertion of the value of temporal good.
The inestimable Privilege of BreathingI
Important Hazard! Whatf s that airy Bubble
When weigh’d with Greece, with Virtue and Aspasia?
A floating Atom, Dust that falls unheeded 
Into the adverse Scale, nor shakes the Balaince.
(Iyii,136-140)
Cali’s fear and desire drive him; Demetrius and Leontius 
wish to achieve happiness for their country and rid it of 
the misery of a conquered state, but their cause is just 
because it is sanctioned by a code higher than the purely 
hedonistic one of Cali Bassa. For had Cali some standard 
based on the distinction between earthly and **divine“ happi­
ness, some code that originated in religion, although it 
operated in civil life, he probably would not have become a 
traitor nor would he need fear at the present time for his 
life.
After dismissing the two Greek consipators, Cali
63
Bassa meets Mahomet* Mahomet assigns him to guard Irene in
an adjoining palace, since
Sure, chill'd with sixty winter camps, thy Blood 
At sight of female Charms will glow no more.
(I,v,5-6)
This comment, probably though unintentionally the best 
lines in the whole play, elicits from Cali Bassa an ironic 
answer.
These Years, unconquer'd Mahomet, demand 
Desires more pure, and other Cares than Love.
Long have I wish'd, before our Prophet's Tomb,
To pour my Prayers for thy successful Reign,
To quit the Tumults of the noisy Ceu^,
And sink into the silent Grave in Peace.
(I,V,7-12)
The irony here resides in the duplicity of the answer. For 
what Cali Bassa is saying the audience knows to be untrue, 
and hence understands "Desires more pure" to mean Cali 
Bassa's desire for his own safety and his own throne in Asia,
and not a wish to lead a virtuous life by following the in­
structions of religion in contrast to the urgings of the 
sensual life. The irony is emphasized by the true appropri­
ateness of the lines. Cali Bassa should, as his life nears
its end, be deeply concerned with his fate in the next world.
He should have "other loves" than those which motivate his
treason. But, unlike Demetrius and Leontius, Cali Bassa fails 
to distinguish between the permissible methods in the political 
sphere and the essential measures in the religious.
Cali Bassa* s failure in this respect is one of will", 
not of knowledge. Even though he is a pagan, he is still a
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mam, and in the eighteenth century all men were thought alike 
in one respect--their reason. By reason they could discover 
certain universal truths. In a future chapter, I will point 
out that Johnson did not believe in the transcendent power 
of reason as did the followers of certain intellectual move­
ments of his age. He did, however, madce it a tremendously
important faculty, since it led men to religion and, under
■ ■ . '
religion’s tutelage, helped them in their journey through 
life. In a soliloquy, Cali Bassa-expresses a universal truth- 
which his reason has discovered and which should, if acted 
upon by his will, deflect him from his traitorous and dis­
astrous path.
How Heav’n in Scorn of human Arrogance,
Commits to trivial Chance the Fate of Nations I 
While with incessant Thought laborious Man 
Extends his mighty Schemes of Wealth and Pow’r,
And tow’rs and triumphs in ideal Greatness;
Some accidental Gust, of Opposition
Blasts all the Beautiçs of his new Creation,
Oerturns the Fabrick of presumptions Reason,
And whelms the swelling Architect beneath it.
(II,iii,l-9)
This passage shows that Cali Bassa is aware of the transitory 
nature of all human endeavours, especially those plans for 
achieving enduring happiness on earth. Had he utilized this 
knowledge in his actions toward Mahomet, instead of ignoring 
it in his drive for safety and power, he would not have come 
to what Johnson considered the inevitable destruction of such- 
unlawful actions. His failure to do so is also an illustration 
of the distrust of reason and the necessity for law which are
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important elements in Johnson’s basic political beliefs.^ 
Reason, even in a pagan, can advise man what is the proper 
course of action, but it cannot insure that he will follow it.
Mahomet's answer, his refusal of Cali Bassa's request,
illustrates a corresponding confusion of values, although the
explanation of the confusion involves different motives on
the part of the two men. Mahomet tells Cali Bassa that now
is not the time- to think of peace and retirement.
WhatI think of Peace while haughty Scanderbeg 
Elate with Conquest, in his native Mountains,
Prowls o'er the wealthy Spoils of bleeding Turkey?
(I,v,13-15)
When Cali Bassa tries to object by pointing out that "This 
pilgrimage our Lawgiver ordain'd--" (I,v,23) Mahomet vehe­
mently answers:
For those who could not please by nobler Service.-- 
Our warlike Prophet loves an active Faith,
The holy Flame of enterprxzing Virtue,
Mocks the dull Vows of Solitude and Penance,
And scorns the lazy Hermit's cheap Devotion;
Shine thou distinguished by superior Merit,
With wonted Zeal pursue the Task of War,
Till every Nation reverence the Koran,
And ev'ry Suppliamt lift his Eyes to Mecca.
(I,V,24-32)
Mahomet's answer is interesting not only for the light 
it casts upon his own character, but as an expression of an 
attitude of religious imperialism, so to speak, which Johnson 
detested throughout his life. A few years prior to his com­
pletion of the script of Irene# Johnson composed his first
^These points will be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter Six.
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published work, an.abridgment and translation of Father Jerome
Lobo’s Voyage to Abyssinia, for which he also provided a
'•Preface.” Mahomet•s interpretation of his religion in terms
of an "active Faith" and his desire to propagate it by the
sword finds a parallel in the Portuguese Jesuits' attempt to
do the same thing in Abyssinia. Johnson condemns this attempt
in his "Preface" and praises Lobo
for having dared so freely, in the midst of France, to 
declare his disapprobation of the patriarch Oviedo's 
sanguinary zeal, who was continually importuning the 
Portuguese to beat up their drums for missionaries who 
might preach the gospel with swords in their hands, and 
propagate, by desolation and slaughter, the true worship 
of the God of peace.1
Johnson's intense dislike for colonization will be 
taken up later, but his attitude towards it is incorporated 
in Cali Bassa's next speech and is interesting as an example 
of a belief that Johnson arrived at early and kept all his 
life. He thought that colonization actually weakened and 
ended finally in misery and apathy in the mother country.
Cali Bassa's answer to Maihomet's desire to colonize the world 
is motivated by his desire for Mahomet to grant his specious 
request to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, but despite the moti­
vation, his answer embodies the saone reasoning as Johnson's 
own when he discussed the effects of colonization on Spain.
This Regal Confidence, this pious Ardour,
Let Prudence moderate, though not suppress.
Is not each Realm that smiles with kinder Suns,
Or boasts a happier Soil, already Thine?
^"Preface" to the translation of Father Lobo's Voyage 
to Abyssinia, V, 256.
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Extended Empire, like expanded Gold,
Exchanges solid Strength for feeble Splendor.
(I,V,33-38)
The simile of beaten gold embodies tbe same idea of. a. wide
area encompassed but encompassed without depth or strength
as the phrase "Bulk without Strength*’ that Johnson was
later to use in the Debates to describe the debilitating power
of colonization. Colonies give only the appearance of power,
whereas in reality they actually weaken a. country. But Cali
Bassa’s point here is disregarded by the Mahomet, who has
made of glory and honor the only means to happiness.
Preach thy dull Politics to vulgar Kings,
Thou know’st not yet thy Master’s future Greatness, 
His vast Designs, his Plans of boundless Power.
When ev’ry Storm in my Domain shall roar,
When ev’ry Wave shall beat a Turkish Sliore,
Then, Cali, shall the Toils of Battle cease.
Then dream of Prayer, and Pilgrimage, and Peace.
(I,V,39-46)
Mahomet's intention is to achieve through conquest 
the highest position eumong men and by achieving this great­
ness, attain perfect happiness. But through a misinterpreta­
tion of Cali Bassa’s dying confession that ’’Irene’s Chamber,/ 
Jwa^ The Place appointed for his Master’s Death," (V,viii,29 
-30) Mahomet has Irene executed. The irony involved in this 
execution arises from the actual faithfulness of Irene and her 
attempts to betray Aspasia and Demetrius after the failure 
of the assassination, when they try to persuade her to leave
with them. Irene had sent her messenger, Murza, to tell
Mahomet of the escape attempt of Aspasia and Demetrius, 
while she tried through a faked indecision to, hold them in
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her chambers. Because Murza failed to reach Mahomet, how­
ever, Irene had no evidence of her faithfulness. At the end 
of the play, following Irene's execution and the revelation 
of her innocence, Mustapha, MaLhomet ' s loyal general, turns 
to Murza and says:
What Plagues, what Tortures, are in store for
thee,
Thou sluggish Idler, dilatory Slave?
Behold the Model of consummate Beauty,
Torn from the mourning Earth by thy Neglect,
Mur. Such was the will of Heav'n— A Band of Greeks
That marked my Course, suspicious of my Purpose, 
Rush'd out and seiz'd me, thoughtless and unarm'd 
Breathless, amaz'^d, and on the guarded Beach
Detained me till Demetrius set me free.
Mus. So sure the Fall of Greatness rais'd on Crimes,
So fix'd the Justice of all-conscious Heav'n, - 
. When haughty Guilt exults with Impious Joy, 
Mistakes shall blast, or Accident destroy;
.Weak man with erring Rage may throw.the Dart,
But Heav'n shall guide it to they guilty Heart,
(V,viii,l-15)
The chance that Mustapha attributes to heaven is 
the same chance that Cali Bassa described in his soliloquy
quoted earlier. This intervention makes any kind of cer­
tainty impossible in the affairs of man, particularly in 
man's attempts tq- secure happiness. It was this same chance 
that Johnson thought vitiated many speculative schemes in 
the political world. In the specific situation here, the 
effects of chance are illustrated by the fate of Irene, who 
would have become Queen of Turkey had it not been for that 
baleful force.
The death of Irene destroys the ambitions of Maho­
met to conquer the world, and in effect destroys his scheme to
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achieve enduring happiness through his conquests «
Robb’d of the Maid, with whom I wished to triumph,
No more I burn for Fame or for Dominion;
Success and Conquest now are empty Sounds,
Remorse and Anguish seire on all-my Breast;
Those Groves, whose Shades embower’d dear Irene, 
Heard her last Cries, and fann’d her dying Beauties, 
Shall hide me from the tasteless World for ever.
(V,XII,42-48)
Since Mahomet has placed all his hopes for enduring happiness 
upon temporal means, the destruction of these means is in 
reality the destruction of Mahomet.
The actions of Aspasia and Demetrius are, conversely,
paradigms of proper behaviour, based on a true insight into
the nature of the two kinds of happiness involved. In a
soliloquy, Aspasia struggles with herself to maintain the
proper distinction between the two, in order not to succumb,
as Irene has, to.a complete involvement with the basically .
insignificant political concerns of temporal happiness. She
is waiting for news of the assassination attempt on the
Sultan's life, which will be the start of a revolution to
free Greece from Turkish dominion.
In these dark.Moments of suspended Fate,
While yet the future fortune of my Country 
Lies in the Womb of Providence conceal'd.
And anxious Angels wait the mighty Birth;
Grant thy sacred Influence, pow’rful Virtuei 
Attention rise, survey the fair Creation,
Till conscious of the incircling ^eity.
Beyond the Mists of Care thy Pinion tow'rs.
This calm, these joys, dear Innocencei are thine, 
Joys ill exchang'd for Gold, and Pride, and Empire.
(V,i,l-IO)
This temptation, if it can be called that, to forget 
the essential distinction between means and ends, the important
70
but still relative positions of political action to religious 
credence, is probably an attempt on Johnson’s part to infuse 
into Aspasia some touch of human wealcness which will make 
her character less stiff. Earlier in the play in a scene 
between Aspasia and Demetrius, the merits of each kind of 
activity and their final result have really already been 
presented.
Dem, Should Heav’n yet unappeas’d .refuse its Aid,
Disperse our Hopes, and frustrate our Designs,
Yet shall the Conscience of the great Attempt 
Diffuse a Brightness on our Future Days ;
Nor will his country’s Groans reproach Demetrius. 
But how can’St thou support the Woes of Exile?
Can’st thou forget hereditary Splendours,
To live obscure upon a foreign Coast,
Content with Science, Innocence and Love?
Asp. Nor Wealth, nor Titles, make Aspasia’s Bliss.
O ’erwhelmed and lost amidst the publick Ruins 
Unmov’d I saw the litt’ring Trifles perish.
And thought the pretty Dross beneath a Sigh. 
Chearful I follow to the rural Cell,
Love be my Wealth, and my Distinction Virtue.
(IV,i,97-111)
A few years more experience in London, living among and ob­
serving the great variety of mankind exhibited there, would 
make Johnson as suspicious of the ability of the ”rural Cell’* 
to provide happiness, as he is of the sacrifice of religious 
belief and its promise of eternal happiness for temporal 
power and its hope of achieving earthly happiness. But this 
later skepticism is simply a widening and extending of the 
suspicion manifested here to encompass all earthly attempts 
at enduring happiness, and is not an abandonment of the 
fundamental conviction about the relative amount of care one
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should devote to government and to, religion,
Aspasia actually fears that Demetrius's cooperation 
with Cali Bassa and Abdalla violates the religious order to 
which the political order of the' state should accomodate 
itself, -
Asp, Think how the Sov'reign Arbiter of Kingdoms 
Detests thy false Associates black Designs,.
And frowns on Perjury, Revenge and Murder,
Embark'd with Treason on the Seas of Fate,
When Heav'n shall bid the swelling Billows rage.
And point vindictive Lightnings at Rebellion,
Will not the Patriot share the Traytor's Danger?
O could thy Hand unaided free thy Country,
Nor mingled Guilt pollute the Sacred Cause.(IV,i,56-64)
Johnson thought the greatest of political blessings to be 
freedom and security of property,^ and as such, in accord 
with Christian teachings. Aspasia calls Demetrius's at­
tempts to free '•Greece”' a '•Sacred Cause,'* which indicates 
not only the harmony of the political and religious order 
here, but also the necessity of attaining that freedom 
through lawful or justifiable means, Cali Bassa is, unlike 
Demetrius, not ridding his country of a foreign, hence un­
lawful, ruler, but is rebelling against the instituted 
forms of his own lawful government, a crucial distinction. 
Mahomet's speech upon discovering Cali Bassa's plot makes 
this point explicitly.
Has Treason's dire Infection reach'd my Palace?
Can Cali dare the Stroke of heav'nly Justice,
^I will give this important principle in Johnson's 
political theory fuller treatment in Chapter Six,
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In the dark Precincts of the gaping Grave,
And load with Perjuries his parting Soul?
Was it for this, that sick’ning in Epirus,
My Father call'd me to his Couch of Death,
Join'd Cali's Hand to mine, and fait'ring cry'd, 
Restrain t he Fervour of impetuous Youth 
With venerable Cali's faithful Counsels?
Are these the Counsels? This the Faith of Cali? 
Were all our Favours lavish'd on a Villain? 
Confest?--
Aili all conspire 
To banish doubt, and brand him for a Villain.
( II,vi,.1-13,2021)
Demetrius answers Aspasia in this manner :
Permitted oft, though not inspir'd by Heav'n, 
Successful Treasons punish impious Kings*
(IV,i,65-66)
The onus of rebellion against constituted authority is not 
to be imputed to Heaven, especially when it is successful, 
as Aspasia auid Demetrius hope the one they are involved in 
will be, and as many had been in the past* Johnson's state­
ment about the Glorious Revolution, "What we did at the 
Revolution was necessary: but it broke our constitution,"1 
is an indication of the same unwillingness to vindicate 
rebellion, regardless of its beneficial consequences* If 
Heaven used rebellion, it would be guilty of making the ends 
justify the means, a proposition Johnson would not allow*
ThiÆ after Demetrius has justified his cooperation 
with "false Associates" in the attempted assassination on 
the grounds that it does not conflict with proper religious 
conduct, he tells Aspasia that they have done allt hey can;
^Life of Johnson, IV, 170-71*
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the rest is ûp to Providence.
Submissive and prepar’d for each Event,
Now let us wait the last Award of Heaven,
Secure of Happiness from Flight or Conquest*
(IV,.i,.112-114)
In this manner, Aspasia and Demetrius both recog­
nize the vital distinction between the value of happiness 
as it is attainable in the temporal sphere through politi­
cal action and in eternal life through virtuous conduct.
Aspasia and Demetrius escape from Constantinople in 
the ship prepared for them, their attempts to free their 
country having failed. But even in failure, Aspasia and 
Demetrius are successful,, for they acted--unlike Mahomet,
Cali Bassa and Irene— in accord with the dictates of their 
religious faith and consequently cannot really fail. For 
failure or success is, when placed in. the batlance with 
eternal happiness gained by a virtuous life, truly insig­
nificant. After they have made their escape, Irene express­
es this belief in a soliloquy,, bitter as it is for her to 
recognize this truth, using imagery of the spiritual world 
which emphasiz-es the point.
Go,, happy Bark,.
Thy sacred Freight j^spasia and Demetriu^ shall 
still the raging Main.
To guide thy Passage shall th* aerial Spirits 
Fill all the starry Lamps with double Blaze;
Th’ applauding Sky shall pour forth all its Beams 
To grace the Triumph of victorious Virtue;
(V,vi.5-10)
Thus Aspasia and Demetrius,. Cali Bassa and Mahomet, and 
Irene provide a concrete embodiment of a fundamental principle
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in Johnson's political thought. Aspasia and Demetrius 
illustrate the proper moral conduct for the individual in 
an extremely difficult political situation. Cali Bassa and 
Mahomet, on the other hand, represent complete failure to 
distinguish between the importance of the political life and 
the religious one. Irene, set between the two pairs, sur­
renders to the temptations of power, the greatest pleasure 
man can enjoy according to Johnson, and in so doing commits 
the same fatal error as Cali Bassa and Mahomet. If in life 
outside a stiff and mechanical tragedy, chance and Heaven 
might not step in so happily to punish the wicked and save 
the virtuous, the principle was not necessarily invali­
dated. In the actual political life of the individual, the 
failure to recognize an ethical order might not be so drastic, 
but a corresponding emphasis upon a materialistic order alone 
to achieve happiness was still bound to fail, at least as far 
as Johnson was concerned. We shall find out only after death 
whether perfect happiness exists, but we need not wait that 
long to see that it never exists before that time. The lives 
of the major characters in the play exemplify this truth in a 
dramatic form and present it with special clarity and 
concreteness.
iii
Johnson embodies a second important principle of the 
first division of the theory in the opening of Irene. In 
this first scene Demetrius and Leontius are walking about
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fallen "Greece," disguised in Turkish robes* It is a few days
after the victory of the invaders, and both men lament the
destruction they have seen going on as the Turks sack the
city. The desire to kill and destroy being satiated, the
Turks now force the citizens of the city to produce their
secret hoards of gold.
Leo. The Lust of Gold succeeds the Rage of Conquest,
The Lust of Gold, unfeeling and remorselessI.
The last Corruption of degenerate ManJ
Urg*d by th* imperious Soldier’s fierce Command,
The Groaning Greeks break up their golden Caverns 
Pregnant with Stores, that India* s. Mines might envy, . 
The accumulated Wealth of Toiling Ages.
(I,i,13-19)
Demetrius's response to Leontius is shame and disgust
at the selfishness of the citizens of the city, since their
refusal to give their "accumulated Wealth" to their leader to
buy protection destroyed the city.
♦
That Wealth, too sacred for their Country’s Use!
That Wealth, too pleasing to be lost for Freedom!
That Wealth, which granted to their weeping Prince, 
Had rang’d embattled Nations at our Gates:
But thus reserv’d to lure the Wolves of Turkey,
Adds Shame to Grief, and Infamy to Ruin.
Lamenting A v ’rice now too late discovers 
Her own neglected, in the publick Safety.
(I,i,20-27)
Leontius answers this charge by citing the sense of false 
security that had been built up in the people by the often- 
repeated unsuccessful attempts to conquer the city. There 
was, besides, "not one Prodigy foretold our Fate," (I,i,35) 
not one warning from the "Power" that rules the world.
Demetrius becomes indignant at this defense of the 
people and describes the actual conditions of the city prior
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to its fall*
Dem* A thousand horrid Prodigies foretold it.
A feeble Government, eluded Laws,
A factious Populace, luxurious Nobles,
And all the Maladies of sinking States*
When publick Villainy, too strong for Justice,
Shows his bold Front, the Harbinger of Ruin,
Can brave Leontius call for airy Wonders,
Which cheats interpret, and which Fools regard?
(I,i,36-43)
Because of this decay in the basic structure, the community 
has fallen prey to destruction. The **tow'ring Domes,/
Sacred to prayer," (I,i,62-63) and the streets where "Com­
merce lavish'd unexhausted Plenty,/ and Jollity maiintain’d 
eternal Revels," (I,i,64-65) are now radically changed*
Dera, Now ghastly Desolation
In triumph sets upon our Shatter'd Spires,
Now Superstition, Ignorance and Error,
Usurp our Temples, and profane our Altars*
4 I Leo* From ev'ry Palace burst a mingled Clamour,
The dreadful Dissonance^of barb'rous Triumph,
Shrieks of Affright, and Wailings of Distress*
(I,i,66-72)
The city described here encompasses one of the most 
fundamental principles in the whole of Johnson's thought about 
the civil state. The devastation and ruin of the city, its 
possession by a mob of undisciplined and savage men who are 
intent upon taking whatever they can, represents for Johnson 
a state without government or law* The difference between this 
unregulated state and that of a political union governed by 
law and controlled by civil institutions was not depicted in 
Johnson's political theory by the spectacle of a savage army 
outside the walls, fighting to get and to lay waste the
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community. The danger to civilized society arose from the same 
desire to possess and to destroy that drives a conqueror, it 
is true, but in his political'theory Johnson made this desire 
the common property of mankind, a desire that must be con­
trolled before any kind of peace or security could be.achieved. 
Hence, people inside the city had within them potentially the 
same drives to destruction as those without; in either-case, 
these drives must be controlled and guided into patterns of 
civilized competition for those "blessings” which the army 
outside the walls was using any destructive means available 
to win. If they were not controlled, if the army breached the 
walls, if the people who made up any community refused to obey 
their lawful governors and maintain their proper subordinate 
positions, then all order and stability must break under the 
impact of anarchy,
Demetrius makes it quite clear in the lines about the 
"Maladies of sinking Stated’that the essential,conditions of 
civil society were disregarded by the Greeks and that the 
resulting destruction was an inevitable concomitant of that 
neglect. Johnson insisted on investing government with con­
siderable power over its citizens. His reason for this in­
vestment was twofold: 1) if the established government did not 
possess this authority, it would pass to some other group, 
which would almost always be unlawful, such as a mob or 
tyrant; 2) this kind of power was necessary to protect and 
maintain the stability and orderly routine of the community.
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Demetrius, in his description of the city, listed a *^feeble 
Government, and eluded Laws'' as prodigies that foretold its 
destruction and they proved accurate. For the power of ruling 
this society passed from "feeble Government" to the.Turks, ' 
which passage vindicates Johnson's fear in reason number one 
above, and the failure to invest government with proper au­
thority stopped it from protecting the people, which failure 
supports Johnson's belief in reason number two above.
The feebleness of government which was partially 
responsible for the fall of the city is shown in its inabil­
ity to force the rich citizens to place their gold at the 
disposal of government for the safety of all. Had the 
"weeping Prince" possessed what Johnson considered his proper 
authority, the "eluded Laws" which.allowed the people to 
hoard their gold would have been enforced. The forthcoming 
gold could have been used to pay mercenaries to fight the 
Turks and in this way, the community’s security would have 
been preserved.1 In this way, the opening scene of Irene 
helps explain Johnson's constant insistence on investing 
government with large powers of command and control and his 
conviction that a weak government was often worse than no 
government at all. For without power, government cannot
^Johnson's usual attitude on the use of mercenaries 
was not at all as favorable as the one expressed through 
Demetrius here. He thought, for England at least, the use of 
mercenaries, "the desparate remedy of desparate distress," 
and that the best means of protecting one's country was through 
a home militia. See Observations on Treaties, VI, 142-47.
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function properly^ whereas a government with only nominal 
powers often provides, a sense of false security by its 
seeming ability to protect the people, which proves illusion- 
ary when subjected to the pressures and forces of savagery^ 
rapiney and greed*
Two other characteristics of the government of the 
city provide specific examples of Johnson's abstract politi­
cal principles* When Demetrius blames the ruin and destruc­
tion of the city on a "factious Populace, luxurious
Noblesy" (I,iy38) he is touching upon the political tenets 
concerning the responsibilities and rights of the governed 
and governors which are taken up in the next chapter*
Briefly stated, Johnson recognizied that authority was bound 
to be abused excessively sometimes and that rebellion would 
eventually oppose that abuse. But even though rebellion 
was sometimes a necessity, it was a drastic and dangerous 
measure; it destroyed the greatest benefits civilized man 
had attained: a harmonious order in which he could pursue 
and enjoy his calling without debilitating fear or anxiety*. 
Johnson also recognized that much political discord arose 
from the dislike certain subordinate members of society 
felt for their place in that society* There was always, 
then, a tendency in the people towaxds rebellion, a ten­
dency, unless held in check by a strong government, which 
weakened government's effectiveness* The ""factious Popu­
lace" of Constaoitinople, refusing to respond to the commands
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of government, enfeebled that government and was eventually 
responsible for its final rout in the battle against Turkish 
agression. The refusa.1 to maintain a reasonable obedience 
to government, which would have kept it strong,, ended in 
disaster-*
The circumscriptions of authority, the duty of the 
ruler as opposed to the subject, is also reflected in this 
part of the play* Authority was invested in a dlass of 
rulers to protect and to maintain the privileges and posses- 
sions of the people* It did not give anyone the right to 
use it arbitrairily, to enhance himself at the expense of 
others or to utilize authority for 'personal gain* Author­
ity was legal and proper only in so far as it was used for 
the good of the whole; when it deviated from that purpose, . 
it lost the sanction of justice* The "luxurious Nobles 
effeminate in proportion as the "Populace" was factious, 
had not properly led the people, nor set them what Johnson 
would call a virjruous example* Instead of strengthening 
the state by working diligently for its defense, they had 
enjoyed the privileges and wealth that high position af­
forded, rendering themselves equally responsible with the 
people for the fall of Constantinople*
Two other incidents of the play touch upon political 
beliefs of Johnson not yet discussed* The first concerns 
the refusal of the people to give up their gold.to their 
"weeping Prince**? This act is singled out as the immediate
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cause for the fall of the city* While Johnson believed 
that only a moral regeneration of the individuals who made 
up the state could guarantee enduring security^ he knew that 
such regeneration of imperfect man was impossible; hence^ 
the force of law was going to be necessary to make many 
people contribute a share of their private good for the 
protection and sustenance of the whole* But as Demetrius 
says y
Lamenting.Av'vice now too late discovers 
Her own neglected, in the publick Safety*
(I,.i„26-27)
What Avarice has discovered is the second belief 
mentioned above* Stated as concisely as possible, the 
political belief touched upon is this : the happiness of the 
people arises from the combined.efforts of the governed and 
governors* Only when the ruled recognized the need for re­
stricting their private liberty for the greater liberty 
and freedom of the whole, and bnly when the rulers them- 
.. selves recognize the need for abiding by thé law they ad­
minister and for setting examples of fidelity and justice 
to those whom they rule, then and oi^y then will society be 
capable of protecting itself and securing its blessings*^
iv
One of the commonest of recurring topics of Johnson's
^ f  all of Johnson’s political beliefs, this one is 
perhaps the most fundamental* It is both the premise from 
which Johnson develops his political theory ahd it is the 
reward which an adherence to theory will provide* Its signi­
ficance is treated at greater length in Chapter Six.
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political theory is subordination* Johnson thought this 
principle, operating through an accepted hierarchy of class­
es, necessary to the maintenance of an even tenor in society: 
it kept the various members of political body from attacking 
one another for the ”blessings**^ that only a few could possess* 
Those who held the higher positions in this kind of organized 
state subsisted upon the work of the lowe? ranks^ but Johnson 
justified their leisure by the '^intellectual improvement** 
that resulted from freeing certain men from laborious tasks 
and allowing them to study various intellectual disciplines* 
Finally, subordination was a "natural" condition in the sense 
that there were obvious inequalities between the talents and 
abilities of men, and unless one, or one group, led the others, 
there would be only aimless movement and meaningless change*
Many men, however, dislike subordinate positions in 
civil society, since they do not enjoy knowing that some one 
has power over their lives and property*^ The desire to 
possess greater wealth, greater honor, greater position than 
one has is naturally implanted in man, Johnson thought, and 
must be constantly controlled through reason and religion, 
reinforced by the power of law* Unless a person recognizes 
the necessity for accepting a subordinate role in life and 
for fulfilling the less pleasant, less honorable, and less 
lucrative duties of that position, he is doing harm to the
^Johnson's belief stated in this and the following 
paragraph are discusses at greater length in Chapter Four*
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good of the whole community. Cooperation of the ruled is
a basic condition for securing peace and stability. Hence^
if a society is to be successful as a political union, that 
is, gain the harmony and stability that are the goals of 
political unions, the subordinate members of that society 
must cooperate.
Unfortunately, many men fail to place the advantages 
of the whole above their own immoderate desires and are 
willing to jeopardize the total good by rebelling against 
their assigned positions. Since government is an institu­
tion composed of a few men wielding power over a number 
many times larger than themselves, it follows that that 
power y and the government it supports, can exist and do its 
work only so long as those who are ruled accept the exer­
cise of it. Once the laws and orders of government have
been disregarded without penalty, that government is a 
government in name only and is a failure. From this fail­
ure arises the disorder and confusion of the non-political 
state and the destruction of any hope of happiness or enjoy­
ment of the individual. Since the passions of men are so 
much stronger than their reason, the temptations to upset 
the subordinate structure of society are often going to be 
too strong to be resisted. Hence^ unless government is in­
vested with large powers to control men, these rebellions 
can end only in the destruction of all political order amd 
government.
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Johnson gives a concrete expression to this inte­
grated system of political doctrines through the actions of 
two sets of related characters : Demetrius and Leontius; and 
Cali Bassa and Abdalla. Involved in each relationship is 
the subordination of one man to another, with the correct 
attitude towards subordination represented in the first pair 
listed above and the hazards of rebellion against it pre­
sented in the second. By creating parallel situations, with 
significant variations in attitudes on the part of the fig­
ures in the situations, Johnson makes his theory of subor­
dination more explicit and distinct, while he simultane­
ously reveals its origin in his observations of the necess­
ary steps in getting things done.
In the first scene of Act One, Leontius’s relation­
ship to Demetrius is implied in a short speech which occurs 
when Leontius tries to calm Demetrius's sorrow over the sack 
of the city and the loss of Aspasia.
Enough of unavailing Tears ̂ Demetrius,
I came obedient to thy Friendly Summons,
And hop’d to share thy Counsels,, not thy Sorrows.
(I,i„104-106)
Leontius’s obedience and his hope to share in the counsels 
indicate that he looks to Demetrius for guidance. He is not 
subservienty subservience not being a quality Johnson associ­
ated with subordination nor practiced himself to any man, but 
is acting as one who recognices both his own worth and the 
necessity for that worth to be directed by a superior.
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A statement Boswell records in The Life of Johnson 
exemplifies Johnson’s attitude toward subordination* "Sir 
says Johnson, I would no more deprive a nobleman of his-re­
spect,, than of his money* I consider myself as acting a part 
in the great system of society, and I do to others as I 
should expect he would behave to me, were I a nobleman and 
he Sam. J o h n s o n . A  system of subordination, for Johnson, 
society's only practical means to secure order among men, 
demands that some ranks be given more prestige, wealth, and 
honor than others. Those not fortunate enough to have been 
born into a high position owe it to the general good to 
respect those who were, for the sake of the general good 
achieved through the system. This respect is really a trib­
ute to the system and not to a single individual, just as to­
day in politics, diplomacy, the military or a number of other 
professions, deference is paid to those in high position and 
not to the policy or personality of the person occupying that 
position.
Johnson told Boswell the following story to illustrate 
this point:
Sir, there is one Mrs. Macaulay in this town, a great 
republican. One day when I was at her house, I put on a 
very grave countenance, and said to her, "Madam, I am 
now become a convert to your way of thinking. I am con­
vinced that all mankind are upon an equal footing; and to 
give you an unquestionable proof. Madam, that I am in 
earnest, here is a very sensible, civil, well-behaved 
fellow-citizen, your footman; I desire that he may be 
allowed to sit down and dine with us.” I thus. Sir,
^Life of Johnson, I , 447.
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shewed her the absurdity of the levelling doctrine* She 
has never liked me since. Sir, your levellers wish to 
level down as far as themselves ; but they cannot bear 
levelling up to themselves* They would all have some 
people under them; why not then have some people above 
them?l
Deference to position did not endanger in any way the self- 
respect or independence of the individual* On the contrary, 
it maintained the system that protected the liberty of thé 
individual, something the "levellers" failed to take into 
consideration.
Leontius’s trust in Demetrius's guidance is further 
illustrated when Cali Bassa questions Demetrius about Leon­
tius's loyalty and fidelity*
Gal. But can thy Q)emetriu^ Friend Q^ontiu"^ sustain
glorious Cause,
The Cause of Liberty, the Cause of Nations?
(I,ii,8-9)
Demetrius defends Leontius as a courageous and resourceful 
fighter, but Leontius regards Cali Bassa's questions as 
insults.
Leo. I scorn a Trust unwillingly repos'd;
Demetrius will not lead me to Dishonour;
Consult in private, call me when your Scheme 
Is rip>e for Action, and demands the Sword*
(I,ii,34-37)
Leontius is a follower of Demetrius, then, and he willingly 
agrees to serve Demetrius in Cali Bassa's assassination 
scheme*. This acceptance on more or less blind faith is, of 
course, not characteristic of Johnson or of the kind of man 
he admired. Except for religion, Johnson believed firmly in
^Life of Johnson, I, 447.
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investigating an issue thoroughly before committing himself 
to it. However, when the situation was critical, e.g,, when 
the peace of society was threatened by war or by mob action, 
then Johnson would commit himself wholeheartedly to govern­
mental action to maintain order. When the crisis had passed, 
he would return to his more usual stance. Johnson clarified 
his position on this matter in a discussion of the correct 
attitude for a citizen to taike in matters of governmental 
policy. First,
The time is now come, in which every Englishman expects 
Xo be informed of the national affairs, and in which he 
has a right to have that expectation gratified.1
Following this line of reasoning, one can say that Leontius
has a right to know what the plan proposed by Cali Bassa
involves. Secohd^
For whatever may be urged by ministers, or those whom 
vanity or interest make the followers of ministers, con­
cerning the necessity of confidence in our governours, 
and the presumption of prying, with profane eyes, into 
the recesses of policy, it is evident^ that this rever­
ence can be claimed only by counsels yet unexecuted, and projects suspended in deliberation.2
The ^'counsels yet unexecuted'*^ are plans for the assassination.
The urgency of the need for killing Mahomet and freeing
Greece, and the dangerous position Demetrius and Leontius
find themselves in provide the necessary conditions for
claiming that •’’reverence”' which accepts a policy or plan
without long aind deliberate investigation. But once accepted




and once executed, the individual has every right--in this 
case if he survives--to demand a full and explicit presenta­
tion of the factors which led to the policy and the effects 
of its execution*
But when a design has ended in miscarriage or success, 
when every eye, and every ear, is witness to general 
discontent, or general satisfaction, it is then a proper 
time to disentangle confusion, and illustrate obscurity; 
to show by what causes every event was produced, and in 
what effects it is likely to terminate; to lay down, 
with distinct particularity, what rumor always huddles , 
in general exclamations, or perplexes by undigested 
narratives; to show whence happiness or calamity is 
derived, and whence it may be expected; and honestly to 
lay before the people, what inquiry can gather of the 
past, and conjecture can estimate of the future*^
Johnson was never servile, but he was aware that prompt
obedience was sometimes necessary during -certain periods
of stress* ■
It is in the fourth act, the night of the assassina­
tion attempt, that the subordinate relationship of Leontius 
to Demetrius is suddenly strained by the pressure of Leon­
tius * s desire to be actively involved in the assassination* 
Leontius announces that the ship, manned by one hundred 
loyal Greeks, awaits on the shore to take the conspirators 
to the coast of Asia after they have killed the Sultan*
Leo* Our Bark unseen has reach'd th' appointed Bay,
And where yon Trees wave o'er the foaming Surge 
Reclines against the Shore: our Grecian Troop 
Extends its Lines along the Sandy Beach,'





'Tis well~-A single Blow compleats our Wishes:
Return with speed, Leontius, to your Charge;
The Greeks disorder’d by their Leader's Absence,
May droop'd dismay'd, or kindle into Madnesso
(IV,iii,8-ll)
Leontius immediately objects to his assignment, since 
it seems to imply that Cali Bassa still does not believe him 
loyal or brave*.
Leo* Suspected still?--What Villain's pois'nous Tongue 
Dares join Leontius' Name with Fear or Falshood?
(IV,iii,12-13)
Cali Bassa answers that he cannot distrust Leontius, since 
the lives of all of them, as .well as "Greece," are bound up 
in the venture, so that if one fail they all fail.
Cal* Hast thou not search'd my Soul's profoundest Thoughts? 
Is not the Fate of Greece and Cali thine?
(IV,iii,18-19)
Leontius refuses to accept this answer and demands 
to know why he must wait on the beach, while Demetrius leads 
the assassination attempt* This supposedly inferior position, 
Leontius feels, will ruin his reputation as a warrior and 
man, and make him a coward in -the eyes of succeeding genera­
tions* Leontius is being driven here by his desire for 
glory and honor, the same passions that are rooted in all 
men and are responsible for the difficulties in maintaining 
subordination within society*
Leo. Why has thy Qzali Bass^ Choice pointed out Leontius, 
Unfit to share this Night's illustrious Toils?
To wait remote from Action, and from Honour,
An idle List'ner to the distant Cries 
Of slaughter'd Infidels, and Clash of Swords I 
Tell me the Cause, that while thy Name, Demetrius, 
Shall soar triumphant on the Wings of Glory,
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Despis'd and curs'd, Leontius must descend 
Through hissing AgeSy a proverbial Coward,
The Tale of Women, and the Scorn of Fools?
(IV,iii,20-29)
I^ontius has not forgotten the cause in which he enlisted—  
the freedom of Greece— but the duties assigned him in pur­
suit of that cause are very distasteful. In like manner, a 
member of society may wish his country well and wish to work 
actively towards that goal, but by the dissension he provokes 
in trying to achieve a higher, more powerful, and more pre- 
stigous position, he may do serious harm to his own cause.
Demetrius tells Leontius that the final achievment 
is much more important than any individual's contribution 
toward it.
Dem. Can brave Leontius be the Slave of Glory?
Glory, the casual Gift of thoughtless Crouds I 
Glory, the Bribe of avaricious Virtuel 
Be but my Country free, be thine the Praise;
I ask no witness, but attesting Conscience,
No Records, but the Records of the Sky.
(IV,iii„30-35) .
The freedom of Greece in the play, the peace and security 
of a well-ordered society in the political realm, are the 
results of men working together--leaders and followers. In 
both cases, the final results are the important thing; the 
various roles of the players, in relation to this great good, 
are not of special importance. But in both cases, subor­
dination is essential to success.
Leontius's reply to Demetrius is the logical reply 
of a subordinate to a superior who is preaching the sacrifice 
of personal good for the good of the whole.
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Leo, Wilt thou(pemetriu^ then head the troop upon the
shore,
While I destroy th’ Oppressor of Mankind?
(IV,iii,36-37)
Demetrius’s answer involves what Johnson considered a funda­
mental truth about mankind accessible to anyone who would 
simply look around him: all men are not equal. Of course, 
this inequality has to be qualified^ since it refers to the 
talent, intelligence, ability, and so forth, and not to the 
intrinsic worth of the individual considered as a creation of 
the ’•'Supreme Being,** Although all men are equal sub specie 
aeternitatis, they are not so on earth, and by choosing the 
best men to lead and direct the others, mankind can avoid 
much misery and make some improvement in intellectual, cultural, 
and moral spheres. Those who have, in society, cultivated 
through leisure the arts and sciences constitute the best, 
i.e., they are the most experienced in these matters and are 
consequently to be most trusted in them.
It is this argument that Demetrius presents to 
Leontius,
What can’st thou boast supérieur to Demetrius?
Ask to whose Sword the Greeks will trust their Cause,
My Name shall echo through the shouting Field;
Demand whose Force yon Turkish HeroeLS^ dread.
The shudd’ring Camp shall murmur out Demetrius,
(IV,iii,38-42)
Demetrius is asking Leontius to suppress his natural desires 
for fame and glory by allowing one who is better equipped 
for the task to attempt it. Although he sacrifices some of 
his personal hopes, Leontius will still- share in the achiev­
ment— the freedom of Greece, In like manner, each citizen
9Z
shares in the general good of society, when he sacrifices 
some of his personal hopes and liberty for the saice of that 
good*
Cali Bassa interupts at this moment with what is 
actually a warning of the dangers to the whole endeavour 
by any insubordination*
Cal* Must Greece, still wretched by her Children’s Folly,
For ever mourn their Avarice or Factions?
(IV„iii,43-44)
Greed for honor and contempt for subordination are the two 
most dangerous enemies to both society— a group of people 
joined together to achieve a common freedom, liberty, and 
order--and the conspirators--a group of men joined for the 
same purpose* The analogy here illustrates how the politics 
and literature of Johnson can illuminate each other and define 
with some precision a number of his fundamental ideas*
Leontius, recognizing the cogency of the arguments^ 
capitulates for the benefit and purpose of the entire group.
My Pride shall ne’er protact my Country’s Woes;
Succeedy my Friend, unenvied by Leontius*
(IV,iii„47-48)
Although this is an ideal representation of Johnson’s concept 
of subordination and its value, its application in society 
need not attempt such perfection* It need only receive the 
general admission and acceptance of the persons who make up 




In contrast to this proper recognition by Leontius 
of subordination’s natural and fruitful place in the organi­
zation and direction of man's energies, the refusal of Abdalla 
to abide by it stands out sharply. The character of Abdalla 
shares several qualities with Leontius’s. Both are passionate 
men who have difficulty in controlling those passions. Deme­
trius tells Leontius in the first scene of the first act that 
he was first contracted by Cali Bassa through the "fiery Chief 
Abdalla" whose "quick Impatience seiz’d my doubtful Hand" (I, 
i,125-126) one night and led the way to the first meeting with 
Cali Bassa. Later when Abdalla tells Cali Bassa that he has 
fallen deeply in love with Aspasia, Cali Bassa asks why he is 
so intense and restless.
Abd. Because I love:
Because my slighted Passion burns in vainl 
Why roars the Lioness distress’d by Hunger?
Why foam the swelling Waves when Tempests rise?
Why shakes the Ground, when subterraneous Fires 
Fierce through the bursting Caverns rend their Way?
(Ill,i,48-53)
This outburst is similar in nature- if not in kind, to Leon­
tius’s when he is commanded to «return to the boat at the be­
ginning of the assassination attempt. Both men have a highly 
developed sense of honor and place which leads them to ex­
plosive outbursts if they think themselves offended. Abdalla 
is thus established in the first act as a man of strong 
passion and a lieutenant of Cali Bassa, in the last quotation 
as one who has an intense conviction of his own worth, each
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of which qualities parallels Leontius in temperament and re­
lationship with Demetrius.
The two temptations of Leontius and Abdalla to break 
the chain of subordination are both presented as exaunples of 
passion overcoming reason. In Leontius's case, however, the 
passion which drives him to seek glory and fame and avoid the 
name of coward and fool is checked by his reason, strengthened 
as it is by the arguments of Demetrius. In Abdalla's case the 
passion which battles with his reason is love, and Aspasia is 
the temptation which brings on the conflict.
At the beginning of Act Three, Cali Bassa and A.bdaMa 
meet. Cali upbraids Abdalla for not concentrating upon the 
dangerous business of the assassination, Abdalla asks Cali,
Must then Ambition's Votaries infringe
The Laws of Kindness, break the Bonds of Nature?
And quit the Names of Brother, Friend and Father?
(Ill,i,15-17)
Cali Bassa's answer shows quite clearly that he, like Abdalla,
has allowed his reason to succumb to the dictates of Passion.
This sov'reign Passion, scornful of Restraint,
Ev'n from the Birth affects supreme Command,
Swells in the Breast, and with resistless Force, 
O'erbears each gentler Motion of the Mind.
(Ill,i,18-21)
It is appropriate for Cali Bassa to be overcome by "Ambition,*♦ 
since, as Mahomet remarked earlier, sixty winter camps have 
reduced the dangers from more earthly passion to his reason. 
Abdalla, however, is a fiery young officer and one of reason's 
greatest enemies at his age is love.
Abd. Yet can Ambition in Abdalla's Breast
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Claim but the second Place: there mighty Love
Has fix’d his Hopes, Inquietudes, and Fears,
His glowing Wishes, and his jealous Pangs*
(III,i,25-29)
Cali Bassa is justifiably afraid that Abdalla*s 
passion might make him recalcitrant and threaten the success 
of the whole scheme. He tries to convince Abdalla that Love,
"indeed the Privilege of Youth," (III,i,29) may be very im­
portant, but on this particular day his mind must be clear and 
his hand steady, "But let us reason--" he starts out, but is 
interrupted violently by Abdalla,
Hast thou grown old amidst the Croud of Courts,
And turn’d th’ instructive Page of Human Life,
To cant, at last, of Reason to a Lover?
Such ill-tim’d Gravity, such serious Folly,
Might well befit the solitary Student,
Th’ unpractis’d Dervise, or sequester’d Faquir,
Know* St thou not yet, when Love invades the Soul, 
That all her Faculties receive his Chains?
That Reason gives her Scepter to his Hamd,
Or only struggles to be more enslav'd?
ASPASIA 1 who can look upon thy Beauties?
Who hear thee speak, and not abandon Reason?
Reasonl the hoary Dotard’s dull Directress,
That loses all because she hazards nothing:
Reason! the tim’rous Pilot, that to shun 
The Rocks of Life, for ever flies the Fort» 1
(III,i,32-47)
1 Johnson ’ s comments in his Preface To Shakespeare on 
the use of love in drama is perhaps pertinent here. In com­
paring Shakespeare’s use of a large number of "passions" as 
motivating forces in characters to other dramatists, he says:
Upon every other stage the universal agent is love, by 
whose power all good and evil is distributed, and every 
action quickened or retarded. To bring a lover, a lady, 
and a rival into the fable; to intangle them in contra­
dictory obligations, perplex them with oppositions of 
interest and harass them with violence of desires incon­
sistent with each other ; to make them meet in rapture, and 
part in agony; , , , is the business of a modern dramatist. 
For this, probability is violated, life is misrepresented.
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Cali Bassa sees that if Demetrius learns 'of Abdalla's love 
for Aspasia the whole plot must fail. His problem is to con­
vince Abdalla that he must sacrifice his personal desire, as 
Leontius has had to do, for the sake of the general good: the 
success of the assassination. In the pres en ce of Abdalla, al­
most immediately after he has announced his love for Aspasia, 
Cali Bassa is forced to grant to Demetrius the opportunity to 
visit Aspasia, As Demetrius leaves to await Cali Bassa's call, 
Abdalla breaks out angrily:
And this is my reward--to burn, to languish.
To rave unheeded, while the happy Greek,
The Refuse of our Swords, the Dross of Conquest, 
Throws his fond Arms about Aspasia's Neck,
Dwells on her Lips, and sighs upon her Breast;
Is't not enough, he lives by'our Indulgence,
But he must live to make his Masters wretched?
(III,iv,l-7)
and language is depraved. But love is only one of many 
■ passions; and, as it has no great influence upon the sum 
of life; it has little operation in the dramas of a poet, 
who caught his ideas from the living world, and exhibited 
only what he saw before him* (V, 107)
This deprecation of love as a motive force perhaps explains 
why Johnson changed Irene from a story of a struggle between 
love and duty on Mahomet's part, with Irene as a helpless 
pawn, to one of a "struggle between virtue and weakness," 
Johnson wanted to broaden the drama, give it more of the 
"living world," by utilizing the passions for honor, glory, 
liberty, and religion as motivating forces. He was probably 
trying to emulate Shaikespeare who
knew that any other passion, as it was regular or exorbi­
tant, was a cause of happiness or calamity, (V, 107)
This desire may be responsible for the dominant intellectual 
tone of the play and the absence of any depth or contour in 
the various characters. But for the purpose of illuminating 
intellectual beliefs in the political sphere, Johnson's 
failure as a dramatist is compensated for by the fruitful­
ness of the intellectual matter displayed.
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When Cali Bassa asks what right Abdalla has to claim 
Aspasia, Abdalla answers:
The Claim of Pow’r,
The unquestion'd Clsiim of Conquerors, aund Kings!
(lTI,iv,8-9)
Abdalla may be one of the conquerors of Greece but he is still 
a subordinate. He is here rebelling against the subordinate 
position he has been assigned and claiming the power that is 
rightfully Cali Bassa’s as the leader of the conspirators.
Cali tries to point this out when he says.
Yet in the Use of Pow’r remember Justice.
(III,iv,10)
The mention of Justice by the traitor Cali Bassa is turned 
ironically against him by Abdalla.
Can then th’ Assassin lift his treach’rous Hand
Against his King, and cry. Remember Justice?
Justice demands the forfeit Life of Cali;
Justice demands that I reveal your Crimes;
Justice demands— But see th* approaching Sultan.
Oppose my Wishes, and--Remember «Justice.
(Ill,iv,11-16)
Abdalla’s accusation against Cali Bassa is a just one, 
but it can be levelled equally against himself. Both are vio­
lating an ethical standard by their political acts. In John­
son’s political system, such actions must be censured, regard­
less of the validity or merit of their purpose. But in re­
lation to the necessity of subordination for the proper func­
tioning of society, the point here is that by his refusal to 
allow himself to be ruled, Abdalla threatens the whole enter­
prise. Abdalla is furious at what he considers an injustice 
done to him by a superior, a danger Johnson specifically noted
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in discussing the discontent aroused by subordination. John­
son believed this kind of discontent would always exist, b u t - 
must be overcome by those suffering it for the benefit of all. 
If it were not overcome by the individual, then it must be by 
the society within which that individual lives. In a solilo­
quy a short time later, Cali Bassa speaks specifically of this 
problem and its solution.
Far more I dread Abdalla*s fiery Folly,
Than all the Wisdom of the grave Divan.
Reason with Reason fights in equal Terms,
The raging Madman*s unconnected Schemes 
We cannot obviate, for we cannot guess.
Deep in my Breast be treasur’d this Resolve,
When Cali mounts the Throne Abdalla dies, ■
Too fierce, too faithless for Neglect or Trust. .
. ' (III,vi,7-14)
This drastic measure is inevitable in a land where there is
no law or government except a tyrant * s will. In a legitimate
-
political body, as conceived by Johnson, a man such as Abdalla 
would be restrained by law. Even if his execution were neces­
sary there, it would still be ̂ or the peace of the whole com­
munity and not merely one man * s whim.
Abdalla * s untrustworthiness in the conspiracy grows 
out of his frustrated passion for Aspasia which overcomes his 
reason. Abdalla*s resentment against his superior, Cali 
Bassa, is paralleled by his resentment against Mahomet and ex­
plains why Abdalla is involved in the conspiracy in the first 
place. When Mustapha and Mahomet receive the report of the 
spies set upon Cali Bassa, they are amazed to learn that he is 
attended by Abdalla. Carza, one of the spies, says that as
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they watched Cali
With him Abdalla we beheld-- 
Mus. Abdallai
Mah. He wears of late Resentment on his Brow,
Deny'd the Government of Servia*s Province.
(IV,viii,8-ll)
Abdalla thus resents both the authority of his lawful 
ruler, Mahomet, and his acknowledged one in the conspiracy,
Cali Bassa. His character embodies concretely the specific 
manner in which men rebel against their proper subordinate 
position in the hierarchial structure of society or of a con­
spiracy because of resentment and frustration. These last 
two qualities arise in turn from reason’s inability to control 
appetites and passions for the benefit of the whole. An indi­
vidual must sacrifice some of his own liberty, his own hopes, 
his own desires, for the order and stability by which all may 
gain some satisfaction. By refusing to serve the general 
good, however, the individual often destroys both his own and 
the public well being.
As the time for the assassination becomes imminent, Ab­
dalla begins breaking the bond of subordination that held him 
to Cali Bassa and to his assignment in the plot. He demands 
that Cali Bassa grant Aspasia to him, instead of to Demetrius 
as Cali Bassa has just done;
Is this the Recompence reserv’d for me?
Dar’st thou thus dally with Abdalla’s Passion? 
Henceforward hope no more my slighted Friendship, 
WaJce from thy Dream of Pow'r to Death and Tortures, 
And bid thy visionary Throne farewell.
(IV,iv,7-11)
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Cali Bassa objects that Aspasia is not his to give, but that 
if Abdalla is able,
Obtain her and possess, thou know * s t thy Rival.
(IV,iv,18)
Cali * s intention is to let Abdalla take Aspasia and kill Deme­
trius after they have executed the Sultan. But Abdalla, de—t
dining to renounce his own private designs for the higher ob­
jectives involved, refuses to wait, to obey the orders of 
Cali Bassa.
Cal. O spare the gallant Greek, in him we lose 
The Politiciaui’s Arts, and Heroe*s Flame.
Abd. When next we meet before we storm the Palace,
The Bowl shall circle to confirm our League,
Then shall these Juices taint Demetrius* s Draught,
(shewing a Phial.
And stream destructive through his freezing Veins: 
Thus shall he live to strike th* important Blow,
And perish ere he tastes the Joys of Conquest.
(IV,iv,26-33)
Abdalla*s plan will theoretically allow Cali Bassa to 
use Demetrius in the plot and at the same time remove him from 
competition for Aspasia. Cali Bassa does not oppose Abdalla, 
but Abdalla*s interference of the regular plan results in dis­
astrous failure for the conspiracy. If Abdalla is not being
specifically insubordinate here, his modification of the .«
scheme disrupts his superior’s plans and hence is dangerously 
close to it, since it is an employment of power that should 
prop>erly be used by only Cali Bassa. The execution of Abdalla*s 
plan signals the beginning of the end for the conspiracy. 
Demetrius explains to Aspasia what happened as they prepare to 
escape the vengeance of the Sultan.
lOl
Or meanly fraudulent, or madly gay,
Abdalla, while we waited near the Palace,
With ill-tim’d Mirth propos'd-the Bowl of Love.
Just as it reach'd my Lips, a sudden Cry 
Urg'd me to dash it to the Ground u'ntouch'd 
And seize my Sword with disencumber'd Hand..
Asp. What Cry? The Stratagem? Did then Abdalla?-»-
Dem. At once a Thousand Passions fir'd his Cheek:
Then all is past he cried--and darted from us;
Nor at the call of Cali deign'd to turn.
Asp. Why did you stay? deserted and betrayed?
What more could Force attempt, or Art contrive?
Dem. Amazement seiz’d us, and the hoary Bassa
Stood torpid in Suspense; but soon Abdalla 
Return'd with Force, that made Resistance vain.
And bade his new Confederates seize the Traitors. 
Cali disarm'd was born away to Death;
Myself- escap'd, or favour'd or neglected.
(V,iii,24-41)
Abdalla, seeing his plan to poison Demetrius fail, completely 
rejects his part in the intrigue and betrays his former plot­
ters. He is directly responsible for the failure of the con­
spiracy by his refusal to maintain and fulfill the duties of 
the station assigned him* Conversely, because Leontius placed 
the general good above his own personal enhancement, he has 
the boat ready on the beach to carry Demetrius and Aspasia to 
freedom in " T u s c a n y s o  that at least the part of the plot 
which was devoted to the escape worked.
The contrast between the actions of Leontius and Ab­
dalla illustrates Johnson's belief in the necessity of subor­
dination for the successful maintenance of society. In the 
play society is analogous to the plotters; their failure, as 
a result of insubordination, is analogous to the anarchy and
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destruction which bursts forth when the hierarchy of the soci­
ety breaJcs down and insubordination undermines the order and 
peace that is the general aim as well as the good of all civil 
unions*
Irene has, then, three major affinities with the first 
division of the political theoryc First, Johnson’s crucial dis­
tinction between religion and politics emerges through the dif­
ferent fates of Demetrius and Aspasia on the one hand, and 
Irene, Mahomet, and Cali Bassa on the other, as they recognize 
or fail to recognize the subordinate rank of politics in life* 
Second, his belief that the "natural"--as opposed to the poli­
tical— state of man was one of turmoil and destruction mani­
fests itself in the collapse and ruin of ’’Greece*’* Third, 
his insistence upon subordination to avert such subversion of 
the social order rises out of the contrast between the de­
structive actions of the insubordinate Abdalla and the bene­
ficial conduct of the willing Leontius*
Johnson’s concern with his poverty and future plans, 
his inheritance from Lichfield, and his inexperience in the 
political world can also be seen in Irene, involved as it is 
with war, invading armies, and rebellion. At this stage in 
his life, he may not have been so certain of exactly how gov­
ernment should function, but he was, nevertheless, sure that 
-without it, there was no safety and happiness.
The second major division of his theory does concern 
the practical relationships of ruler and ruled, the proper
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manner for each to perform his duty and the difficulties for 
each. This section finds expression in the imaginative works 
mainly through the allegories, written as they were after 
Johnson*s close observation of and varied experience with the 
machinery of government in London and devoted to teaching the 
correct and practical way to live. '
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON: GOVERNMENT, 
ITS METHODS AND PROBLEMS
Once government has been satisfactorily established, 
with the majority of the people accepting their place in the 
social structure, one must still not expect to find all strife 
and confusion checked, and all competition softened into coop­
eration. Since it requires ”ho proof” that
the life of man is unhappy, that his. days are not only 
few, but evil, that he is surrounded by dangers, dis­
tracted by uncertainties, and oppressed by calamities,^
then what Johnson calls ”speculative reason” would expect
such
beings, not brute and savage, but endowed with reason, 
and united in society • • • should join in a perpetual 
confederacy against the certain, or fortuitous, troubles 
to which they are exposed • • • (^n^ that they should 
universally cooperate in the proportion of universalfelicity.2
Unfortunately, ”speculative reason” must always bow 
to experience, and this instance is no exception. For even




under government in a civilized society, men sometimes ignore
the general happiness of the community, which they inevitably
share in, and work diligently only for their own goals, which
are the more valuable for them as the less attainable by other
members of society»
The hostility perpetually exercised between one man and 
another, is caused by the desire of many for that -which 
only a few can possess. Every man would be rich, power­
ful, and famous; yet fame, power, and riches are only 
names of relative conditions, which imply the obscurity, 
dependence, and poverty of greater numbers.1
Under these conditions, the competition among many 
for the few available prizes must inevitably lead to disap­
pointment and pain for some, as others more fortunate than 
they gain happiness. For when the
general good of mankind is subdivided into the separate 
advantages of individuals, it must necessarily happen, 
that many will desire what few can possess, and conse­
quently, that some will be fortunate by the disappoint­
ment or defeat of others, and since no man suffers dis­
appointment without pain, that one must become miserable 
by another’s happiness.2
Nevertheless, when one considers the kind of creature 
man is, one can see that the pursuit of ’’private interest” and 
disregard of the ’’general good” are inevitable elements in the 
’’natural condition of human life.” For man is an imperfect 
being and finds it very difficult to act without self- 
interest, even though his own good is served, to some degree, 
by acting out of interest for the society of which he is paxt,
R̂ambler. No. 183, III, 354.
^Sermon XXIII, IX, 497.
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the happiness of the whole being necessarily composed of 
and shared in by all the parts^. Johnson utilized exactly 
this principle, without much success,, when he argued that 
the colonies need not fear an unjust taxation by England 
even though they were not represented in the English Parlia­
ment,
We(Englan3 shall be restrained from oppression(i.e., un­
just taxeg by that great principle which holds all em­
pires togethery ^that the happiness of the whole is the 
happiness of its parts.”^
Whether by nature or by selfish motives, many men
simply cannot see that the public good is in any way related
to their own private good. Finally, men cannot wait for all
their private needs to be filled by "publick plenty»" nor
can they wait for the difficulties and "vexations" in their
private lives to be quieted by "universal p e a c e . "2 Hence,
the misery of the world» therefore, so far as it arises 
from inequality of conditions, is incurable. These 
are desires» which almost all feel, but which all cannot 
gratify. Every man may, without a crime, study his own 
happiness, if he be careful not to impede, by design, 
the happiness of others. In the race of life, some must 
gain the prize, and others must lose it; but the prize 
is honestly gained by him who outruns his competitor, 
without endeavouring to overthrow h i m . 3
The main duty of the subject in this kind of society is to 
obey lawful authority and thereby assure a controlled com­
petition which will not endanger the peace of the state;
i**Vinerian Lectures," in E, L* McAdam, Jr.*s Dr. 
Johnson and the English Law (Syracuse, New York; Syracuse 
University Press, 1951), p, 106.
2sermon XXIII, IX, 498.
3lbid., p, 498.
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these lawful means of competition exclude the destructive 
methods of attaining honor, wealth, and position*
Since there is to be an inevitable competition,, an 
honest suid honorable one, between men for the ’̂ blessings’* of 
lifey there will also inevitably be some strife between 
the competitors* This strife is beyond eradication and is 
to be expected, however, and will not seriously disrupt 
the machinery of society if it is controlled by the acknow­
ledged rules and regulations of lawful government. This
strife(arising from honest competition would be without 
confusion, if it were regulated by reason and religion, 
if men would endeavour after lawful ends by lawful means*!
A force operating within a political union which aids 
in the control of competition among men and the strife arising 
from it is "habit*** Johnson often used the word **feverence’* 
in his political writings as a synonym for the word "habit," 
Both words mean the custom of obedience to established laws 
that was ingrained in the members of society who have grown 
up under them* Johnson referred to this fact--relied on 
heavily by Burke in Speech on American Taxations (1774)-- 
when he said:
The general story of mankind will evince, that lawful 
and settled authority is very seldom resisted when it is 
well employed* Gross corruption, or evident imbecility, 
is necessary to the suppression of that reverence with 
which the majority of mankind look upon their governors*
llbid*
2cf. Selected Writings of Edmund Burke, ed. Walter 
Jackson Bate (New York: The Modern Library, 1960), pp. 67, 
100- 101*
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. . . For though men are drawn by their passions.into 
forgetfulness of invisible rewards and punishments, yet 
they are easily kept obedient to those who have temporal 
dominion in their hands, till their veneration is dissi­
pated by such wickedness and folly as cam neither be 
defended nor concealed.1
Johnson did not restrict the beneficial use of habit
to political affairs. As Katherine Balderston points out, he
shared with William Law a deep "concern for the power of
habit, both for good and ill, in the economy of the moral
life."2 Professor Balderston goes on to add that this "'idea,
as all readers of Johnson know, is omnipiresent in his w o r k s , "3
and in attempting to illustrate what she considers the strong
influence of Law on Johnson, says that Law may quite possibly
be the source of Johnson's belief in the beneficial use of
habit. She argues.
An outgrowth . . .  of Law's belief that the power of 
habit may be utilized for good, by making our bodies 
conform to "such habits of life as naturally produce 
habits in the soul" . . .  did, I believe, influence 
Johnson and help to explain those practices of his re­
ligious life which his contemporaries found so singular.
I refer to Law's regimen of "rules," in small things
as well as great. . . .  The rules thus set up and strictly
obeyed discipline the Christian in the subjugation of 
his body, and strengthen the soul in the habit of obe­
dience to G o d *4
Johnson made rules for himself throughout his life, as is
iRambler, No. 50, II, 242.
^Katherine Balderston, 'Dr. Johnson and William Law," 
PMLA, LXXV (September, 1960), 388.
3 l b i d .
4lbid.
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"abundantly evident from the Prayers and Meditations," al- 
though he seldom ever kept them, particularly thé ones, con­
cerning early rising. The interesting point here is his 
adaptation of a moral insight, whether taken from Law or not y _ 
into the political world* This adaptation indicates the . 
closeness of political issues with moral issues in Johnson’s 
mind and illustrates in reverse his method of reducing large 
political questions to their effect upon the individual. If 
general policy must be empirically tested in the practical 
world of' men and women, then those methods which have been 
proved effective in the ethical life of the individual each 
be practiced in the larger realm of general politics for 
their beneficial effect.
Much good can come as a-result of the aforementioned
kind of ""prosecution of private interest*"; In the community y
the desire of the individual citizen to better his condition 
*
of life can lead him to work industriously and diligently 
at his trade; in this way, he provides not only himself but 
also all his fellow citizens with more of the "conveniences" 
of life. In the world of the intellect, as opposed to that 
of physical labor, "neighbourhood[colleges or groups of 
scholar^, where it does not conciliate friendship, incites 
competition, aind he that would contentedly rest in a lower 
degree of excellence, where he had no rival to dread, will 
be urged by his impatience of inferiority to incessant 
endeavors after great attainments* These stimulations of
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honest rivalry, are, perhaps,, the chief effects of academies 
and societies."! Hence, the inequality of conditions, 
while it can and does cause some pain and distress, must be 
considered natural and ordained ; it is also responsible for 
much of the improvements of maJikind, both in the domain of 
physical needs and mental activity.
Johnson consequently places the responsibility for 
effective government squarely upon the two classes who com­
pose. it : those who rule and those who are ruled. Unlike 
those who held to the growing belief that man was inherently 
good, but was made evil by unnatural customs, prejudicial 
institutions and laws, and that he need only **'change the en­
vironment in which children grow up, and in a generation or 
two all the evils will wither and blow a w a y ,,"2 Johnson clung 
to his view that wholesale change was dangerous in the ex­
treme and that the present system was adequate if each mem­
ber of society fulfilled his individual responsibility to the 
community* The effectiveness of government, therefore, 
depended upon the manner in which ruler and subject performed 
their respective duties.
ii
There is, unfortunately, another kind of strife that 
neither meliorates the "condition of life*^ nor advances the
^Adventurer, No. 45, IV, 20.
2Louis Bredvbld, The Brave New World of the Enlight- 
enment (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 
1961), p. 108.
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"boundaries of science.'^ This kind^ caused predominantly
by envy or "interest,.** that is, greed, is **of a pernicious
and destructive kind,
which daily disturbs the quiet of individuals, and too 
frequently obstructs, or disturbs, the happiness of 
nations ; a strife which always terminates in confusion."1
The envy which produces this kind of strife is present
in all levels and precincts of life.
Envy is almost the only vice which is practicable at 
all times, and in every place; the only passion which 
can never lie quiet for want of irritations: its effects 
therefore are everywhere discoverable, and its attempts 
always to be dreaded.2
It is **mere unmixed and genuine evil; it pursues a hateful
end by despicable means, and desires not so much its own
happiness as another * s m i s e r y . "3 it is produced by the
hope of alleviating the sense of our dispaority by lessen­
ing others, though we gain nothing to ourselves.4
Since the strife proceeding from this source is so 
dangerous to political society and since envy is so "various 
in its appearance, , . . often disguised by specious pre­
tences" or "removed from notice by intermediate causes,"^ 
every individual who is desirous of maintaining order and 
peace in civil society through government should recognize
ISermon XXIII, IX, 498.
ambler. No. 183, III, 356.
3 l b i d . ,  p. 358.
4ibid., p. 355.
SSermon XXIII, IX, 500.
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what Johnson calls ’♦'tokens” of that strife proceeding from 
envy.
One symptom of this malevolent strife arising from
"corrupt Passions” is a disproportion between the significance
of the ends proposed and the "vehemence” of the means to
those ends. As most men prefer quiet to discord and would
rather live in ease than expand great energy for some cause,
so most men involve themselves in "tasks of difficulty" or
"suffer hardships" only for some reward greater than the ease
which thëV give up* If, however, the end for which a man
labors does not seem worthy of "so much assiduity," then he
may justly be suspected of forming, to himself,
some imaginary interest, and • • • seeking his: grati­
fication, not in that which he himself gains, but which 
another loses.^
The kind of strife which disrupts society, proceeding 
as it does from envy, can also be recognized by a second 
token, the use of "unlawful means" to attain the "blessings” 
of this life. Even if a man proposes for himself some 
acceptable or valuable end, he has no right to utilize-any 
but
the just and allowed methods of attaining it. To do 
evil that good may come, can never be the purpose of a 
man who has not perverted his morality by some false 
principle.^




earlier, though there it was applied specifically to men in 
office*.
If the Legislative Powers shall, in making Laws, 
discover that they regard any Motives before the Ad­
vantage of their Country, dr that they pursue the Pub- 
lick Good by Measures inadequate and ill-concerted, 
what can be expected from the People, but that they 
should set up their own Judgment in Opposition to that of 
their Governors, make themselves the Arbiters in all 
doubtful Questions, and Obey or disregard the Laws at 
Discretion.1
That the ends never justify the meams is not sinq>ly a moral 
maxim for private conduct but is a principle applicable in 
every compartment of life. Johnson's application of moral 
principles to political actions illustrates his approach to 
the problems of life: all questions concerning men are ulti­
mately moral and can find their satisfactory answer only in 
solutions based solidly on religious principles.
A third "'token** of that pernicious kind of strife 
which disorders society can be seen in the use of **unlawful 
means . . .  in preference to those which are recommended by 
reason, and warranted by justice.**^ The unnecessary utili­
sation of power in gaining an object when that object could 
be obtained through law or mediation can mean only that power 
was chosen not to gain but to humble the former possessor.
An individual can therefore utilize unjust means not only to 
obtain whatever ends he desires, but also to cause misery or 
distress by choosing them in lieu of readily available means
^«Debates," XII, p. 240.
2sermon XXIII, IX, 501.
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sanctioned by society. The former kind of immoral activity 
arises from greed, the latter from envy, probably the most 
vicious of sins in Johnson's eyes. Johnson makes this obser­
vation the basis of his plea for moderation in the conflict of 
England and Spain over Falkland's Islands,
But when we ^ngland^J have obtained all that was asked,
[an apology and withdrawal from the islands by Spaij^ why
should we complain that we have not more? « • • To push 
advantages too far is neither generous or just, , • • The 
utmost exertion of right is always invidious
iii
There is yet one other kind of strife in the affairs 
of men* It cannot be judged with absolute certainty as to its 
origins and validity, that is, whether it proceeds from just 
or unjust motives. This is that which arises from contentions 
against "legal superiority," The difficulty in judging arises 
from the nature of government, which gives to some men power 
over others. This power too frequently blinds those who pos­
sess it to the needs of the people for which it is exercised.
Thus it happens that
Power will sometimes be abused, and Punishment sometimes be escaped,2
In its most extreme form the effect is this:
learned , , , by Experience that exorbitant 
Power will always produce Exorbitant Pride, that very 
few when they can oppress with Security, will be con­
tained within the Bounds of Equity by the Restraints of Morality or of R e l i g i o n , 3
^Thoughts on the Late Transactions respecting Falk- 




If those in possession of power misuse it to the detriment of
society, and in so doing fail of their responsibility as
leaders and rulers, then
such insolence • • • may justly be restrained and such op­
pression • • • may be lawfully resisted.1
This is the only place in Johnson's works that I have found 
in which he justifies rebellion to acknowledged authority.
Here, rebellion is permitted on the basis of the failure of 
those who possess that authority to use it properly, to pro­
vide a fundamental security and protection for the individual, 
without which no individual in society can pursue the blessings 
and happiness of life. This is more of an apparent than a 
real contradiction of Johnson's usual position, I believe, 
since his words are "lawfully resisted," not "lawfully re­
belled against." Johnson is advocating resistance but not 
total rebellion against the established order. Total re­
bellion-complete overthrow of the government— had occurred 
and would possibly occur again, but such rebellion usually 
took place in such a desparate situation that law and order 
was already lost and each political act could be measured only 
against its ability to return society to its former harmony.
This.belief is at the bottom of Johnson's argument
with Adam Fergusson about power and the king.
The crown [he says to Fergusso^ has not power enough.
When I say that all governments are alike, I consider 
that in no government power can be abused long. Mankind 
will not bear it. If a sovereign oppresses his people
^Sermon.XXIII, IX, 502.
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to a great degree, they will rise and cut off his head. 
There is a remedy in humein nature against tyranny, that 
will keep us safe under every form of government.^
Rebellion is such a desparate act that although it has happen­
ed on certain occasions, it must be remembered that
many modes of tyranny have been practiced in the world, 
of which it is more natural to ask, with wonder, why they 
were submitted to so long, than why they were at last op­
posed and quelled.2
One example of this fact for Johnson was the unhappy state of
Ireland.
The Irish are in a most unnatural state; for we see there 
the minority prevailing over the majority. There is no 
instauice, even in the ten persecutions, of such severity 
as that which the Protestants of Ireland have exercised 
against the Catholics.3
The wonder in this case is not so much at the submission to
English tyranny--English arms being the obvious explanation--
but at the boldfaced manner in which this tyranny is imposed.
'Man has then a remedy for the misuse of government 
which is both accessible and practical, although as Johnson
^Life of Johnson, II, 170, Johnson did not foresee 
the great progress in technology that science was to make and 
therefore could not not know how it would be possible for mod­
ern forms of totalitarian government to control 1 surge numbers 
of the population of a country through the use of highly de­
veloped means of communications, of powerful weapons, and of 
rapid methods of transportation. His point, nevertheless, 
still has validity, I believe, in that the only real safeguard 
against tyranny must come from the people who are being gov­
erned and from them alone. No outside force can render a
country safe from despotism, even though it may remove a psur- 
ticular tyrant at a particular time. Liberty must grow from
within; it cannot be grafted on from without.
^Sermon XXIII, IX, 502
^Life of Johnson, II, 255.
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is always quick to point out, it is also a dangerous and dras­
tic one* Rebellion is a great upheaval in the body politic 
in which no man can feel safe or secure. It is actually a 
war, a civil war, and to Johnson "war , « . was one of the 
heaviest of national evils, a calamity in which every species 
of misery is involved*"^
Johnson’s recognition of the need for an escape from
the abuse of power is not, of course, a criticism of authority
and power per se.
• * * history and experience inform us that power and 
greatness grow wanton and licentious, that wealth and 
prosperity elate the mind, and enslave the understanding 
to desire, and when men once find that no one has power 
to control them, they are seldom very attentive to jus­
tice, or very careful to control themselves*2
There are facts which must be recognized, but, even though
they are acknowledged, they must not be allowed to distract
from other equally pertinent truths: the strife that arises
from objections to and altercations with recognized authority
is very often the result, not of honest or just attempts to
rectify the misuse of authority, but of the discontent of
those who find living under the regulations of a civil state,
administrated by men given superior places by that state, a
distressing and vexing experience. We do well to recognize
the temptations that beset men in authority but
history and experience will likewise show us, that the 
contrary condition has its temptations and its crimes,
iThe Patriot. VI, 220.
^Sermon XXIII. IX, 502.
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that he, who considers himself as subject to another, 
and liable to suffer by caprice or wickedness, often 
anticipates the evils of his state, imagines himself 
to feel what he only fears, and imputes every fzd-lure 
of negligence, or start of passion, to studied tyranny 
and settled malevolence.1
This kind of destructive strife is unfortunately pos­
sible under any form of government:
whoever rises above those who once pleased themselves 
with equality, will have many malevolent gazers at his 
eminence. To gain sooner than others that which all 
pursue with the same ardour, and to which all imagine 
themselves entitled, will for ever be a crime.2
This uneasiness in the presence of superiority is unhappily
an inevitable reaction, since it arises, Johnson believed,
from the constitution of man himself.
There is in every mind, implanted by nature, a desire 
of superiority, which counteracts the pleasure, which 
the sight of success and happiness ought always to im­
part. Between men of equal condition, and therefore 
willingly consulting with each other, any flow of for­
tune, which produces inequality, makes him who is -left 
behind look with less content on his own condition, and 
with less kindness on him who has reduced him to inferi­
ority. The advancement of a superior gives pain by in­
creasing that distance, by difference of station, which 
was thought already greater than could be claimed by anydifference.3
The temptation to the governed is thus in the direction of an­
archy, just as the temptation of the governors is in the di­
rection of tyranny. Both governed and governors must control 
those impulses and submit, one to the responsibilities of 
power, the other to the duties of a citizen.
^Ibid.
Gambler, No. 172, III, 310. 
^Sermon XI, IX, 389.
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If the impulse to resist is not subdued but is allowed
expression, then danger to society grows with each expression.
When the passions of resistance [to lawful authority] are
once in motion, they are not easily appeased, or checked.
He that has once concluded it lawful to resist power, 
when it wants merit, will soon find a want of merit, to
justify his resistance of power.1
This kind of destructive resistance must be stopped at once, 
since it strikes at the foundation of the political order-- 
obedience to government--and provides a rationalization for 
the improper resistance to lawful authority. This belief of 
Johnson’s concerning envy as the basis of much rebelldous ac­
tivity stands behind his famous, “Patriotism is the last re­
fuge of a scoundrel.” Many political agitators were simply 
men envious of the superiority granted others by governmental 
position. By declaring the honor and safety of government 
their motive, these men hoped to win, through their “patri­
otism," the power they displaced from those in office by .their 
vicious attacks. Their actual motives were, of course, envy 
and greed.
iv
The nature of government is therefore responsible for
the grave danger involved in these attacks on it. If
all government is the power of the few over the many,
QzherT] all government subsists upon o p i n i o n . 2
By opinion, Johnson means the willingness of those ruled to
ISermon XXIII, IX, 503.
^“Vinerian Lectures," p. 84.
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submit to the guidance and control of the few men who are in­
vested with the office of government. Thus:
• • • once we £he House of Lord0 lose the Esteem of the 
Public, our.Votes, while we shall be allowed to give them, 
will be only empty Sounds, to which no other Regard will 
be paid than a. standing army shall enforce.1 ,
For this reason Johnson refuses the naone of patriot to one
who would
insult a king with a rude remonstrance, only because 
there is no punishment for legal insolence. . • • For it 
tends to the subversion of order, and lets wickedness 
loose upon upon the land, by destroying the reverence due 
to sovereign authority.2
Much of the criticism of various forms of government,
then, stems from the **vitious passion”" of an individual who
is rebelling against his proper subordinate position in the
scheme of civil society. Such criticism believes
that every mischief of chance • * .Results froD^ill 
designs, and that • • • they are • • • injured by an ad­
ministration,, either unskillful, or c o r r u p t .3
The men who believe this fail to consider that
If possibility of abuse be an argument against authority, 
no authority ever can be established: if the actual abuse 
destroys its legality, there is no legal government now 
in the wprId.^
The best that can be expected of ""those who are in­
trusted with the Chief Direction of great Numbers of Sub- ' 
officers" is that under them
l"Debates," XI, 395.
2The Patriot. VI, 217.
3Sermon XXIII, IX, 503.
^False Alarm. VI, 159.
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corrupt Practices are not frequent, and their Justice 
such, that they are never unpunished when legally de­
tected.1 . .
If men refuse to understand this fact about government, and 
create difficulties and' strife which undermine it, they do in­
jury to society and injustice to those who compose the gov- 
ernment•
.Just as the strife which accompanied the competition 
for superiority, preference, and position produced both the 
’’necessities” and ’Conveniences” of life and the advancement 
of science, so the strife which is involved in the unjust at­
tempts of men to gain the ’’blessings” of life or to rebel 
against the lawful power of the state will end in the
destruction of order, . • • the abolition of stated reg­
ulations, C^n^ must fill the world with uncertainty, dis­traction, and solicitude.2
Whatever the motives, however--boredom, desperation, hurt
pride, or despair at the status quo--many men have ignored
the pain and distress caused society by the dissolution of
government, so that they may have a better chance at ”honor
or wealth.” For
when sedition and uproar have once silenced law, and con­
founded property, then is the hour when chance begins to 
predominate in the world, when every man may hope without 
bounds, and those who know how to improve the lucky mo­
ment, may gain in a day what no length of labour could 
have procured, without the concurrence of casual advantage.2
1"Debates,” XI, 457.
2Sermon XXIII, IX, 503.
^Ibid., p. 504.
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One man’s advantage here is society’s disaster* The
confusion and disorder that enable a few men to gain riches
and honor immediately have a price paid by the many in ’*uni-
versal m i s e r y T h e  confusion which follows this evil strife
completely foils the purpose of government and permits the
return of the state of unrestrained nature.
The great benefit of society is that the weaLk are pro­
tected agadLnst the strong* The great evil of confusion 
is that the world is thrown into the hamds, not of the 
best, but of the strongestj.that all certainty of possess­
ion or acquisition is destroyed; that every man*s cauce 
is confined to his own interesty and that general negli­
gence of the general good makes way for general licen­
tiousness.^
From unlawful or unjust opposition to government to the un­
regulated rule of the strongest is but a stepy for govern­
ment is a fragile thing, built on the-mutual consent of gov­
ernment amd people--governors and governed. If the consent 
of the governed is destroyed by the insidious and pernicious 
efforts of corrupt men, then chaos and old night are come 
again.
But as the great end of government is to give every man 
his own, no inconvenience is greater than that of making 
right uncertain. Nor is any man more am. enemy to pub­
lic peace, than he who ̂ fil^s weak heads with imaginary 
cladLms, and breaks the series of civil subordination, 
by inciting the lower classes of mankind to encroach upon the higher*2
But government must equally have the consent of those 
in authority if it is to function properly*
- J-Ibid*
2U.fe of Johnson, II, 244*
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Politicians remark, that no.oppression is so heavy or 
lasting as that which is inflicted by the perversion amd 
exorbitance of legal authority* The robber may be seized, 
and the invader repelled, whenever they are found; they 
who pretend no right but that of force, may by force be 
punished or suppressed* But when plunder bears the name 
of impost, and murder is perpetrated by a judicial sen­
tence, fortitude is intimidated, and wisdom confounded: 
resistance shrinks from aoi alliance with rebellion, and 
the villain remains secure in the robes of the magis­
trate*^
This consent is given implicitly by the possessors
of rank and power, when they act in accord with what Johnson
considers the duties and responsibilities of authority* In
a system such as the English one, for instance,
the true Interest * * * of every Monarch, is to please 
the People*2
As the monarch is
invested with all the rights and powers of royalty, so 
he must necessarily be bound • * * to the performance 
of those duties for the sake of which his rights and 
powers are conferred on h i m * 3
The first of these duties consists of the proper use of power,
Their superiority is not to be considered as a sanction 
for la^ness, or a privilege for vice* They are not to 
conceive, that their passions are to be allowed a wider 
range, or their appetites set more free from subjection 
to reason, than those of others* They are not to consult 
their own glory, at the expense of the lives of othersj 
or to gratify their avarice, by plundering those whom 
diligence and labour have entitled to aiffluence* They 
are not to conceive that power gives a right to oppress, 
.and to punish those who murmur at o p p r e s s i o n . 4
^Rambler* No* 148, III, 201*
2«Debates,” XI, 414*
3»»vinerian Lectures,** p* 94*
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 508*
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Second, he must, if the "true tenderness for the 
People" be his guidg,
consult their Advantage, • • • protect their Liberty,, 
and • • • preserve their Virtue»^
To put it another way, he should
preserve their Liberties, their Reputations, and their 
Commerce
In more general terms, those who are placed in author­
ity
are to look upon their power,, and their greatness, as 
instruments placed in their hands^ to be employed for 
the publick advantage* • • • They must reflect, that it 
is their duty to secure property from the attempts of 
rapine and robbery, and that those whom they protect 
will be very little benefited by their care, if what they 
rescue from others they take away themselves
These are heavy duties for any occupation. It is 
understandable that people in a subordinate position should 
accept that position even though it is displeasing to them, 
since a revolt against their station on the part of a large 
number means the loss of all positions, security, and order. 
Thus an individual receives the benefits of peace for accept­
ing an unpleasing state of inferiority. But why should a 
person placed in authority accept all these difficult re­
strictions on its use? No doubt, the examples of Charles I 
and Jaumes II provided some kind of incentive to discretion 
in its exercise,, but many other men who misused their power,
^"Debates," XI, 410.
2lbid., p. 414.
3sermon XXIV, IX, 508.
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Charles IX to go no further, could be cited as encouraging 
examples to wilfulness. This danger alone would not stop 
the abuse of power.
The practical benefits of government afe peace and 
order— not national peace or international peace— but peace 
in every day life, in the village, town, and city. The dis­
order that follows insubordination is equally concrete, for 
in thé"anarchy that fills the space left by government, man 
is
driveny by forces from the comforts of life, is compelled 
to leave his house to a casual comer, and, whatever he 
does, or wherever he wainders, finds, every moment, some 
new testimony of his own subjection to the anarchic forces 
of brute strength.^
Johnson answers the question of practical benefits
to the ruler by turning to the actual experience of men with
power as it has been recorded throughout history.
It appears from those struggles for dominion, which 
have filled the world with war, bloodshed, and desolation, 
and have torn in pieces almost all the states and king­
doms of the earth, . . .  that there is somewhat in power 
more pleasing than in any other enjoyment ; and, con­
sequently, to bestow upon man the happiness of ruling 
others, is to bestow upon him the greatest benefit he 
is capable of receiving,2
The benefits of the rulers corresponding to those of the
ruled, then, are the intense gratifications derived from the
use of power, and they are the price paid for the difficult
job of properly exercising power.
^Taxation No Tyranny, VI, 229.
Zsermon XXTV, IX, 508-509.
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The bestowal of the privilege of power upon an in­
dividual places that individual under great debt. For if 
the pleasures of power are so great, then the possessors of 
power are greatly in debt to the people responsible for 
giving them that power» Hence, the responsibilities of 
authority are not only enforced by the dangers of not meeting 
them, that is, rebellion, but also by the moral law in which 
justice requires that an individual "'requite . » » a benefit,**
Nothing then can equal the obligations of governors to 
the people, and nothing but the most flagrant ingrati­
tude can make them careless of the interests, or uncon­
cerned at the misfortunes, of those to whom they owe 
that, for which no danger has been thought too dreadful 
to be encountered, , » .^ o ^  gratitude is a species of 
Justice.!
But those in power must obey a law other than the one which 
dictates an honest return for a privilege bestowed, important 
as this law is. This other law is based on the rights of thé 
people, the rights Johnson has sometimes been accused of 
ignoring.
The Welfare of the Publick • , , has always been allowed 
the supreme Law, and when any Governors sacrifice the 
general Good either to private Views, or temporary Con­
venience, they deviate at once from Integrity and Policy, 
they betray their Trust, and neglect their Interest
Johnson knew that the problems of government were not 
solved even though men recognized its importance to mankind. 
Within a governed state, man must not expect all the strife. 




not be destructive if all members of that society abide by 
the civilized rules of competition. If they do not, then 
they endanger the stability of the state by the destructive 
nature of their unjust methods of competition.
An equally dangerous weakness of government lies in 
the temptations of the governors. If they do not place the 
interest of the people above their own gain, then the people 
will, sooner or later, rise up and destroy them. In the 
process, the peace of the community will also be destroyed.
Johnson thus put the responsibility for the safety 
and happiness of the people upon the willingness of those 
people and their rulers to refrain from indulging their own 
desires at the expense of their fellow men.
CHAPTER V
THE ALLEGORIES
Johnson's two extended allegories. The Vision of 
Theodore, The Hermit of Teneriffe  ̂ amd The Fountains; A 
Faiiry Tale were separated by an interval of eighteen years, 1 
the former being published in 1748 and the latter in 1766.
The two works were probably both written immediately prior 
to their publication— Johnson's usual habit of composition.
By 1748 Johnson had a long and varied career as a journalist, 
mainly for the Gentleman's Magazine, which meant that he had 
become deeply involved in the most important political events 
of the last fifteen years; the fall of Walpole, the failure 
to impeach him, the War with Spain, and the War of the Aus­
trian Succession. The Parliamentary Debates which he wrote 
from 1741 to 1744 provided him with an excellent opportunity 
to observe the actual workings of England's government, while 
at the same time it gave him a chance to investigate from 
several directions many of the most important political
1-William Pridéaux Courtney and David Nichol Smith,
A Bibliography of Samuel Johnson (Oxford; The Clarendon Press, 
1925), pp. 21-22, 111-12.
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principles of his day. As James Clifford says.
Forced to make up a large part of his material, Johnson 
took the opportunity to stress many of his own dominant 
interests* In his imagined great arena of Parliament he 
could discuss what most concerned him— the power of the 
people,, representative government, basic questions of 
individual liberty and civic morality. He was always 
intent on a larger design, on universal principles. . . .  
Here was a ready-made public forum in which he could 
discuss at length the major political and ethical prob­
lems of the age.l
The effect of the years in London upon Johnson can
be seen in the contrast between the attitudes toward pastoral
retreat from the world as a method for finding happiness as
presented in Irene, written prior to Johnson*s arrival in
London, and in The Vision of Theodore, The Hermit of Tene-
riffe, written over a decade after his arrival. In Irene,
Demetrius asks Aspasia if she will be able to stand the forced
withdrawal from hereditary "Splendours’* caused by a failure
in the assassination attempt on Mahomet. He wonders if she
will be content
To live obscure upon a foreign Coast,
Content with Science, Innocence and Love?
{IV,i,104-105)
As was noted earlier in Chapter Three, Aspasia denies any
intrinsic worth to court society.
Nor Wealth, nor Titles, make Aspasia*s Bliss.
O ’erwhelmed and lost amidst the publick Ruins 
Unmov’d I saw the glitt * ring Trifles perish.
And thought the pretty Dross beneath a Sigh. 
Chearful I follow to the rural Cell,
Love be my Wealth, and my Distinction Virtue*
(IV,i,106-111)
^Young S ^  Johnson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com­
pany, Inc., 1955), p. 259.
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such sentiments about the ability of a "rural Cell" to provide 
enduring happiness and pastoral innocence delighting in **Love" 
and "Virtue" suffered severely in Johnson's hands many times 
later in his life, nowhere more devastatingly perhaps, than 
in Chapter XIX of Rasselas, "A Glimpse of Pastoral Life."
In The Vision of Theodore, this belief is discredited through 
the allegory of the Mountain of Existence.
The plot of the tale can be briefly summarized. Theo­
dore, the hermit, has retreated from the world because he 
found in it no happiness.
I (jTheodor^ was once what thou (^he reader of this t a l ^  
art now, a groveller on the earth, and a gazer at the sky;
I trafficked and heaped wealth together, . . .  I was am­
bitious, and rose to greatness; I was unhappy arid re­
tired.^
After forty-eight years of retirement, TheoddYe is pestered 
by a restlessness that drives hin to seek the summit of Mount 
Teneriffe, at whose foot he had been living all these years.
He finally gives in to his restlessness and attempts an as­
cent. Being old and laden with heavy supplies, he soon tires 
and falls asleep upon a small plain. He is awakened by a 
"benevolent Being," who learns that Theodore is seeking a "more 
extensive prospect of the works of nature"^ at the top of the 
mountain.
Theodore's "preceptor" then reveals to him in a vision 
the Mountain of Existence upon which an allegorical presenta-
^ h e  Vision of Theodore, IX, 162.
^Ibid., p. 164.
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tion of life as a journey upward takes up the rest of the tale. 
At the foot of the mountain where the ground was smooth and 
safe, ”a modest virgin in a white robe"! guided the people for 
a short while. She very soon gave over her followers to Edu­
cation, "a nymph more severe in her a s p e c t , " 2  who led them 
more cautiously and authoritatively into narrow and confined 
paths. Appetite began tempting the travellers at this time 
but was an easy enemy for Education to control, particularly . 
when it was separated from .Habit, Education’s most dangerous 
adversary.
Habit appeared in the form of a pygmy that could ei­
ther aid or hinder the sojourner up the mountain. If guided 
by Education, Habit helped smooth the road and grew slowly in 
size; but if Habit and Appetite joined. Habit soon grew large 
and bound the individual in slight but powerful chains which 
hindered or stopped him from following Education. From its 
first appearance, Habit remained a constant companion for each 
person, whether for good or evil.
As the way grew steeper and rougher. Education turned, 
her followers over to the last two guides: Reason and Re­
ligion. Although Reason "appeared capable of presiding in sen­
ates, or governing nations,"^ she still followed carefully the 






if Religion left her. Reason was, of "all subordinate beings 
the noblest and the g r e a t e s t , b u t  only Religion, as Reason 
explained to the new group, could guide them safely up the 
steep and difficult path to the mist at the top of the moun­
tain, wherein existed the "temples of Happiness
Those who followed Religion and Reason were tempted 
along the way by Appetites and Passions. These "seducers" 
were much more successful with the pilgrims who followed only
Reason, than with those who followed both Religion and Reason,
'
For Religion had Coi\science as an aide in recalling those who 
faltered, whereas Reason possessed only Pride, which often 
times betrayed rather than supported her. The greatest dan­
ger to the disciples of Religion was not Passion or Appetite, 
however, but Habit, which used its seemingly small and slight 
but actually powerful chains to bind those who wished des- 
parately to return to Religion’s road. Of course, if Habit 
were constantly controlled and made to work for the individual 
as he followed Religion, his path became easier, especially 
as he neared the mist at the top through which all travellers 
must at last pass.
For those who followed Reason alone, the path was 
naturally the same as that of Religion, Reason being merely 
the follower of Religion, but those who trod on it were in­
evitably led aside either by Passion, or by Appetite. Reason
^Ibid,, p, 168, ;
^Ibid,, p. 169.
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was incapable of guiding man on his proper course without the 
help of Religion, As Theodore was "musing on • . . ^ h ^  mis­
erable scene"^ which the fate of those who left the true path 
of Reason and Religion presented, ending as they did in the 
Cavern of Despair, he suddenly awoke from his vision with a 
last warning from his preceptor.
Remember, Theodore, and be wise, and let not Habit pre­
vail against thee.^
Theodore had noticed that some of the travellers dis­
liked thé treatment they received from Education and attempted 
to return to the first part of the mountain.
Some went back to the first part of the mountain, and 
seemed desirous of continuing busied in plucking flowers, 
but were no longer guarded by Innocence; and such as 
Education could not forcé bàckj- proceeded up the mountain 
by some miry road, in which they were seldom seen, and 
scarcely ever regarded,3
There is no way to escape the necessity of Education. The 
abortive return to childhood, the retreat to the pastoral 
innocence of simple flower plucking, must fail, since that 
. life can only be satisfactory to a child whose innocence 
makes him ignorant of the difficult moral problems of life, 
(Melville’s Typee is a good example of this kind of failure: 
the author cannot remain on the island because the satis­
factions that are perfectly adequate to the natives in their 





for insight and knowledge into the deeper problems of maoî»)
The **miry road** followed, by those who refuse to follow Ed­
ucation symbolizes several things* First* a person might 
quite literally be forced to walk in the dirt and mire if he 
is not educated, since only the meanest occupations would 
be open to him. But more significantly* the refusal to grap­
ple with the difficult and complex moral issues in life, which 
a retreat into a "'rural Cell"' often, if not always, involved, 
meant that an individual was incapacitated for the truly 
meaningful task of civilization and consequently would never 
achieve any award or honor from the adult community* The 
"tüdry road**" was neither the road of duty nor of honor ; it 
was the road of retreat and failure*
Johnson, did not indiscriminately condemn all with­
drawals from society, but only those made by persons who 
believe that happiness or bliss could be attained and misery 
and distress avoided by them, Mzin took his problems with 
him wherever he went,^ but if he understood this and was more
^Milton made this particular delusion one of the means 
of illuminating Satan’s evil and of exposing the crippling of 
his reason, which resulted from his sin, Johnson did not need 
Milton to arrive at this moral insight, but he would not have 
found it presented so dramatically or forcefully in any other 
author. In Paradise Lost, Satan first is described:
Horror and doubt distract 
His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir 
The Hell within Him, for within Him Hell 
He brings, and round about him, nor from Hell 
One step no more than from himself can fly 
By change of place,
(IV, 11. 18-23) 
Satan admits the truth of this description in a soliloquy
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capable of dealing with them in solitude and retreat^ then 
Johnson would not condemn him. This problem arises in Ras­
selas and Johnson presents what is probably his considered 
opinion through Imlac, the philosopher* Nelcayab^ the prin­
cess ; asks Imlac,
Do you think * • • that the monastick rule is a more 
holy amd less imperfect state than any other? May not 
he equally hope for future happiness, who converses 
openly with mamkind, who succours the distressed by his 
charity . . * and contributes, by his industry, to the 
general system of life . . . ?1
Imlac answers:
This . a . is a question which has long divided the wise, 
and perplexed the good* I am afraid to decide on either 
part* He that lives well in the world, is better than 
he that lives well in a monastary* But, perhaps, every 
one is not able to stem the temptations of publick life; 
and, if he cannot conquer, he may properly retreat* Some 
have little power to do good, and have, likewise, little 
strength to resist evil* * * * In monasteries, the weak 
and timorous may be happily sheltered, the weary may
a short time later when he says.
Me miserableI which way shall I fly 
Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?
Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell;
And in the lowest deep a lower deep 
Still thret*ning to devour me opens wide.
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav’n.
(IV, 11* 73-78)
Satan is a type of super rationalist who believes he can 
overcome the moral problems of living by reason (*mind*) 
alone, whereas the figures who retreat in Johnson’s allegory 
hope to evade them by refusing to use reason at all. The 
misuse of reason by both parties comes about through the same 




repose, and the penitent may meditate* Those retreats 
of prayer and contemplation have something so congenial 
to the mind of man, that, perhaps, there is scarcely one 
that does not propose to close his life in pious abstract­
ion with a few associates, as serious as himself»^
Johnson, like Milton, is unwilling to "praise a fugi­
tive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed,"2 
but he can see, unlike Milton in Areopagitica, some value 
in a retreat* The conditions he insists upon, such as 
weakness or old age on the part of the monasticks, excludes 
from consideration the popular notion of the bliss of rural 
retreat and the joys of pastoral innocence. Theodore himself 
has retreated from the world, not to find happiness, but to 
avoid the necessity "of purchasing the assistance of men, 
by the toleration of their follies"3; but even he is unable 
finally to still the restlessness and discontent brought on 
by the solitude. Irene, if we could follow her to her "rural 
Cell," would undoubtedly suffer the same fate.
iX
A deep involvement with the political and intellectual 
life of London, therefore gave Johnson much material emd ex­
perience to draw upon, particularly in the composition of 
an allegory. Both examples under discussion here draw 
heavily upon that experience as they embody in concrete form
1%, 303-304.
^Areopagitica in John Milton, Complete Poems and 
Major Prose ed. Merrxtt Y. Hu^es (New York: The Odyssey 
Press, 1957), p. 728.
^IX, 162.
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the specific problems which arise in the pursuit of happiness. 
In The Vision of Theodore that happiness is specifically eter­
nal happiness, signified by the ’’Temples of Happines^* which 
sit at the top of the Mountain of Existence, Of the two, The 
Vision of Theodore is concerned with the more general issues 
involved in questions of conduct, such as the proper use of 
reason, the need for education, the common dangers to moral 
judgments from the passions and the appetites ; The Fountains 
on the other hand, deal with more specific issues, such as the 
need for obediénce of a daughter to her mother, the treachery 
of beauty and/or wealth in personal and intimate relationships, 
the uselessness of trying to enforce faithfulness on a lover 
through external control.s, and so on.
Since the second division of the political thought 
was specifically concerned with the problems of conduct for 
the'individual in society, the allegories most clearly trans­
late the abstract formulations of this division.
The reason for this relationship can be found in the 
intention of the allegories. An allegory by its nature is 
intended to direct and reveal proper modes of behavior. Two 
of the greatest in the English language. Everyman and Pilgrim’s 
Progress, are both conduct books whose primary purpose of in­
struction has been fused with great literary ability; in cre­
ating allegorical figures of intense depth and unique detail, 
their authors have made them literary classics. Johnson’s 
creations do not possess the enduring literary art of Everyman
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or Pilgrim* s Progress « but his allegories share with them a 
moral purpose of persuasion and instruction in the conduct of 
life.^ It is this similarity in purpose between the second 
division of the politics and the allegories which accounts for 
their close relationship.
The Vision of Theodore embodies particularly, first, 
the important distinction between religion and reason as ap­
proaches to happiness and, second, the potentiality of habit 
for good and evil in the conduct of man in civil society. The 
former belief is one that continually appears in one form or 
another in a large variety of Johnson * s works, both fiction 
and non-fiction. Such recurrences of this question are not 
uncommon in Johnson * s age, since the impetus of scientific 
advancements, particularly of Newton in mathematics and as­
tronomy and Locke in psychology, were directing men to a re­
examination of every area of life, including religion. What 
is unusual, however, is Johnson's constant and undeviating 
subordination of reason to religion in the fulfillment of
^The Vision of Theodore was first published appro­
priately enough in the Dodsley’s The Preceptor t Containing A 
General Course of Education Wherein The First Principles of 
Polite Learning Are laid down In a Way most suitable for 
trying the Genius, and advancing the Instruction of Youth. 
(Courtney and Smith, p. 22.) Johnson also supplied the ”Pre- 
face" to this work. The importance of The Vision of Theodore 
as evidence in assessing Johnson's thought may perhaps be in- 
dicated by a statement of Boswell's. "The Bishop of Dromore 
[Perc;^ heard Dr* Johnson say, that he thought this was the 
best thing he ever wrote." (Life of Johnson, I, 192.)
The Fountains was first published in Miscellanies in 
Prose and Verse, by Anna Williams, in 1766, a work Johnson 
helped publish for the benefit of this blind lady who lived 
in his home. (Courtney and Smith, pp. 111-12.)
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man*s infinite capacity for desiring happiness--illustrated
particularly well by the allegories and Rasselas* He refused
to accept the popular belief that reason, utilizing the
scientific method in all provinces» could solve the age-old
problems that beset man* This attitude in the eighteenth
century that Johnson opposed is summed up by one modern his-
in this mannerÎ
Newton's life work, and especially for perfection of the 
calculus and his grand mathematical formulation of the 
relation of the planets and the laws of gravity, seemed 
to contemporaries to explain all natural phenomena, or 
at least to show how all such phenomena— including the 
behavior of hyman beings— could be explained* Locke, 
taking the methods of clear simple reasoning out of the 
bewildering metaphysics where Descartes had landed them, 
seemed to make them a nice extension of common sense*
He seemed to show men the way Newton's great successes 
could be applied to the study of human affairs*^
The popular belief in the fabulous abilities of "^reason"'
which Johnson opposed led many to hope for perfection*
Reason is at its clearest * * * as mathematics* Reason, 
argued the agents of Enlightenment, enables us to pene­
trate from appearances to reality* * * * Reason applied 
to human relations will show us that kings are not 
fathers of their people, that if meat is good to eat 
on Thursday it is good to eat on Friday. * . * Reason 
will enable us to find human institutions, human re­
lations that are **natural"^; once we find such institu­
tions, we shall conform to them and be happy* Reason 
will clear up the mess that superstition, revelation, 
and faith (the devils of the rationalists) have piled 
up here on earth*2
To Johnson, nevertheless, religion, not reason, had already
shown that these problems had no final solution on earth,
^rane Brinton. Ideas and Men, The Story of Western 
Thought (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), pp. 369-70*
2lbid*. p* 370.
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but must be wrestled with by every individual in his pro­
gress towards his final destiny, be it salvation or damnation. 
This kind of attitude was unpopular during Johnson* s own 
day and probably accounts for the disdain Macaulay held for 
him and certainly for the exaggerated praise Carlyle heaped 
upon him in the nineteenth centur’̂ when the problem of 
science and religion became acute.
Although the distinction between the importance of 
religion and reason in man’s pursuit of happiness is found 
in the first division^ of the political thought and not the 
second-—the section which the allegories illuminate most com- 
pletely-“it is too central and distinct in this tale, also, 
to ignore. Briefly, Johnson’s thesis is that temporal happi­
ness is always inconstant and that perfect happiness can 
exist only in another world. Accordingly,, it is to this next 
world that religion directs men, while it is in this world 
that reason dictates to them the form of government under 
which they hope to avoid as much of the misery and attain 
as much of the ’’blessings” of this life as is possible.
There must always be, consequently, a strict division be­
tween the function and importance of religion and reason in 
man’s search for happiness. This complex attitude is basic 
to The Vision of Theodore and is used as the premise from 
which certain other truths, ethical and, by implication, 
political, are drawn.
^See pp. 29-32 for this discussion.
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Even though the specific realms of reason and re­
ligion receive their demarcation in the first division, 
the distinction does have a particular relevance to the 
problems of conduct, for "reason** is assumed by Johnson in 
his political theory and explicitly stated in this allegory 
to be capable of functioning efficaciously in judging and 
following the best course to happiness. This is, of course, 
a general assumption which is not invalidated by the failure 
of men to 'actually choose the right path; the failure of men 
to actually do so indicates only the possibility of wyong 
choice.
Existence is divided into three stages in the tale:
childhood, adolescence and maturity, and old age. Theodore * s
description of the mountain clearly implies this division.
I ^heodor^• .' . observed the bottom of the mountain to 
be of gentle rise, and overspread with flowers; the mid­
dle to be more steep, embarrassed with crags, and inter­
rupted by precipices. . . .  The tracts . . .  nearest the 
top were generally barren.l
The individual is led by Innocence, personified by a **modest 
white virgin in a white robe, through the gentle and harm­
less paths at the bottom of the montain (childhood- and ado­
lescence), until Education, "a nymph more severe in her as­
pect, and imperious in her commands,"^ accepts them from 
Innocence and directs their steps onto the first of the more




difficult passages* Upon entering maturity, the individual
is released by Education, and his journey towards happiness
becomes very difficult.
At this stage, Reason and Religion are introduced
into the allegory. Reason being described, as was quoted.
above, ’•’as capable of presiding in senates, or governing
nations."I Theodore is directed by his ’•protector’̂ to speak
to these two ••powers of superior aspect.” He approaches
them and addresses the ”inferiour nymph.”
Bright power . . .  by whatever name it is lawful to 
address thee, tell me, thou who presidest here, on what 
condition thy protection will be granted?^
Reason’s answer indicates the important position that John­
son gives to this faculty in life*
It (protectio^ will be granted . . . only to obedi­
ence. I am Reason, of all subordinate beings the noblest 
and the greatest.3
The most important benefit Reason can confer upon man accounts
for its primacy in the hierarchy of man's powers* Reason
announces to Theodore,
if' thou wilt receive my laws, |lj will reward thee, like 
the rest of my votaries, by conducting thee to R e l i g i o n . 4
The positive function of Reason in aiding man in his diffi-
, - V  ■cult journey toward happiness is to Iqad him to Religion,
^Ibido, p. 167. 
2lbid.
^Ibid., pp. 167-68o 
4Ibid., p. 168.
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the only guide who can be trusted on the dangerous and 
treacherous path up the Mountain of Existence.
Reason has also a negative function which is carried
out by its reinforcement.of the teachings of Education. As •
the travellers.le^ve the tutelage of Education, they are met
by Reason who expatiates upon the grave dangers that await
them during the rest of their journey. .
Reason counselled them. . ... to enlist themselves among 
the votaries of Religion; and informed them, that if they 
trusted to her alone, they would find the same fate with 
her other admirers, whom she had not been able to secure 
against Appetites and Passions, and who, having been 
seized by Habits in the regions of Desire, had been drag­
ged away to the Caverns of Despair. . . . Pride has some­
times reproached me with the narrowness of my view, but, 
when she endeavoured to extend it, could only show me, 
below the mist, the bowers of content; even they van­
ished, as I fixed my eyes upon them; and those whom she 
persuaded to travel towards them, were enchained by Habits, 
and ingulfed by Despair, a cruel tyrant, whose caverns are 
beyond the darkness on the right side and on the left, 
from whose prisons none can escape, and whom I cannot 
teach you to avoid.^
■The warning issued by Reason convinced some of the travellers
of the truth of the lessons of Education.
Such was the declaration of Reason to those who demanded 
her protection. Some that recollected the dictates of 
Education, finding them now seconded by another authority, 
submitted with reluctance to the strict decree, and en­
gaged themselves among the followers' of R e l i g i o n . ^
Important as reason is the life of man, however, it 
nonetheless is still quite limited ; it can only advise; it 




feet happiness of the Temples of Happiness nor provide en­
during happiness here on earth, the former being the prov­
ince of Religion, the latter an impossibility. The inade­
quacy of Reason and the superiority of Religion in these 
matters is first confessed by Reason herself.
The path [^f life up the Mountain^ seems now plain and 
even, but .there are asperities and pitfalls, over which 
Religion only can conduct you. Look upwards, and you per­
ceive a mist before you, settled upon the highest visible 
part of the mountain; a mist by which my prospect is term­
inated, and which is pierced only by the eyes of Religion. 
Beyond it, are the Temples of Happiness, in vAiich those 
who climb the precipice by her direction, after the toil 
of their pilgrimage, repose forever. I know not the way, 
and, therefore, can only conduct you to a better guide.^
The dangerous weakness of Reason is next illustrated 
a short time later by the results of the conflicts between 
Habit and Reason or between Habit and Religion, When an indi­
vidual is overcome by Habit and cannot follow Reason and Re­
ligion, he can and often does call upon them for help.
Habit, insolent with her power, would often presume to 
parley with Reason, and offer to loose some of her chains, 
if the rest might remain. To this. Reason, who was never 
certain of victory, frequently consented, but always 
found her concession destructive, and saw the captive led 
away by Habit to his former s l a v e r y , 2
As a conductor along the precarious road to the perfect happi­
ness of the Temples, Reason lacks both the power to control 
and the strength to guide man.
Religion ([on the other han^ never submitted to treaty, 




the captive to whom she gave it did not quit his hold, 
always led him away in triumph, and placed him in the 
direct path to the Temple o-f Happiness. 1
The limitations of Reason are conclusively illus­
trated once more at the end of the journey up the Mountain, 
Those who have used Habit wisely in the practice of Reason 
and Religion walk serenely and confidently into the mist 
where Reason cannot see.
, , , they, whose Habits were strong, advanced towards 
the mists with little emotion, and entered them at last 
with calmness and confidence; after which, they were 
seen only by the eye of Religion; and though Reason 
looked after them with most earnest curiosity, she could 
only obtain a faint glimpsey when her mistress, to en­
large her prospect, raised her from the ground. Reason, 
however, discerned that they were safe,, but Religion 
saw that they were happy,2
Thus Reason cannot promise security and happiness in this life,
nor lead man to it in the next.
iii
Johnson's concept of reason has ramifications through­
out his political theory. The weaknesses of this faculty 
account for his insistence upon government and law as the 
only means of insuring order^ since the "’state of nature” 
which is the obverse of political union was merely a state 
of anarchy and savagery, whose only law was power and might. 
Johnson further believed that reason, by itself, was inade­
quate to control men in a civil state, because even just and 




for some objective tribunal to settle the dispute before it 
was settled by peace-destroying force. Johnson also knew 
that just men were not in all circumstances able to remain 
just*, andy finally^ that some men were simply going to ig­
nore reason’s dictate to sacrifice part of their own private 
happiness for the sake of the general good. Their refusal 
must result in the use of force to make them comply.
The embodiment of this complex of ideas in the forms 
of allegorical representation— the first indication of the 
deficiency of reason as the sole counsellor and judge in 
life--occurs when Theodore relates how quickly those who 
are climbing the Mountain of Existence are left by Innocence 
and taken by Education. The personified innocence of this 
early part of the journey is the innocence of childhood in 
which the young are protected and shielded from the cares 
and responsibilities that will be theirs soon enough. This 
childish innocence can exist only in the absence of power 
to do harm to others or to themselves (Innocence smiled if 
anyone ’’plucked a thistle for a flower,”1 a thistle being a 
harmless thing compared to the dangerous or poisonous fruits 
and flowers in the latter part of the journey which sym­
bolize intemperance or indolence), for as the child grows 
to the many so grows his power to destroy. Because this power 
must be controlled and channeled for the safety of civil 
society. Education soon forces these early travellers into
^Ibid., p. 165.
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"certain paths, in their opinion too narrow and too rough.
The failure of some to follow Education throws some inter­
esting light on Johnson’s relationship to one of the com­
monly accepted beliefs of the age.
Some went back to the first part of the maintain, and 
seemed desirous of continuing busied in plucking flowers, 
but were no longer guarded by Innocence; and such as 
Education could not force back, proceeded up the mount­
ain by some miry road,' in which they were seldom seen,, 
and scarcely ever regarded.2
In a seminal article entitled "The Parallelism of 
Deism and Classicism,"^ Arthur Lovejoy attempts to "outline 
briefly the characteristic idea-complex which constitutes 
what is commonly called the ’rationalism of the Enlighten­
ment .’ One of these characteristics Lovejoy called 
Rationalistic primitivism, which was the belief that, since 
reason was the same in all men, the truths of reason were' 
known to all men of all ages and races. Further, since the 
"minds of men of first ages were not corrupted by 'preju­
dices* at all,” then "What is universal.and uniform in m a n " 5  
must have been better known to them than to any other age.
For these universal truths apprehensible by all men have 
been ’’overlaid and obscured by historic accretions in the
llbid.
2jbid.
3jn Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore: Johns 




unhappy diversities of belief and practice of modern and 
civilized peoples.”^
Now while Johnson believed reason was the same in 
all men ("Uniformitarianism" as Lovejoy calls it in this 
same article)  ̂ this kind of rigorously logical application 
of it--particularly by the Deists in their attempts to 
arrive at a "natural Religion," of which modern Christianity 
was but a corrupted and impure version--is explicitly con­
tradicted here. Those who attempt to escape Education, and 
what is logically implicated, the life of Reason and Re­
ligion that Education leads to, proceed in life by some 
"miry" road, i.e., the road of a beast not a man. Man can­
not live as a man except by the use of his reason; it is his 
most important faculty. But for Johnson, this importance 
was not to be understood as granting reason the power, to 
rule alone. The "noble savage" was savage but not noble.
He was closer to a beast than a man, since Education did 
not lead him to the proper use of his Reason.
Thusy Johnson’s rationalism did not direct him to 
the primitivism of Deists in religion, nor did it lead him 
to an application of it in aesthetics,, where enthusiasts found 
as yet uncorrupted reason creating the best literature in the 
earliest ages. Johnson deeply admired ancient literature, 
but on literary grounds; his rejection of the Ossian forger­
ies. of MacPherson plainly indicates his refusal to subdue
Ijbid.
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his critical sense to the primitivist theory of unspoiled 
reason.^ Johnson believed deeply in the power of reason, 
as the example of those who escaped it shows, but this be­
lief was neither uncritical nor naive. For if reason had 
great power, it had also great weaknesses, and its gains 
were to be found where the priroitivists believed they were 
lost— in Education and in the civilized training of reason.
Since Education needs to be ‘*^severe” and to come so 
early, that which is to be trained^ the reason, must be 
either weak at this early stage, or weak at all times and 
in need of various supports, such as law,, government, and 
religion. The example of those who attempt to follow only
^ his belief also led to the search for the untutored 
and "natural" poet, e.g., '^Stephen Duck, the poetical thresh­
er man, Henry Jones, the poetical bricklayer discovered by 
Chesterfield in Ireland, James Woodhouse, the poetical shoe­
maker whom Johnson advised to stick to his last, and Ann 
Yearsley, the poetical pig-woman of Bristol." (Italics mine.) 
(Louis Bred VO Id, The Literature of the Restoration and Eight - 
teenth Century, 1660-1798, Vol. Ill of A History of English 
Literature ed. Hardin Craig (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 
pp. 162-63, See C. B. Tinker, Nature * s Simple fh.n (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1922) for a discussion of these 
"natural" poets and the belief that led to a seaurch for them.) 
The Woodhouse incident referred to occurs in Boswell:
He spoke with much contempt of the notice taken of 
Woodhouse, the poetical shoemaker. He said, it was all 
vanity and childishness: and that such objects were, 
to those who patronised them, mere mirrours of their 
own superiority, **They had better (said he,) furnish 
the man with good implements for his trade, than raise 
subscriptions for his poems # He may make an excellent 
shoemaker, but can never make a good poet. A school­
boy's exercise may be a pretty thing for a school-boy; 
but is no treat for a man."
(Life of Johnson, II, 127.)
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reason, as described by Theodore, proves the latter to be 
true.
These seducers(Appetites and Passion^ had the greatest 
success upon the followers of Reason, over whom they 
scarcely ever failed to prevail, except when they counter­
acted one another. . . .  They that professed to obey 
Reason, if once they forsook her, seldom returned; for 
she had no messenger to summon them but Pride, who gen­
erally betrayed her confidence, and employed all her 
skill to support Passion; and if ever she did her duty, 
was found unable to prevail, if Habit had inter-posed.1
The ’*benefactor** who awakened Theodore from his sleep 
to the vision of the Mountain of Existence points out at the 
end of the tale the fate of those who, after leaving Education, 
take only Reason as their guide. Theodore sees that the 
road of Reason is identical with the road of Religion, but 
that Reason had discovered the right way because Religion 
had instructed her. After this repudiation of the Deistical 
belief in ^natural religion,** that is, a religion discover­
able by all men through the light of reason, Theodore desribes 
what happens to those who attempt to guide their lives by 
Reason.
Reason was however at last well instructed l^y Religio^ 
in part of the way, and appeared to teach it with some 
success, when her precepts were not misrepresented by 
Passion, or her influence overborne by Appetite. But 
neither of these enemies was she able to resist. When 
Passion seized upon her votaries, she seldom attempted 
oppositions she sc - »d, indeed, to contend with more vigor 
against Appetite^ . *vas generally over-wearied in the 
contest ; and if either of her opponents had confeder­
ated with Habit, her authority was wholly at an end.
iThe Vision of Theodore, IX, 170.
^Ibid., p. 173.
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The nature of man makes a life of reason impossible. 
The power of his appetite and passions--as was noted before, 
Theodore gives intemperance as a specific example for the 
former and ambition for the latter— is too strong for reason 
alone. The effects of this weaikness demand in communal 
life civil institutions to sanction and to enforce the dic­
tates that reason receives from religion. But in both the 
political theory and this allegory, Johnson emphasises the 
inadequacy of reason as a guide for civilized living. In 
the former, reason must be supported by government to be 
effective and in the latter by religion. What the allegory 
makes clear is that Johnson's insistence in his political 
theory upon endowing government with strong powers stems 
from the experiences daily life presented to him of the pli — 
ableness of reason, of its failure to remain inflexible 
under the assaults of "Passion and Appetites.’* If in pri­
vate life the failure of religion led to the ^^Caverns of 
Despair,** then man, by giving government power to control 
and support reason, might possibly avoid this fate in the 
state.
The emphasis in The Vision of Theodore is constantly 
upon the unique ability of religion to provide permanent 
happiness and upon the inability of reason to do more than 
guide man to, and at times with, religion; however, in his 
political utterances, Johnson laid great emphasis upon the 
value of reason in raising government to protect men and
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in creating laws for them to live by. The difference in 
judgment is explained by the purpose of each* The Vision 
of Theodore is a moral allegory, stressing the religious 
nature of life ; the political axioms are temporal guides, 
stressing the possible benefits that can be had without con­
flicting with the religious order in life. In both cases, the 
root idea is t he same: permanent happiness can be achieved 
only by religion; temporal^ unstable, brief earthly happiness 
can be sometimes attained by reason working through govern­
ment and law. But reason must always turn for guidance, 
judgmeht, and sanction to religion, and must always expect 
failures and disappointments.
iv
With the importance of reason properly defined and 
affirmed along the same lines as those laid down in the 
first division of the political though, Johnson then embodies 
in the tale the potentiality of habit for good and evil, a 
potentiality which, in civil society, has a very strong in­
fluence upon the achievement of order and peace or upon the 
failure of that achieverent.
Johnson considered all government simply the power 
of a few over the many. As a consequence of this structure, 
power could be effectively utilized only so long as the • 
people accepted it and followed its direction. Generally 
speaking, people tended to obey those in authority by habit, 
by long continuance under the same laws and rules, provid­
ing there were no gross or outrageous abuses. Thus the habit
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of obedience, to lawful government was an important factor 
in maintaining peace and order, and for that reason, among 
others, Johnson opposed changes which disrupted the old 
habits.
It may, however, be considered, that the change of old 
establishments is always an evil; and that, therefore, 
where the good of the change is not certain and con- ' 
stant, it is better to preserve that reverence and that 
confidence, which is produced by consistency of conduct 
and permanency of laws.^
In the saune manner, a long, continued discord in the 
community likewise becaune a habit, one which destroyed se­
curity and peace. Thus it was necessary,, habit growing so 
quickly, to suppress as soon as possible "irreverence . . .  
to publick institutions,since that irreverence soon be­
came a constant and corrosive attitude to government and 
law. It was the long habit of acceptance of the Hanovers 
by the English people that finally led Johnson to accept 
them as the rightful heirs to the throne.
In the allegory under consideration. Education*s
counsel to those in her charge is closely related to this
political principle.
As Education led her troop up the mountain, nothing 
was more observable than that she was frequently giving 
them cautions to beware of Habits; and was calling out 
to one or another, at every step, that a Habit was en­
snaring them; that they would be under the dominion of 
Habit before they perceived their danger; and that those 
whom Habit should once subdue, had little hope of
^Considerations on the Corn Laws, V, 327,
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 515.
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regaining their Liberty.^
Habits, appearing on the Mountain as à ’’troop of pygmies” 
walking in front of these travellers and smoothing their 
way, each possessed a small chain in his hand with which he . 
attempted to bind the person who followed him. The travellers 
were benefited by the actions of these creatures so long as 
Education kept them from Appetite and forced them to clear 
away some of the roughness of the road.
Habits grew constantly, but at different rates, of
speed. Under Education, Reason, and Religion, they grew
—slowly but strongly, till at the end of the long journey they 
helped their followers walk calmly into the mist, the alle­
gorical representation of death. But when joined with 
Passion or Appetite, they grew quite differently.
But if they Qlabit^ once deviated at the call of Appe­
tite, their stature soon became gigantick; and their 
strength was such, that Education pointed out to her 
tribe many that were led in chains by them, whom she 
'could never more ..rescue from their s l a v e r y .  2
As noted before. Reason’s counsel to them as they enter under
her control is similar to Education's.
If they Qthe people travelling up the Mountain^ trusted 
to her Qîeasof^ alone, they would find the same fate with 
her other admirers, whom she had not been able to secure 
against Appetites and Passions, and who, having been, 
seized by Habits in the Regions of Desire, had been 
dragged away to the caverns of D e s p a i r . 3




Johnson's insistence in his political beliefs on the
necessity for the state to set up regular observances is
based upon his awareness of the power'of habit. Boswell
reports an incident which involves this belief.
One of them Qjuaker^ having objected to the 'observance 
of days, and months, and years,' Johnson answered, 'The 
Church does not superstitiously observe days, merely as 
days, but as memorials of important facts. Christmas 
might be kept as well upon one day of the year as an­
other ; but there should be a stated day for commemorating 
the birth of our. Saviour, because there is danger that 
what may be done on any day, will be neglected.1
(BoSwell goes on to say in the following paragraph.
He said to me at another time, 'Sir, the holidays ob­
served by our church are of great use in religion,'
to which he adds a characteristically Boswellian>comment :
There can be no doubt of this, in a limited sense, I 
mean if the number of such consecrated portions of time 
be not too extensive.2)
The habit of religious observance, like the habit of obed­
ience to constituted authority, was an impelling force to­
wards the maintenance of religion in the individual's life 
and of order within the staite. The converse was unfortunately 
true, as Theodore relates.
I soon found that the great danger to the followers of 
Religion was only from Habit ; every other power was 
easily resisted, nor did they find any difficulty, when 
they inadvertently quitted her, to find her again by the 
direction of Conscience, unless they had given time to 
Habit to draw her chain behind them, and bar up the way 
by which they had wandered.^
^Life of Johnson, II, 458.
^Ibid.
3 'The Vision of Theodore, IX, 170.
156
Johnson’s apprehension of habit’s potentiality for 
good and evil finds expression in The Vision of Theodore 
and his political utterances. If in the political beliefs, 
Johnson’s insistence upon obedience seems arbitrary, in the 
allegory it is shown to arise from his observation of the 
great power that habit can almost invisibly secure over 
people and the consequent necessity to combat an evil habit 
as soon as it appears. If a man can become addicted to wine 
or food, or become wedded to aimbition through habit, it is 
equally possible and dangerous that he can become, through 
irreverence to the law, addicted to disorder and lawlessness.
It is therefore crucially important that evil habits 
in the state--consisting primarily of a disregard for the law 
and order which government creates so that its subjects may 
pursue their own happiness— be discouraged. If they are not, 
this disregard upon the part of some unscrupulous or dis­
honest men sets a disruptive pattern which is imitated by 
others, until this imitation becomes an evil habit. The 
final result of such conduct will be to arouse such powerful 
and destructive strife within society that order, concord, 
and peace are destroyed.
Johnson gives a more concrete expression in The Vision 
of Theodore to other fundamental political ideas than just the 
two discussed. For example, Theodore is perturbed by his rest­
less desire to leave his hermitage after forty-eight years 
and climb to the summit of the mountain.
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This motion of my thoughts I endeavoured to suppress, 
not because it appeared criminal, but because it was 
hew; and all change not evidently for the better, alarms 
a mind taught by experience to distrust itself.^
This is a basic conservative principle of Johnson’s and has 
been used in attacks uf)on him as a blind reactionary. But 
in the allegory, Theodore’s mistrust is justified. First, 
Theodore left society where ”he was ambitious, and rose to 
greatness,” because after his rise he ’’was unhappy, and re­
t i r e d . I t  is not just an inflexible principle that Theo­
dore falls back on in not wanting to change; it is the ex­
perience that he has had which undeniably tells him that the 
change will merely be to what he has already found unsatis­
factory and has deserted. Second, the change that Theodore 
finally makes in leaving his hermitage and climbing the 
mountain ”to enjoy a more extensive prospect of the works of 
nature”3 is stopped by his exhaustion before it gets fairly 
started. When he is awakened from his sleep and explains 
why he is climbing Mount Teneriffe, the "benevolent being” 
tells him, ’’Attend first . . .  to the prospect which this 
place affords, and what thou dost not understand I will ex­
plain. What Theodore is seeking is actually there before 
him, just as what most men are seeking, at least in politics.
^Ibid., p. 163. 
^Ibid., p. 162. 
^Ibid., p. 164 
^Ibid.
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is already there, for example, liberty of the English people 
and freedom from the tyranny of monarchy. If they are not 
present, however, they will not be gained by simply changing 
from one form of government to another.
This shared attitude towards change in this allegory 
and the political theory is only one of several others that 
could be mentioned. But the two discussed earlier are the 
major concepts which the two works have in common and which 
receive most illumination by being compared.
V
The second allegory of Johnson's is The Fountains :
A Fairy Tale. In this tale Floretta, a young girl, rescues 
a beautiful goldfinch from a hawk and then immediately frees 
it. The goldfinch turns out to be a fairy called Lady Lili- 
net, who had been turned into a goldfinch by the Queen of 
Fairies for disobedience and sent out into the world in this 
shape until a single human being should disinterestedly help 
her. As a reward for her service, Li linet takes Floretta in­
to a cavern wherein two fountains called the Spring of Jdy 
and the Spring of Sorrow rise out of the ground. There Lili- 
net tells her that her wishes will be granted when she drinks 
from the sweet waters of the Spring of Joy, but that the 
’’ill effect” of any .foolish wish can be remedied only by 
drinking the bitter waters of the Spring of Sorrow.
Floretta wishes for in turn, and retracts soon after, 
perfect beauty, a faithful lover, a powerful, will, wealth, 
wit, great length of life, and finally, death. With possible
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exception of death, none of the granted wishes of Floretta 
proves capable of providing enduring happiness, but often 
brings misery instead. As in Rasselas and The Vision of 
Theodore, the search is for happiness, with a guide leading 
and teaching the initiate in and through the normative 
periods of life. These typical experiences are made possible 
by the device of the supernatural, with the exception of 
Rasselas where the wealth of the prince fulfills that 
function, and their lesson is the same: permanent happiness 
is impossible, although a certain amount of content and joy 
is possible if one will recognize and accept it.
The major relationship between the political beliefs 
of Johnson and his imaginative works rests upon this search 
and desire for happiness. The conditions of life that John­
son presents in concrete and individual terms in his imagi­
native literature are the same conditions that dictate his 
political beliefs. The Fountains illustrate in some specific 
detail two important tenets of hi^ political theory, one in­
volving the dangers of insubordination, and the other the in­
effectiveness of external agencies in promoting just conduct 
in society.
A certain amount of strife and contention was an in­
evitable concomitant of political union. This competition 
did not have to be destructive, but could be actually con­
structive if it followed the rules of reason and law.
Certain other kinds of strife, however, were inevitably
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present in society and tended to destroy peace and order, 
arising as they did from contempt of authority, from envy, 
or from some other "corrupt passion." Whatever the reason, 
such contention tended to erode the effectiveness of the in­
stitutional authority set up by society to distribute justice 
and to maintain the equilibrium and harmony of the state.
When people, who were accustomed to "reverence" these insti­
tutions, saw them flaunted, decried, or contemptuously op­
posed, their respect— the basis of their obedience— for those 
institutions and the rules, of order they enforced was dimin­
ished and in time destroyed. This kind of strife was in 
large part responsible for the necessity of authority in gov­
ernment and power in law to control it,^
Johnson embodies the first of these political con­
cepts in one of the episodes of The. Fountains. Some time 
after receiving the special gift of.the fairy Lilinet, Flor­
etta was
on some occasion thwarted by her mother's authority,
[so] she went to Lilinet, and drank at the alabaster 
fountain ^pring of Jo]^ for a spirit to do her own w a y . 2
One of the special qualities of the two fountains was that' the
intensity of sweetness or bitterness increased as the wish was
raised higher and higher, Johnson's great sensitivity to the
pleasures that possession of power granted the individual— he
iThis point is taken up in the next chapter.
^The Fountains : A Fairy Tale, IX, 183.
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made it the reward for the heavy duties and severe restrictions 
that should.always accompany its use--and the difficulties in 
subduing the will to an inferior position when society decreed 
it--the ’’natural" desire of all men for superiority protested 
against submission--is indicated by the sweetness of the 
water.
Lilinet saw that she drank immoderately, and admonished 
her of the danger ; but spirit and her own way gave such 
sweetness to the water, that she could not prevail upon 
herself to forbear, till Lilinet, in pure compassion, 
snatched the cup out of her hand.^
The great sweetness of the water indicates the powerful pres­
sures within men that push them from civil society, from sur­
rendering some of their own liberty for the liberty of all*
Such pressures, in turn, explain why Johnson insisted on 
granting strong authority and power to government as rein­
forcements to man's reason in giving up that libery.
The results of Floretta*s draught are soon apparent.
When she came home every thought was contempt, and every 
action was rebellion: she had drunk into herself a spirit 
to resist, but could not give her mother a disposition to 
yield; the old lady asserted her right to govern ; and, 
though she was often foiled by the impetuosity of her 
daughter, she supplied by pertinacity what she wanted in 
violence ; so that the house was in a continual tumult by 
the pranks of the daughter and opposition of the mother.^
Floretta* s failure to assume her properly subordinate
position results in a "constant tumult** in the house, which




anarchy comes into being when men leave their subordinate 
positions and refuse to obey their lawful superiors.
Johnson’s later criticism attacking the supporters 
of both the Wilkes position and the American colonies in 
their disputes with England is implicitly contained in this 
incident. In the first conflict, the refusal of the Middle­
sex voters to return a new candidate after Wilkes had been 
expelled and the general discontent raised against the King 
and government over his expulsion correspond to Floretta’s 
resistance and the resulting confusion in her home. In the 
latter case, Floretta represents the American colonies in 
their ’’spirit to resist” while Floretta’s mother’s ’’right to 
govern” represents England’s legitimate demands upon America, 
at least as far as Johnson interpreted the situation later.
In the case of Wilkes and the colonies, however, the ending 
was quite dissimilar from that of Floretta’s rebellion.
In time, Floretta was convinced that spirit had only made 
her a capricious termagant, and that her own ways ended in 
errour, perplexity, and disgrace; she perceived that the 
vehemence of mind, which to a man may sometimes procure 
awe and obedience, produce to a woman nothing but 
detestation; she, therefore, went back, and by a large 
draught from the flinty fountain, though the water was 
very bitter, replaced herself under her mother’s care, 
and quitted her spirit and her own way
The colonies and Wilkes found the fountain too bitter and set
up, as it were, their own home.
The relationship of England to her colonies, and of
^Ibid.. p. 184.
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one borough, county, or parish to England as a nation, were 
for Johnson closely analogous to that of parent and child.
If the child rebelled against the lawful authority of its 
parent, it mustj for its own sake as well as for the sake of 
the whole house, be brought under control.,. The limitation of 
the analogy is obvious: England may be the mother of her 
colonies or the different parts of the nation, but both of 
these have independent rights which, to carry the analogy 
further, have accrued to them as they have grown to maturity. 
The conflict centers upon what, in the analogy, is to be con­
sidered most important: the rights of the child or the peace 
of the home obtained, by the authority of the parent.
Burke attacks just this analogy in his Speech on
American Taxation and exposes the weakness.
A noble lord ^Lord.Carmarthei^, who spoke some time ago, . 
is full of the fire of ingenuous youth. . . .  He has 
said that the Americans are our children, and how can 
they revolt against their parent? He says, that, if 
they are not free in their present state, England is not 
free; because Manchester, and other considerable places, 
are not represented* So, then, because some towns in Eng­
land are not represented, America is to have no represen­
tative at all. They are "our children"; but when chil­
dren ask for bread, we are not to give a stone. . . .
When this child of ours wishes to assimilate to its parent, 
and to reflect with a true filial resemblance the beau­
teous countenance of British libery , are we to turn to 
them the shêimeful parts of our constitution? are we to 
give them our weakness for their strength, our opprobrium 
for their glory, and the slough of slavery, which we are 
not able to work off, to serve them for their freedom?!
Burke's approach to the problem, from the vantage point of
history, appears to be more reasonable, more practicable, and
^Burke, pp. 101-02.
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more capable of execution than the plan Johnson advocated and 
which Lord North followed. But the incident of .the allegory 
places this fault where it belongs, on Johnson’s sincere 
desire for peace and equally sincere belief in the lawfulness 
of the authority of England’s Parliament over its colonies and 
subordinate part s *
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The second fundamental political principle which 
Johnson expresses through the allegory occurs in the working 
out of another of Floretta’s wishes. Floretta’s first wish 
was for perfect beauty, but when it had been granted the 
jealousy and envy of other women and the obviously insincere 
compliments and flattery of courtiers soon destroyed the il­
lusion that perfect beauty could bring perfect happiness.
’■ After she had drank the bitter water from the Fountain of
Sorrow to return to her former ’’agreeable” state, she ’’lived
some time with great content; but content is seldom lasting.
Floretta returned to the Fountain of Joy and wished for a
’’faithful lover.”
After her return she was soon addressed by a young man, 
whom she thought worthy of her affection. He courted, 
and flattered, and promised; till at last she yielded 
up her heart. He then applied to her parents; and, find­
ing her fortune less than he expected, contrived a quarrel, 
and deserted h e r . 2
Floretta’s disappointment sends her in anger to Lili-
T̂he Fountains, IX, 183.
^Ibid.
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net, whom she accuses of deceit.
Lilinet asked her with a smile, for what she had been 
wishing; and being told, made her this reply. ’’You are 
not, my dear, to wonder or complain: you may wish for 
yourself, but your wishes can have no effect upon another.
You may become lovely by the efficacy of the fountain, 
but that you shall be loved is by no means a certain con­
sequence; for you cannot confer upon another either dis­
cernment or fidelity ; that happiness which you must derive from 
others, it is not in my power to regulate or bestow.^
(Italics mine.)
Floretta wished to receive the happiness that comes from a 
faithful lover; she attempted to obtain that happiness by 
the use of an external agency--magic. But this external 
agency is incapable of supplying happiness, of imposing upon 
another certain traits : faithfulness and honesty; and in­
suring certain results: happiness. Floretta’s lover, dis­
satisfied with her fortune, ignored the demand of either jus­
tice or duty and left. In the same way, men wished for sta­
bility and security, within which they could have a certain 
amount of freedom to live as they chose. In pursuing this 
desire, they joined in a political union and set the external 
agencies of government and the law to procure for themselves 
the happiness of a peaceful state. But like the case of Flor­
etta ’s unfaithful lover, these agencies can be only as de­
pendable as the disposition and character of the people who 
control them. Hence, to grant certain men high offices and 
the rewards that go with them will not insure probity or in­
tegrity. The men who are entrusted with the control and reg-
llbid.
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ulation of society through the established institutions of 
government must adhere to a moral standard in the perform­
ance of their duties. This moral standard in turn must be 
instilled early and practiced generally by a society if it 
is to prevail. In other words, the rewards and benefits of 
life cannot by themselves protect a people; the people must 
protect themselves by maintaining through their conduct the 
principles of justice and honor.
The root idea in both cases here is the same: from 
the character of man issues the quality of all his works 
and acts. In the political world, then, liberty and happi­
ness are not to be assured by civil institutions, but are 
to be gained only by placing good men within those institu­
tions; in the private world of men and women, the happiness 
of a faithful lover can be assured only by the honest char­
acter of that lover * In neither case, in so far aa John­
son could see, can there ever be absolute certainty.
In these allegories of Johnson four major tenets 
of his political philosophy have received expression in 
concrete and particularized form: 1) the important distinc­
tion between the respective ability of religion and reason 
to provide or guide man to happiness ; 2) the potentiality of 
habit for good and evil; 3) the disorder resulting from in­
subordination to lawful authority; 4) the inefficiency of 
external controls in securing proper conduct in government. 
The first point is probably the most significant of all four
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and to a certain extent is the basic premise for the other 
three, their true importance being always contingent upon 
an awareness of reason's limitations and religion's cen­
trality. The last three beliefs are related to each other 
by their basis in the problem of conduct. All three, in 
effect, point up the same Johnsonian hypothesis : government 
will succeed if each individual recognizes his duty to the 
general good and acts upon that principle. The key to ef­
fective government, as well as to all of mankind's complex 
problems, is the moral consciousness of the individual.
Some of what seems arbitrary,, reactionary, or merely 
prejudicial in Johnson's political theory becomes here more 
comprehensible, if not necessarily more valid. In the two 
works under consideration in this chapter, the clarification 
of Johnson's insistence on obedience and his indifference to 
politics seem to me the chief contribution in this regard.
By obedience to lawful authority, Floretta received one of 
the great benefits of society--peace and order--just as a 
habit of obedience to the same lawful authority provided 
ease to those struggling up the Mountain of Existence. Since 
Johnson emphasized the avoidance of misery more than the 
achievment of happiness, Floretta and the travellers really 
gain by avoiding the misery of strife and roughness.
Johnson’s apparent indifference to politics is clar­
ified by the limited ability of reason, operating within any 
political framework, to do much more than follow the path
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of religion, which will lead eventually to the only per­
manent happiness that exists: the Temples of Happiness after 
death. The incident of Floretta's unfaithful lover illus­
trated the weakness of all external agencies in providing 
happiness and explained, somewhat, why Johnson cared little 
for the outer form of government, but concerned himself 
greatly with the character of the men within it *
CHAPTER VI
THE POLITICS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON: SOCIETY, ITS BENEFITS, 
DISADVANTAGES, AND WEAKNESSES
i
Johnson thought the fundeumental goal of government, 
attained usually through the exercise of legal authority by 
individuals possessing governmental offices, should always 
be the happiness of the people. The primary function and 
duty of authority, then, is to provide the means for the 
attainment of happiness. Johnson turned to Locke in de­
ciding how this happiness is best to be promoted. Certain 
conditions are necessary for the growth of happiness :
It is well known that Gratitude is the Foundation of 
our Duty to our Country, and to our Superiors . . .  
(Becaus^ we receive Protection from them, and are main­
tained in the quiet Possession of our Fortunes, and the 
Security of our Lives.
In defining the end of law--the arms of government-- 
Johnson also emphasized the practical means, or what is the 
same thing, the Lockean means available to government for 
promoting happiness.




everybody that which he may justly claim, and the design 
of all juridical maxims and institutions is to adjust 
and satisfy the various degrees of right which may arise 
in the devolutions of succession, the reciprocations of 
contracts, the terms or conditions of credit and of 
partnerships and the various combinations of accident 
or commerce.!
Certain inalienable rights of man, liberty and prop­
erty primarily, form the heart of Locke's system of govern­
ment, and Johnson takes them over more'or less completely.
That established property and inviolable freedom are the 
greatest of political felicities, no man can be supposed 
likely to deny. To depend upon the will of another, to 
labour for that, of which arbitrary power can prohibit 
enjoyment, is the state to which want of reason has sub­
jected the brute. To be happy we must know our own 
rights; and we must know them to be s a f e . 2
The function of government, as was noted earlier, is 
therefore to protect man, his property, and his enjoyment of 
that property, from the power of all men stronger than he or 
of one man who has established himself through strength over 
all others. Johnson does not here mention the "extension of 
commerce’* which he says elsewhere is one of the great demands 
made upon government in England, along with "security of 
property, and the confirmation of l i b e r t y . "3 The reason for 
omitting this function as one of the important duties of gov­
ernment is his assumption about the essential and non- 
essential responsibilities of government. If "human society
!"Vinerian Lectures," in E. L. McAdaon, Jr.'s, Dr. 
Johnson and English Law (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 19517, p. 119.
2Sermon XXIV, IX, 510.
3Ibid.
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has its present form" from the "care to provide against the 
evils, and to attain the blessings of life,"l then, in a 
world where there is "much to be endured auid little to be 
enjoyed," the prevention of misery must be vital, while what 
energy is left can be devoted to the pursuit of the "little" 
that is to be enjoyed. Combined with this practical reason 
is perhaps a more compelling one: government cannot provide 
actual happiness to any individual, for happiness is an inner 
state dependent upon, finally, inner resources.
Thus it is that once Johnson has insisted that gov­
ernment provide men with security for their freedom and prop­
erty, he goes on to say that although this security "be 
necessary to happiness . . . it is not sufficient,"2 even 
in a
, nation like ours, in which commerce has kindled an uni­
versal emulation of wealth, and in which money receives 
all the honours which are the proper right of knowledge 
and virtue.3 '
Spain provided an excellent example of the inadequacy 
of mere material possessions to happiness which Johnson used 
in the introduction he wrote for the Lilliputian Debates, 
the flimsy disguise used by the Gentleman* s Magazine in re­
porting the debates in the English Parliament.^
^Sermon XVIII, IX, 452.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 511.
^Idler, No. 73, IV, 365.
^Johnson also used Spain to illustrate the failure 
of colonies to provide happiness for the mother country.
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Even Iberia ^pairQ, a Country at the Southwest Point of 
Degulia (Europ^, whose Inhabitants were the first Dis­
coverers of Columbia [Americ^, tho* she boasts herself 
Mistress of the richest and most fertile part of that 
Quarter of the World, which she secured to herself by 
the most dreadful Massacres and Devastations, has not 
yet, in all the Gold she has imported, received an Equiv­
alent for the Numbers of her Natives sent out to people 
those Kingdoms her Sword has wasted ; so that the whole 
Advantage of her mighty Conquests, is Bulk without 
Strength, and Pride without Power
The power and strength of the Spaniards have, in effect,
provided them with the opportunity to do evil to others.
Had the Spanish used their advantages properly,
when they first took possession of the newly-discovered 
world, • • • had [thé)Q either the urbanity or the policy 
to have conciliated them by kind treatment, • • • such 
an accession might have been made to the power of the 
King of Spain as would have made him far the greatest 
monarch that ever yet ruled in the globe; but the oppor­
tunity was lost by foolishness and cruelty.^
Even as
there is no desire so extensive, so continual in its 
exertions, that possesses so many minds, or operates 
with such restless activity; Qas^ there is none that dé­
criâtes into greater irregularity, or more frequently 
corrupts the heart of man, than the wish to enlarge 
possession and accumulate wealth,3
so when possessed,
liberty, if not regulated by virtue, can be only license 
to do evil; and property, if not virtuously enjoyed, can 
only corrupt the possesseur, and give him the power to 
injure others. Trade may maJ&e us rich; but riches, with­
out goodness, cannot make us happy.4
1Quoted by Hoover, Samuel Johnson*s Parliauaentary Re­
porting (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1953), p. 177.
3An Introduction to the Political State of Great 
Britain, VI, 129-30.
3Serroon XVIII, IX, 453.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 511.
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Government, therefore, not only is limited in its ability 
to achieve happiness for the citizens it serves, but also 
can actually provide some of them with opportunity to do 
evil to others: to spoil the happiness of many and to 
destroy the basic privileges realized by government* John­
son is here forcing political theory to operate on the 
practical level of human experience in order to ascertain 
its strength and its weakness. What he finds here, as he 
usually does, is that government partakes of the imperfec­
tions of the men who make it up and, hence, can be no better 
or worse than these men are.
ii
Even if "riches and liberty" are not in themselves 
capable of supplying happiness, nor free from destructive 
potential, they are still valuable in that they do dispel 
the misery and unhappiness of poverty and want* The next 
problem for government is "how riches and liberty can be 
secured."
To this the politician has a ready answer, that they 
are to be secured by laws wisely formed, and vigor­
ously executed*!
This answer, however, only apparently solves the problem,
for as Johnson points out.
It has appeared to some a question difficult of deci­
sion what is the use of a court of equity if our laws 
are right, and what is the use of laws if they are 
wrong* This question supposes in human institutions
libido
174
a degree of excellence which they never have attained*
No human law was ever perfect;, it has always equity for 
its object, but i t sometimes misses of its end,^
Johnson explained, a trifle impatiently, to the American
colonies this inevitable weakness of law and government*
That governours have sometimes been given them only 
that a great man might get ease from importunity, and 
that they have had judges, not always of the deepest 
learning, or the purest integrity, we have no great 
reason to doubt, because such misfortunes happen to 
ourselves. Whoever is governed, will, sometimes, be 
governed ill*^
It is undoubtedly "an evil" that the "innocent should be
confounded with the guilty," but "it is an evil which no
care or caution can p r e v e n t A s  with riches and liberty,
so with laws : their value depends wholly on the quality of
the men who create them and the use to which they are put *
Government suffers an intrinsic and inevitable flaw
in its structure*
The inseparable imperfection annexed to all human gov­
ernments , consisted, he Qjohnson^ said, in not being 
able to create a sufficient fund of virtue and principle 
■ to carry the laws into due and effectual execution.
Wisdom might plan, but virtue alone could execute* And 
where could sufficient virtue be found? A variety of 
delegated, and often discretionary, powers must be en­
trusted somewhere; which, if not governed by integrity 
and conscience, would necessarity be abused*^
It was by this consideration that Johnson stated:
It is, perhaps, impossible for human wisdom to go
^"Vinerian Lectures," p. 101.
^Taxation No Tyranny, VI, 250.
^The Patriot, VI, 222.
^Life of Johnson, II, 118*
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further, than to contrive a law of which the good is 
certain and uniform, and the evil, though possible in 
itself, yet always subject to certain and effectual 
restraints.!
The attainment of any kind of perfection of govern­
ment, any kind of permanent assurance of security and order 
for the individual under government, is impossible. The best 
that can be done is to provide as many safeguards as possible 
against the inevitable deficiencies. Even so, all
human laws, however honestly instituted, or however 
vigorously enforced, must be limited in their effect, 
partly by our ignorance, and partly by our wickedness.2
Johnson’s observations did not lead him to despair 
of all government. In a perhaps uncommon optimistic moment, 
he stated:
There is reason to expect, that, as the world is more 
enlightened, policy and morality will, at last, be recon­
ciled, and that nations will learn not to do what they 
would not suffer.3
The practical good of government, arrived primarily through
obedience to the law, can be achieved only by the willingness
of the people to abide by them. This willingness cannot be
legislated nor promoted by any outside means but must come
about through an inner conviction. Thus,
The only uniform and perpetual cause of publick happi­
ness is publick virtue. . . .  [The] deficiencies in civil 
life can be supplied only by religion.4
^Considerations On the Corn Laws, V, 324-25.
2sermon XXIV, IX, 512.
3Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falk­
land * s Islands, VI, 184,
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 510; 512.
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It must be remembered of course that this "perpetual cause" 
will never be strong enough to completely overcome the in­
herent evil in the world.
Infelicity is involved in corporeal nature, and 'inter­
woven with our being; and all attempts, therefore, to 
decline it wholly are useless and vain: the armies of 
pain send their arrows against us on every side; the 
choice is only between those which are more or less 
sharp, or tinged with poison of greater or less malig­
nity; and the strongest armour which reason can supply, 
will only blunt their points, but cannot repel them.l
What virtue can do is make rulers and followers persevere
in their duty and in this way maintain the public peace.
Unfortunately, the present state of the world affords 
us little hope, that virtue can, by any government, be 
so strongly impressed, or so widely diffused, as to 
supersede the necessity of suppressing wickedness.
. . .  However virtue may be encouraged or rewarded, it 
can never appear to all minds the shortest means of 
present good. There will always be those who would 
rather grow rich by fraud, than by diligence, and who 
will provide for vitious ^ic] pleasures by violence, 
rather than by labour.2
Though a governor may promote religion by maintaining and 
ordering public worship, by rewarding those who are most 
"eminent for sanctity of life," and by encouraging in every 
other way possible by exsumple and precept the value of right­
eousness, he cannot finally hope to effectually rule by 
these methods alone. He must resort to what Johnson calls 
"the vindictive law," the "Lex armata, that stands forth the 
champion of the weak, and the protectress of the i n n o c e n t . "3
iRambler. No. 32, II, 157.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 514.
^ibid.
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The nature of the world therefore requires us to turn
to this kind of law.
The world is full of fraud and corruption, rapine or 
malignity; interest is the ruling motive of mankind, 
and every one is endeavouring to increase his own stores 
of happiness by perpetual accumulation, without reflect­
ing upon the numbers whom his superfluity condemns to 
want: in this state of things a book of morality is pub­
lished, in which charity and benevolence are strongly 
enforced, , , , The book is applauded, and the author 
is preferred, , , . Let us look again upon mankind: 
interest is still the ruling motive, and the world is 
yet full of fraud and corruption, malevolence and 
• rapine,!
The effect of virtue is thus, while not ineffective over a 
long period as Johnson makes very clear in this same Ad­
venturer , not immediately or apparently of much force. Since 
"the greater part of mankind are corrupt in every condition, 
and differ in high and low stations, only as they have more 
or fewer opportunities of gratifying their desires, or as 
they are more or less restrained by human c e n s u r e s , "2 the 
necessity for law remains,
iii
Government must also use law for another reason in
ruling men. Even though all members of civil society were
just and virtuous, there would still arise disputes which
would destroy quiet and security.
Because it may easily happen, and, in effect, will happen, 
very frequently, that our own private happiness may be 
promoted by an act injurious to others, when yet no man 
can be obliged, by nature, to prefer, ultimately, the 
happiness of others to his o w n , 3
^Adventurer, No. 137, IV, 140,
2Rambler. No, 172, III, 310.
BReview of Free Enquiry, VI, 71*
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Force can be used to insure that a person will sacrifice
some of his own happiness, but
of force, it is apparent, that the exertion of it is an 
immediate evil, and that prevalence at last will be no 
proof of justice.1
Whereas in law,
A subject has . . .  a rule of action always safe, and 
commonly right; and where it happens to be wrong a remedyis provided.2
The law is thus the means of establishing order and security, 
by replacing the judgment of one man over another with an 
established rule to which all men can agree.
Even in the best of civil societies, laws and gov­
ernment will consequently be necessary, because civil society 
is in reality only a group of individuals who have banded 
together for mutual benefit and safety by surrendering some 
of their private liberty for public good. But the whole 
system depends upon the willingness of these individuals to 
follow the articles of agreement. It was apparent to. Johnson 
that this willingness was not going to be forthcoming at 
all times, dependent on man's imperfect nature as it was.
. . .  reason and experience are always ready to inform 
us of our real state; but we refuse to listen to their 
suggestion, because we feel our hearts unwilling to obey them.3
People can generally recognize their duties but they are
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 514.
^"Vinerian Lectures," p. 101.
3Adventurer, No. Ill, IV, 115.
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either not willing or able, by nature or circumstances, to
perform them. Even though
The depravity of mankind is so easily discoverable, 
that nothing but the desert or the cell can exclude 
it from notice,1
it is still true that
We frequently fall into error and folly, not because 
the true principles of action are not known, but because, 
for a time, they are not remembered,2
’’Error” and ’’folly” are misdemeanors, slight faults that need
not imply ’’depravity” or corruption. But these faults are
unfortunately not the most common, as Johnson points out in.
another context.
In publick, as in private transactions, men more frequent­
ly deviate from the right, for want of virtue, than ofwisdom.3
Consistency, especially in virtuous conduct, is simply not 
a characteristic of man, so law and government are required 
for all.
The wisest man is not always wise, and the best man is 
not always good. We all sometimes want the admonition of 
law, as supplemental to the dictates of reason and the 
suggestions of conscience.4
Since so much depended upon law and since the individual’s
I
obedience to that law was subject to so mamy disruptive and 
debilitating forces, Johnson analyzed at some length the
^Rambler, No, 175, III, 322.
2 Ibid.
^Observations On The Treaty, VI, 143, 
Sermon XXIV, IX, 515.'
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the process of effective enforcement. He saw that,the estab­
lishment of the vindictive law and its ability to work in. 
society
arises from the constitution of things ordained by Pro­
vidence, by which man is so formed and disposed that he 
can suffer more than he can enjoy.1
This principle, that "pain would be too powerful for pleas­
ure," was responsible for creating the law, which promises 
"every man a prospect of living more happily by forbearing 
thaui by usurping the property of another," and which results 
in the repression of the "passions of anger ajid revenge by 
making their gratifications the cause of immediate m i s e r y , "2
The fundamental nature of men again dictates the
structure of the political state in which they live#
He {̂ a "tragick poet'Q might have said, with rigorous 
propriety, that no man is happy but as he is compared 
with the miserable; for such is the state of this world, 
that we find in it absolute misery, but happiness only 
comparative; we may incur as much pain as can possibly 
endure, though we can never obtain as much happiness as 
we might possibly e n j o y . 3
iv
Nevertheless, even by making great misery and pain 
the result of disobeying the law, society cannot make the 
law permanently and totally effective. In the same way, the 
encouragement of virtue in society cannot make men virtuous 
enough to obey the law, simply through their reverence for
l"Vinerian Lectures," p# llO.
?Ibid.
^Adventurer, No. Ill, IV, 105.
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the rights of men that law protects. For "disobedience and
perverseness," on the part of some men, and what Johnson calls
"radicated wickedness” on the part of others, will undoubtedly
frustrate the effect of government at various times. Now to
hinder and frustrate government leads, too quickly, to the
eventual chaos of anarchy, which usually leads in turn to
tyranny. The natural course was this:*
Power is always gradually stealing away from the many to 
the few, because the few are more vigilant and consistent; 
it still contracts to a smaller number, till in time it 
centres in a single person.1
A state of anarchy simply 'provided the few with a good 
opportunity to gain power without the necessary restrictions,
as the safeguards against tyranny are destroyed by the gen­
eral subversion of all law. Thus, when complaining to.Bos­
well about the decay of subordination, Johnson stated: '
My hope is, that as anarchy produces tyranny, this ex­
treme relaxation will produce freni strictio fâ tight
rei^.2 — ------------- ^
To avoid both tyranny and anarchy, reasonable men must main­
tain and support government; they must stall its disinte­
gration by obeying the law and opposing those who are ob­
structing government or wealcening it by harsh or unecessary 
criticism.
Johnson was particularly sensitive to the weaJknesses 
that endangered the actual survival of government aind was
^Adventurer, No. 45, IV, 18.
^Life of Johnson, III, 262.
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quick to criticize those who were unwittingly weakening the 
very supports and foundation of civil institutions. This 
quickness stemmed from his knowledge of the fragileness of 
government, from his fear that the tenuous bonds of society 
would be unintentionally or maliciously broken.
The good of the whole demanded that some of the pri­
vate good of the parts be sacrificed. As some men were Ob­
viously going to be unwilling to make this sacrifice, the 
law was necessary to enforce it. The law, and the government 
for which it acts, depend, however, on ""opinion,** the coop­
eration of the mamy so the few can enforce these regulations. 
With this consideration in mind,
no ban, who desires the publick prosperity, will inflame 
general resentment by aggravating minute injuries, or 
enforcing disputable rights of little importance.1
By raising petty grievances and complaints into serious 
charges against government, the individual creates a poten­
tially dangerous situation.
Nor is any mam more an enemy to publick peace, than he 
who fills weak heads with imaginary claims, and breaks 
the series of civil subordination, by inciting the lower 
classes of mankind to encroach upon the h i g h e r . 2
The consequences of such irresponsibility is that
he that encourages irreverence, in himself, or others 
to publick institutions, weaJcens all the human securities 
of peace, and all thé corroborations of v i r t u e . 3
^The Patriot, Vi, 220, -
^On Lay Patronage, V, 478.
3Sermon XXIV, IX, 515. '
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This kind of constant care for the civil institutions 
of society is crucial because it takes only a few men to raise 
a large amount of discontent, which eats at the foundation of 
government.
Nothing, my Lords, is more necessary to the Legislature 
than the Affection and Esteem of the People, all Gov­
ernment consists in the Authority of the Few over the 
Many, and Authority, therefore, can be founded only on 
Opinion, and must always fall to the Ground, when that 
which supports it is taken away.1
The consent to be governed will not be given long if rumors 
and false reports are spread about the corruption, ineffi­
ciency or dangerous tendencies of any government. Since, as 
was shown above, many men spread these kinds of reports for 
their own gain and for expression of their own discontent 
at inferiority, then
the first duty . . .  of subjects is obedience to the 
laws; such obedience as is the effect, not of compulsion, 
but of reverence; such as arises from a conviction of the 
instability of human virtue, and of the necessity of 
some coercive power, which may restrain the exorbitances 
of passions, and check the career of natural d e s i r e s . 2 
(As Johnson put it in another context, "every man desires 
to retain his own in proportion as he desires to seize 
what is another’s, and no mam can be allowed to rob, 
where none are willing to be r o b b e d . ’*3]}
Johnson did not, however, think it necessary to 
censor all political writings, but only those which tended 
to provoke what modern historians have pointed out, at least 
for London, was a populace easily aroused and difficultly
^"Debates," XII, 668.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 515.
^"Vinerian Lectures," p. 108,
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appeased. He makes this point in his review of a book on
Roman history that had contemporary applications. The Memoirs
of the*Augustus by Thomas Blackwell.
Among other affectations of this writer, is a furious and 
unnecessary zeal for liberty; or rather, for one form 
of government as preferable to another. This, indeed, 
might be suffered, becaus.e political institutions are 
a subject in which men have always differed, and, if they 
continue to obey their lawful governors, and attempt not 
to make innovations, for the sake of their favorite 
schemes, they may differ forever, without amy just re­
proach from one another,^
It must always be remembered, especially by those who 
are prone to criticize slight faults, that all governments 
are made up of men. Hence all governments partake of the 
same imperfections of men and suffer their same flaws. As 
Johnson puts it, "all institutions are defective by nature; 
and all rulers have their imperfections, like other m e n , "2 
One corollary of this fact is that "Every human Establishment 
has its Advantages and its Inconveniehcies,"3 and another is 
"No government could subsist for a day, if single errours 
could justify defection.
Man must be willing to put up with the faults in gov­
ernment for the good that government can do. If perfection 
is expected, then government cannot exist. To quote again 
one of Johnson* s empirical observations:
^Review of Memoirs of the Court of Augustus, VI, 12,
2Sermon XXIV, IX, 515,
3**Debates," XI, 629,
4Taxation No Tyranny, VI, 250,
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If possibility of abuse be an argument against authority, 
no authority ever can be established: if the actual abuse 
destroys its legality, there is no legal government now 
in the world.^
If an individual understands this radical imperfection in the 
basic configuration of authority and its exercise, he will 
also know that
it is always to be remembered, that even errours and de­
ficiencies of authority must be treated with respect.2
Johnson’s attitude towards imperfection in government 
explains his explosions against much of the political agi­
tation of the day.
We live in an age, in which there is much talk of inde­
pendence, of private judgment, of liberty of thought, and 
liberty of press. Our clamorous praises of liberty suf­
ficiently prove that we enjoy it; and if, by liberty, 
nothing else be meant, than security from the persecutions 
of power, it is so fully possessed by us, that little more 
is to be desired, except that one should talk of it less, and use it better,3
Not that recognition of the inevitability of imperfection in
government meant that one should ignore or fail to correct
it, if possible. Johnson quotes Jenyns with approval on this
point: ’’What has here been said of their ^governments^ imper-.,
fections and abuses, is, by no means, intended as a defence
of them; every wise man ought to redress them to the utmost
iFalse Alarm, VI, 159.
Zsermon XXIV, IX, 515.
^’’Account of a Book Entitled, An Historical and Crit­
ical Enquiry into the Evidence Produced by the Earls of Moray 
and Morton against Mary Queen of S c o t s VI, 80.
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of his power."!
In such a complex thing as national affairs, it is 
likewise to be expected that there shall occur occasional 
errors, that "deceptions • . • ^an<^ negligence should some­
times find their way."2 And since national affairs are com­
plex, the. government which ministers to them must be equally 
complex.
Governments formed by chance, and gradually improved by 
by such expedients, as the successive discovery of their 
defects happened to suggest, are never to be tried by a 
regular theory. They are fabricks of dissimilar materials, 
raised by different architects, upon different plans. We 
must be content with them, as they are ; should we attempt 
to mend their disproportions, we might easily demolish, 
and difficultly rebuild t h e m . 3
All government is built by different men over long periods
of time and has its "Parts • , , like a complicated Machine
. . .  fitted to each o t h e r . " 4
Johnson implies in the closing paragraph of a sermon
he wrote for John Taylor many of the basic principles from
which he drew his political comments and judgments.
The happiness of a nation must arise from the combined 
endeavours of governours and subjects. The duties of 
governing can be the lot of few, but all of us have the 
duties of subjects to perform; and every man ought to 
incite in himself, and in his neighbour, that obedience 
to the laws, and that respect to the chief magistrate, 
which secure and promote concord and quiet. Of this,
iReview of Free Inquiry, VI, 74.
^Sermon XXIV, IX, 516,
^False Alarm, VI, 164.
^"Debates," XI, 629,
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as of all other virtues, the true basis is religion. The 
laws will be easily obeyed by him who adds to human 
sanctions the obligations of conscience; and he will not 
easily be disposed to censure his superiors, when 
religion has made acquainted with his own failings.^
Government is an institution created for the happiness of the
people who originated it. It can function properly only when
governors and subjects perform the respective duties of their
station: the use of authority for protection and security;
the obedience and respect of authority for the sake of peace
and order. These duties, particularly of the subjects, will
be more easily performed when each individual recognizes his
own and, by extension, all other men’s human failings and
limitations and the concomitant need for some established
authority to correct those imperfections and supply those
deficiencies. Finally, religion will make man aware of his





Of all the imaginative works of Johnson, Rasselas 
is most fully concerned with the attainment of happiness.
It has been called a prose Vanity of Human Wishes, but this 
description is an oversimplification. That both works have 
much in common cannot be denied, but the somberness and 
gravity which is seldom, if ever, lightened in the latter is 
not consistently maintained in the former. Two recent 
studies of Rasselas, for example, discuss the comic elements 
in the tale. The first article finds Prince Rasselas "the 
antithesis of the man of common sense of the eighteenth cen­
tury, and a stubborn rationalist who makes himself ridiculous 
by refusing to comply with the modus vivendi that has been 
worked out by the men of good sense of his age. • • • Thus 
Johnson views his dilemma as c o m i c . T h e  second article 
depicts Rasselas as "novel of moral ideas, and Johnson . . .  
concerned with contrasting two views of life, explicitly
R. Tracy, "Democritus, Arise! A Study of Dr.
Johnson's Humor," The Yale Review, XXXIX (Winter, 1950), p. 309<
188
189
condemning the one by means of dramatic irony and implicitly 
upholding the other. His quiet vantage point is common sense, 
reason tempered by an awareness of what is practical and pos­
sible in the real w o r l d , I t  is debatable whether Rasselas 
can be considered a comic work as these two writers have 
argued, but their insistence on finding a variety of tones 
and a positive assertion about the possibility of leading 
a sane and sometimes even happy life in it balances the too 
heavy weight that has been placed upon the dark moral of the 
tale. A particularly valuable observation both men make con­
cerns the implicit manner in which Johnson makes his positive 
statement. Johnson is, in other words, presenting and clari­
fying certain truths about life, by exploring and exploding 
some of the more commonly accepted falsehoods. Tracy and 
Whitley, the authors of these articles, arrive at certain 
generalizations about human conduct and destiny by analyzing 
the implications of the episodes of Rasselas; this kind of 
technique can also be used in discovering more than ethical 
generalizations. The implications of Rasselas set up many 
reverberations in the political world, to the discovery and 
analysis of which this chapter will be devoted.
My first division of the political theory dealt with 
Johnson’s beliefs about the relative value of a political and 
non-political state of man. In Rasselas the political state
^Alvin Whitley, "The Comedy of R a s s e l a s , Journal 
of English Literary History, XXIII (March, 1956), p. 51.
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is more or less taken for granted as the best way for man to 
live. The second division of the political theory presented 
Johnson's concept of the proper and improper manner for 
man--ruler and ruled, governors and governed— to live under 
government. Its concern was with specific political duties 
and rights. The "choice of life" receives most of the at­
tention in Rasselas, not the manner in which to live.
Division three of the political thought presented the bene­
ficial results of living in the political state of part one 
and of following the rules of conduct laid down in part two, 
while indicating at the same time the dangers to these bene­
fits by the inevitable imperfections of man and government. 
The corresponding features of Rasselas are embodied in the 
possible benefits in life for the individual and the dangers 
in believing or trusting too much to any one thing to provide 
those benefits.
Rasselas could be used to illustrate in concrete form 
many of the political beliefs found in all three divisions, 
but the proportions are not equal. It is the last major 
division of the political thought that receives the most 
thorough embodiment in Rasselas. If one believes that the 
tale is not merely an exercise in Johnsonian pessimism but 
is a moral novel containing both positive and negative 
assertions about man's chances and abilities to attain 
happiness on this earth, then there is a logical basis for 
the deeper relationship of Rasselas and the last division of
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the political theory.
In the novel, the search for happiness through the 
proper choice of life leads Rasselas and Nekayah into many 
levels and different conditions that exist in society. Some 
happiness is found in almost all but the lowest levels and 
occupations, but both Rasselas and Nekayah are constantly 
disappointed that it is not perfect, that is, enduring, stable, 
and consistent. Part of the lesson Imlac provides for them 
is an unveiling of this instability, and the resulting neces­
sity for accepting this condition of instability in order 
to enjoy what happiness there is. The third division of the 
political thought which corresponds to Rasselas follows a 
similar pattern. Part one and two indicate the necessity 
and difficulties of establishing and maintaining a political 
state, while part three deals with the benefits— imperfect 
as they are— that are created in political union and pro­
mote the belief that all must accept y along with these bene­
fits, the necessary imperfections that accompany them.
One of the arguments that claim Rasselas is a prose 
Vanity of Human Wishes and therefore contains little more 
than somber and grave reflections on the misery of life is 
based upon the manner in which the tale concludes. After 
many levels and stations in life have been investigated and 
found wanting, so the criticism goes, Johnson simply stops, 
since to go on would be a repetition of what is already a 
monotonous occurrence in Rasselas, The last chapter of the
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tale, "The Conclusion In Which Nothing Is Concluded,closes 
the work ineffectually, because Johnson has not created any 
climax to his story, but has only repeated the saune moral 
over and over again in various guises* If this criticism is 
accurate, it seriously invalidates the important connections 
presented in this chapter between Rasselas and the political 
theoryy especially as I find in both works a positive state­
ment about thé happiness to be found in life.
Part of this kind of criticism comes, I believe, from 
placing too much emphasis on the dissatisfaction found in 
life by the major characters of Rasselas  ̂and from not seeing 
clearly the implicit and explicit affirmation that are there*
In a later part of this chapter I deal with the positive 
assertion of Johnson, while the articles listed above pro­
vide some persuasive arguments for the implicit affirmations 
that are presented by Johnson. But there is a third point 
to be made, I think, that will in part nullify this criti­
cism* It concerns the structure of Rasselas, particularly 
the significance of the ending.
This novel possesses, it appears to me, a kind of 
mythic or archetypical pattern underlying the more logical 
arrangement of its episodes, illustrating as they do mam* s 
inevitable failure in his constant search for permanent 
happiness.1 As the tale opens, Rasselas is living in a 
valley that he is unable to leave* It is called the Happy
Icf* Gwin Kolb, "The Structure of Rasselas," PMLA,
LXVI (September, 1951), pp. 698-717, for a structural analysis*
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Valley, for in it all desires are grauited, and all pain and 
discomforture avoided or banished. But in this "womb" Ras­
selas becomes at last dissatisfied and wishes to leave» His 
opportunity for doing so comes through the torrential rains 
which flow down the mountains of the valley and fill the 
lake to overflowing. The rising waters force Rasselas to 
stay inside the palace and to spend much time with Imlac, 
who greatly arouses his curiousity about life outside. 
Through his intelligence about the outer world,, Imlac is 
finally responsible for Rasselas's being **born" into it,
AAer the water subsides^ Rasselas and Imlac walk on the side 
of one of the mountains and there find rabbits who had fled 
the rising water. These animals had burrowed into the moun­
tain "tending upward in an oblique line,"^ Following their 
example, Rasselas^ with Imlac * s help,- burrows out of the 
Happy Valley through a "fissure" he has discovered.
The rest of the tale concerns the "growing up,." the 
education of Rasselas and Nekayah into the ways of the world. 
First they have to learn how to act.
Imlac was forced to observe them with great vigilance, 
lest they should betray their rank by their unusual 
behaviour, and detained them several weeks in the first 
village, to accustom them to the sight of common mortals.
(p. 234.)
Next they have to learn to speak the language.
His ^ m l a c ’^  companions Q^asselas and NekayahJ, not 
being able to mix in the conversation, could make no
lly 230—31* All further references to Rasselas will 
be given in parenthesis after the quotation.
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discovery of their ignorance or surprise, and were 
gradually initiated in the world, as they gained know­
ledge of the language»
(p. 236.)
After they have learned how to act and to speak—- 
after they have ’♦'grown up*^--they begin their search for the 
best possible choice of life, for all life is motivated by 
a desire for happiness. They are,, then, archetypes of man 
seaorching for happiness in life, everyman pursuing his common 
destiny. After numerous and various investigations, the 
novel proceeds to its close. As the now sane "mad astrono­
mer" tells them.
Your curiosity • • • has been so general, and your pur­
suit of knowledge so vigorous, that novelties are not 
now very easily to be found; but what you can ho longer 
procure from the living, may be given by the dead.
Among the wonders of this country are the catacombs,
(pp, 304-05*)
The end of the journey of life isnaturally enough, the tomb.
In the catacombs, the soul and its prospects a^fter
death are the logical subjects. The final attitude expressed
is typically Johnsonian.
That it Q h e  soul] will not perish by any inherent cause 
of decay, or principle of corruption, may be shown by 
philosophy; but philosophy can tell no more. That it 
will not be annihilated by him that made it, we must 
humbly learn from higher authority.
(p, 308,)
Thus after the journey of life lies only conjecture„ which
religion alone can support. The proper attitude to taJce is
voiced through Nekayah,
To me, said the princess, the choice of life is become 




This doctrine, closely related to Johnson's distinction 
between politics and religion as outlined in Chapter One, 
distinguishes what is truly essential in life and what is 
not. But it should also be noted that the journey which 
leads to this conclusion takes the form of a search for 
temporal happiness. Temporal happiness is not completely 
depreciated here; it is "become less important."
This incident occurs in the second-to-last chapter 
and not in what one might expect to be the last chapter.
For if there is a pattern underlying Rasselas of birth, ma­
turity, death, and the life thereafter, then the tomb should 
logically be the end. But there is one more chapter which 
seems to end the tale upon a note of anti-climax, which makes 
Rasselas apparently just stop-rather than coherently end.
The answer to this puzzle lies, I think, in the nature of 
the pattern.
In the last chapter ̂ the Nile begins its annual rise 
(this overflow of " V a t e r a f t e r  the "death" of the tombs 
in the preceding chapter, signalizes the "rebirth" that in­
evitably recurs in the cycle of life) and confines Rasselas, 
Nekayah, Pekuah, Imlac, and the astronomer to their house. 
After each has announced his future intentions, Johnson con­
cludes the tale with this last paragraph.
Of these wishes, that they had formed, they well 
knew that none could be obtained. They deliberated 
awhile what was to be done, and resolved, when the in­
undation should cease, to return to Abissinia.
(p. 310.)
196
They are going to return to Abyssinia, to the place of their 
birth, to the *^womb»’̂ A cycle has been completed; a circle 
has been formed, or rather, joined. The pattern is of arche- 
typal man: birth, growth, death followed by birth and the 
pattern of life begins anew. Like the annual rise and fall 
of the Nile, man too repeats in his individual life in spe­
cific detail the general pattern of all men’s lives. Thus 
nothing is concluded at the end of Rasselas because a circle 
has no end, a pattern of birth, death, and birth has no con­
clusion. The life of archetypal man is a constant and unin­
terrupted repetition of the life of individual man and the 
experience of one is the recurring experience of all.
If the pattern described above does exist in Ras­
selas , then it makes the relationship between the politics 
and the events in the tale a close auid important one. f'or 
the political life of.man,' his search for happiness within 
a civil union, has its'outline traced in more general form 
in the archetypal life of man. Political life is one among 
the many rays reflected through the prism of the général 
life of mankind in Rasselas.
ii
As far as the benefits of civil society were con­
cerned, Johnson considered the security of property and 
freedom of the individual the greatest of political bless­
ings, the sine qua non of happiness. Any government which 
could provide these things had performed one of its most
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important functions and in Johnson’s eyes was successful.
The failure to do so was in effect the destruction of almost 
any chance at happiness. Man cannot be happy, according to 
Johnson, unless his person and property is secure, and he 
possesses the knowledge that it is.
Johnson embodies this idea in two.separate episodes 
in Rasselas. In Chapter XX, ’♦The Danger of Prosperity," 
Rasselas and his party, on their way into the country to 
visit a hermit, come upon a thick woods in which they take 
shelter from the heat of the sun. The woods turns out to 
be a cultivated forest and garden surrounding a "stately 
palace." The master of this pastoral paradise entertains 
them and maikes them his guest for several days. Rasselas 
wonders if the master has perhaps found perfect happiness 
in the beauty and peace of this forest retreat.
The prince [Rasselas] now saw all the domesticks 
chearfulT, and all the face of nature smiling round the 
place, and could not forbear to hope that he should 
find here what he was seeking; but when he was con­
gratulating the master upon his possessions, he answered, 
with a sigh: "My condition has, indeed, the appearance 
of happiness, but appearances are delusive. My pros­
perity puts my life in danger; the bassa of Egypt is my 
enemy, incensed only by my wealth and popularity. I 
have been, hitherto, protected against him by the princes 
of the country; but, as the favor of the great is un­
certain, I know not, how soon my defenders may be per­
suaded to share the plunder with the bassa. I have sent 
my treasures into a distant country, and, upon the first 
alarm, aun prepared to follow them. Then will my enemies 
riot in my mansion, and enjoy the gardens which I have 
planted."
(p. 244)
The anxiety of his position spoils the peace of mind that 
Johnson often equates with happiness. The masteridiere, for
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all the appearances of happiness, unable to enjoy the 
"blessings'* of his life, because one of the essential con­
ditions for happiness, the security of property, or what is 
to Johnson almost the same thing, the assurance of the safety 
of property, has been violated. Thus, the political axiom 
that government must secure and protect the property of 
the individual if he is to attain any happiness finds a 
concrete embodiment in the anxiety and lack of happiness of 
the master.
An earlier episode that takes place in the Happy 
Valley is related more to the freedom of the individual in 
his pursuit of happiness than to the security of his prop­
erty. In Chapter XII, "The Story of Imlac Continued," Im- 
lac finishes telling Rasselas the story of his life; how, 
disgusted with society, he "resolved to hide • • • for ever 
from the world, and depend no longer on the opinion or ca­
price of others" (p. 228.) by entering the Happy Valley. 
Rasselas asks if he has "here found happiness at last? . . .  
Tell me, without reserve ; art thou content with they con­
dition? . . .  All the inhabitants of this valley celebrate 
their lot, and, at the annual visit of the emperour, invite 
others to partake of their felicity." (p. 228.)
Great prince, said Imlac, I shall speak the truth;
I know not one of all your attendants who does not la­
ment the hour when he entered this retreat. . . .  Ç'he}^ 
are either corroded by malignant passions, or sit stupid 
in the gloom of perpetual vacancy. . . .  They aire weary 
of themselves, amd of each other, and expect to find re­
lief in new companions. They envy the liberty which their
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folly has forfeited, and would gladly see all mankind 
imprisoned like themselves* (Italics mine.)(p. 228.)
Johnson's belief in the necessity of government to promote 
its subjects' freedom is here concretely embedded in the 
unhappiness of those who are imprisoned in the Happy Valley. 
By implication, Johnson is saying that one needs personal 
freedom--the'one blessing not enjoyed by the inhabitants of 
the V&lley--in order to achieve happiness. One might add 
that freedom is not only necessary to happiness, but also 
necessary to growth and maturity as well. When Rasselas and 
his sister leave the enforced paradise of the Happy Valley 
and commence their intercourse with mankind in the great 
cities of the East, they begin to lose their ignorance and 
their naivete by learning some of the unpleasant truths that 
are essential to a mature understanding of the world. John­
son's lack of relish for the retired life ("No, Sir, when a 
man is tired of London, he is tired of life."l) and Imlac's 
attraction to the crowded concourses of the great cities 
are lines leading to the same source.
In both this instance and the one cited before it, 
Johnson is presenting through the actions of particular men 
the basis of his political doctrine stated in the beginning 
of Chapter Six. Without property and freedom, happiness is 
impossible. But, as was further stated, Johnson did not be­
lieve that the granting of these conditions by government
^Life of Johnson, III, 178.
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would lead to inevitable happiness. For property and freedom 
were external to man, and must be used properly if they are 
to be of any value to him. In the political theory, the 
riches Spain got from the new world illustrated this belief.
In Rasselas, Johnson presents the same idea in Chapter XVII, 
"The Prince Associates with Young Men of Spirit and Gaiety," 
only this time he embodies it in Rasselas's first attempt to 
find happiness.
In this chapter, Rasselas decides to associate with 
youth, since youth is the time of gladness. "I will join my­
self to the young men, whose only business is to gratify 
their desires, and whose time is all spent in a succession 
of enjoyments.” (p. 238.) Rasselas is soon disillusioned 
with the life of the hedonist.
To such societies he was readily admitted, but a few 
days brought him back, weary and disgusted. Their mirth 
was without images; their laughter without motive; their 
pleasures were gross and sensual, in which the mind had 
no part; their conduct was, at once, wild and mean ; they 
laughed at order and law, but the frown of power dejected, 
and the eye of wisdom abashed them. (p. 238.)
The freedom and wealth of these young men failed to bring
them happiness, because neither is capable of providing it
itself. Happiness is a state which cannot come from external
agents, such as wealth, freedom or power, but must come from
within. Certain conditions outside of man, however, must
prevail before happiness can exist. As Nekayah tells
Rasselas a little later, when she relates what discoveries
she made in her investigation of.private family life, "I did
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not seek ease among the poor, because I concluded that, there, 
it could not be found." (p. 252.) Johnson attacks Jenyns and 
Pope, in his review of Jenyn’s Free Inquiry, for so glibly 
passing over.the destructive power of poverty on the human 
spirit.
Poverty is very gently paraphrased by want of riches 
[by Jenyns]. In that sense, almost every man may, in his 
own opinion, be poor. But there is another poverty, 
which is want of competence of all that can soften the 
miseries of life, of all that can diversify attention, 
or delight imagination. . . .  The milder degrees of 
poverty are, sometimes, supported by hope; but the more 
severe often sink down in motionless despondence.1
Liberty and property are necessary but not sufficient means
to happiness.
The pyramids provide the clearest example of the in­
ability of either wealth or power, property or freedom by 
themselves to secure happiness. In Chapter XXXII, "They 
Enter the Pyramid," Imlac leads Nekayah and Rasselas into the 
pyramids and while inside explains why he thinks they were 
built.
. . .  no reason has ever been given adequate to the cost 
and labour of the work. . . .  It seems to have been 
erected only in compliance with that hunger of the imagi­
nation, which preys incessantly upon life, and must be 
always appeased by some employment. Those who have 
already all that they can enjoy, must enlarge their 
desires. . . .  I consider this mighty structure, as a 
monument of the insufficiency of human enjoyments. A 
king, whose power is unlimited, and whose treasures sur­
mount all real and imaginary wants, is compelled to 
solace, by the erection of a pyramid, the satiety of 
dominion and tastelessness of pleasures, and to amuse the 
tediousness of declining life, by seeing thousands
^Review of A Free Inquiry, VI, 54.
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labouring without end, 'and one stone, for no purpose, 
laid upon another. Whoever thou art, that, not content 
with a moderate condition, imaginest happiness in royal 
magnificence, and drearnest that command or riches c ^  
feed the appetite of novelty, with perpetual gratifi­
cations, survey the pyraunids, and confess thy follyI 
(Italics mine,) (p. 269.)
Liberty.and property are essential but no amount of 
them provided by any government can promise happiness. But 
it must be remembered that while Johnson embodied' a part of 
a political principle in the pyramid, it was only a part.
The whole principle involved a positive assertion of the 
value of freedom and property, implied more than stated in 
the episodes of the unhappy ’’master'* and the inhabitants of 
the Happy Valley, By examining Rasselas with the political 
theory in mind, one can avoid this kind of distortion, just 
as one can see more clearly other parts of Johnson’s poli­
tical beliefs by examining the allegories, Irene, and the 
poetry,
iii
If government is undeniably necessary to man in his 
constant labor to achieve happiness, then it must be accepted 
with its accompanying disadvantages. These disadvantages 
arise from the inevitable imperfections of government. The 
protection of the property and the freedom of the individual 
are the paramount functions of the state. But government can 
only be as good as the men who are invested with its power, 
make and carry out its law, and support its principles.
Hence government is susceptible to the same imperfections
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that cripple man; it is limited, as man is, by ignorance or 
by wickedness. Ignorance can never be completely eradicated, 
but wickedness can be effectually fought by morality and must 
be if government is to advance in effectiveness and thereby 
provide a greater amount of fundamental security. The qual­
ity of government will improve with the quality of men. When 
Johnson says that virtue is the only means to permanent happi­
ness, he is referring not only to life after death, but to the 
increased effectiveness of government as more and more vir­
tuous men assume it. Government can never achieve perfection, 
of course, just as man cannot: "human judgment, though it be 
gradually gaining upon certainty, never becomes infallible.
This political belief is expressed through both 
Imlac and Rasselas as they discourse at different times, is 
embodied in a particular situation, and is even given a hu­
morous expression at one place in the tale. Imlac is the 
first one to present this belief.
In Chapter VIII, "The History of Imlac," Imlac begins 
his story by describing his father (who sounds, as one com­
mentator puts it, suspiciously like a Whig) as a "wealthy 
merchant" who was "honest, frugal, and diligent, but of mean 
sentiments, and narrow comprehension; he desired only to be 
rich, and to conceal his riches, lest he should be spoiled 
by the governours of the province." (p. 215.) Rasselas is 
indignant that "merchants durst not enjoy his honest gains,
^Preface To Shakespeare, V, 105.
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for fear of losing them by the rapacity of power. Name the
governour, who robbed the people, that I may declare his
crimes to the emperour.” (p. 215.) Imlac's answer restates
the political principle discussed above.
Sir, said Imlac, your ardour is the natural effect of 
virtue animated by youth: the time will come when you 
will acquit your father, and perhaps, hear with less im­
patience of the governour. Oppression is, in the Ab­
issinian dominions, neither frequent nor tolerated; but 
no form of government has been yet discovered, by which 
cruelty can be wholly prevented. Subordination supposes 
power on one part, and subjection on the other ; and if 
power be in the hands of men, it will, sometimes, be abused. 
The vigilance of the supreme magistrate may do much, but 
much will still remain undone. He can never know all the 
crimes that are committed, and can seldom punish all that 
he knows. (pp. 215-16.)
The ignorance of man, his inability simply to know enough, 
is an inevitable limitation of government. Significantly, 
Rasselas, at this point in the tale still a novice who has 
not left the Happy Valley, says, "This . . . I do not under­
stand, but I had rather hear thee than dispute." (p. 216.)
After he has lived in the outside world and has investigated 
"High Stations" in his search for happiness, Rasselas begins 
to understand, or least Johnson allows him to repeat Imlac*s 
sentiments for Nekayah*s benefit.
In Chapter XXVII, "Disquisition Upon Greatness," Ras­
selas has just heard Nekayah tell of the many discords and 
various kinds of unhappiness in domestic life and is con­
vinced that she is mistaken. Happiness must reside in "seats 
of humble privacy,, and placid obscurity," because the more 
power a man exercises, the more discontent he will arouse in
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those who are not favored by this power. Nekayaih answers
that this discontent "which is thus unreasonable, I hope,
that I shall always have spirit to despise, and you power to
repress." (p. 256.)
Discontent, answered Rasselas, will not always be without 
reason under the most just and vigilant administration of 
publick affairs. None, however attentive, can always 
discover that merit, which indigence or faction may 
happen to obscure; and none, however powerful, can always 
reward it. Yet, he that sees inférieur desert advanced 
above him, will naturally impute that preference to par­
tiality or caprice; and, indeed, it can scarcely be hoped 
that any man, however magnanimous by nature, or exalted 
by condition, will be able to persist, for ever, in fixed 
and inexorable justice of distribution; he will sometimes 
indulge his own affections, and sometimes those of his 
favourites; he will permit some to please him who can 
never serve him; he will discover in those whom he loves, 
qualities which, in reality, they do not possess; and to 
those, from whom he receives pleasure, he will, in his 
turn, endeavour to give it. . . .  He that has much to do 
will do something wrong, and, of that wrong must suffer 
the consequences; and, if it were possible that he should 
always act rightly, yet, when such numbers are to judge 
of his conduct, the bad will censure and obstruct him by 
malevolence, and the good sometimes by mistake.
(p. 256.)
The nature of man must be considered in any dis­
cussion of government, since government is the power of a 
few men over the many. These few are. bound to be sometimes 
weak, sometimes unjust, sometimes ignorant, and sometimes 
misguided. The power that they wield in the name of govern­
ment must by these imperfections be sometimes exercised un­
fairly. All government is consequently imperfect. Rasselas 
has apparently learned from experience what Imlac told him 
earlier.
This belief about the inevitable inadequacies of
206
government is embodied in a particular episode in Chapter 
XXIV, '̂ *The Prince Exaumines The Happiness of High Stations," 
and may be considered one of the experiences which validated 
for Rasselas Imlac* s earlier statement of the same doctrine. 
In this chapter, Rasselas began his investigation of "High
Stations" to discover whether true happiness lived there.
'
He thought, before he started his inspection, that some kind 
of satisfaction or happiness probably resided in high.em­
ployment , but he soon found himself mistaken.
. . .  he found that almost every man, who stood high in 
employment, hated all the rest, and was hated by them, 
and that their lives were a continual succession of 
plots and detections, stratagems and escapes, faction and 
treachery. Many of those, who surrounded the bassa, were 
sent only to watch and report his conduct; every tongue 
was muttering censure, and every eye was searching for a 
fault.
(p. 250.)
Allowing for certain "oriental" excesses, this presentation 
of life at court embodies the difficulties even a good gov­
ernor, much less a bad one, would have in maintaining' order 
and administering justice. All men to a certain degree, in 
Johnson's view often a high rather than a low one, were 
driven to this kind of activity in political life as well as 
in any other. One had to expect it and if possible, allow 
for it, by not expecting government to provide permanent or 
enduring security. Government simply must fail at some time.
Johnson expresses this belief in a humorous context 
during the episode of the "mad astronomer." Near the end of 
Rasselas, Imlac introduces the story of the brilliant
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astronomer who has become so deranged that he thinks he
controls thé weather and seasons. He is getting old and
Imlac is the first friend he has found who he thinks is
capable of discharging this great duty after his death. He
instructs Imlac in.the proper methods of the task.
I 0:he astronome^ have diligently considered*the position 
of the earth and sun, and formed innumerable schemes, in 
which I changed their situation, I have sometimes turned 
aside the axis of the earth, and sometimes varied the 
ecliptick of the sun: but I have found it impossible to 
make a disposition, by which the world may be advantaged; 
what one region gains, another loses by any imaginable 
alteration, even without considering the distant parts of 
the solar system, with which we are unacquainted. Do 
not, therefore, in thy administration of the year, in­
dulge thy pride by innovation; do not please thyself with 
thinking, that thou canst make thyself renowned to all 
future ages, by disordering the seasons. The memory of 
mischief is no desirable fame. Much less will it become 
thee to let kindness or interest prevail. Never rob 
other countries of rain to pour it on thine own. For us 
the Nile is sufficient. (pp. 291-92.)
Even with magic, there is no hope for perfection. Not all can
be satisfied; the best that can be done is to preserve the
good that has already been gained. The madness of the
astronomer has not stopped him from testing his theory--his
magic in this case--by experience, and his conclusion is
therefore sane though madly expressed.
In Imlac and Rasselas*s speeches, in the actual gov­
ernment of the province, in the episode of the mad astronomer, 
Johnson has presented or embodied his conviction that all gov­
ernment is imperfect and that from this imperfection must 
arise discontent and the possible destruction of any enduring 
happiness. Thus one should not and cannot expect enduring
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happiness through government on this earth.
The possibilities of securing protection, then, are 
limited, but they are not necessarily bound to any fixed 
limit. For the imperfection of government is the imperfection 
of man, and man’s imperfection arises from his ignorance auad 
his wickedness. Education might do much for ignorance, but 
the really vital problem was the moral regeneration of man.
If this could be accomplished, then government axid the 
blessings it secures, would become more stable amd enduring, 
Were men good, then the government which they created would 
likewise be good, and the achievment of happiness would be 
much easier,
Johnson embodies this idea in one of Nekayah’s adven­
tures as she investigates ’’private life” to see if happi­
ness resides there. She tells Rasselas that "if a kingdom be, . 
as Imlac tells us, a great family, a family, likewise, is a 
little kingdom, torn with factions, and exposed to revo­
lutions.” (p, 253,) With this happy beginning, Nekayah goes 
on to catalogue the varied miseries that ajccompany -family 
life. She ends thus: .
Thus parents and children, for the greatest part, live 
on to love less amd less; amd, if those whom nature has
thus closely united are the torments of each other, where
shall we look for tenderness and consolation.
(p. 254.)
Rasselas is not - unexpectedly shaken at Nekayah*s recitation
and asks her if discord is a ’’natural necessity” in the most
tender of all relations.
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Domestic discord, answered she, is not inevitably and 
fatally necessary; but yet is not easily avoided. We 
seldom see that a whole family is virtuous: the good and 
evil cannot well agree; and the evil can yet less agree 
with one another; even the virtuous fall, sometimes to 
variance, when their virtues are of different kinds, and 
tending to extremes.
(p. 254.)
Nekayah's point here is that only where each indi­
vidual in the family fulfills his responsibilities and acts 
according to a proper and just code can there exist peace and 
concord. The analogous political situation occurs where the 
same kind of proper conduct in government is necessary if it 
is to function correctly by providing the harmony and order 
within the state that happiness needs to live. The only per­
petual cause of public happiness is public virtue, Johnson 
believes. He embodies that belief through Nekayah's 
description of the family, where the only perpetual cause of 
private happiness is private virtue.^
IV
Imperfect as government is, it is still a prereq­
uisite to the achievement of any happiness: man's reason-- 
inner government as opposed to outer--is simply incapable of 
controlling him. Jf.ohnson's analysis of the mind at the 
beginning of Chapter XLIV, "The Dangerous Prevalence of
^Johnson constantly returns to the family for analo­
gies when he discusses problems of government, which method 
guarantees a certain practical, matter-of-fact validity to 
his beliefs, but which at the same time limits their value 
when the children in the analogy, e.g., the American colonies, 
grow up and demand their adult privileges. See pp. 162-63 of 
Chapter Five for a further discussion of this point.
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Imagination,” is a prelude to his description of the manner 
in which the astronomer has become mad, but it is applicable 
to all mankind and, consequently, is important in a consid­
eration of his political beliefs*
Disorders of intellect • • • happen much more often than 
superficial observers will easily believe. Perhaps, if 
we speak with rigorous exactness, no human mind is in its 
right state. There is no man, whose imagination does not, 
sometimes, predominate over his reason, who can regulate 
his attention wholly by his will, auid whose ideas will 
come and go at his command. No man will be found in 
whose mind airy notions do not, sometimes, tyrannize, and 
force him to hope or fear beyond the limits of sober 
probability. All power of fancy over reason, is a degree 
of insanity; but, while this power is such as we can con- 
troul and repress, it is not visible to others, nor con­
sidered as any depravation of the mental faculties: it is 
not pronounced madness, but when it comes ungovernable, 
and apparently influences speech or action.
(pp. 292-93.)
This belief about man’s nature made Johnson certain 
that government and law would always be necessary, since man 
would never be completely morally regenerated. There would 
always be some who would refuse to abide by the settled rules 
of society and attempt to "grow rich" by fraud or violence.
To control these men, government was instituted in the first 
place, and to maintain that control, government and law would 
always be necessary. Even among just and honest men, this 
need would still exist, since man's limited knowledge and 
reason could give him only limited vision and opinions. A 
man might honestly believe himself in the right therefore 
through ignorance or misguidance. Law, instead of force, 
would be the rule of conduct to settle this kind of dispute. 
Finally, wise or unwise, just or unjust, men simply were not
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consistent and therefore would not be depended upon to do any 
one thing all the time. Since society was a group of people 
banded together to preserve themselves from attacks by others 
or by themselves^ all must contribute, either liberty, time, 
or money, or all three, to the good of the whole. Reason 
might tell a man a sacrifice was necessary, but through ig­
norance, wickedness, or inconsistency in virtue, he might 
not be willing to make it. Thus government and law were 
necessary to enforce the sacrifice, to make all contribute 
their share.
The example of the mad astronomer that Imlac uses 
in his analysis of the nature of man is only one example 
of the frailty of human nature and the necessity for ob­
jective rules and regulations, established by the civil 
institutions of society in order to control man. Involved 
in this belief about man's nature and the political con­
sequences of that belief is Johnson's relation to several 
of the intellectual movements of his day, movements which 
spring from different attitudes and ideas about the nature 
of man. Some of these will be pointed out in this section 
and Johnson's relation to them illustrated through episodes 
in Rasselas and the political beliefs there embodied.
The first incident that embraces the political prin­
ciples outlined above occurs in Chapter XVIII, Prince
Finds a Wise and Happy Man." One day Rasselas enters a 
school "of declamation" where ""professors read lectures to
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their auditory.” One particular sage attracts his attention 
as he "discoursed, with great energy, on the government of 
passions
He showed, with great strength of sentiment, and variety 
of illustration, that human nature is degraded and de­
based, when the lower faculties predominate over the 
higher; that when fancy, the parent of passions, usurps 
dominion of the mind, nothing ensues but the natural 
effect of unlawful government, perturbation and confusion; 
that she betrays the fortress of the intellect to rebels, 
and excites her children to sedition against reason, 
their lawful sovereign#
(pp. 239-40.)
After this warning of the dangers to man if he lets reason 
succumb to passion, the sage lists the benefits of the rule
He then communicated the various precepts given,, from 
time to timey for the conquest of passion, and displayed 
the happiness of those who had obtained the important 
victory, after which man is no longer the slave of fear, 
nor the fool of hope; is no more emaciated by envy, in­
flamed by anger, emasculated by tenderness, or depressed 
by grief; but walks on calmly through the tumults, or 
privacies of life, as the sun pursues alike his course 
through the calm or the stormy sky.
(p. 240.)
The sage’s final counsel is for all his listeners to adhere
as closely as possible to this ideal.
He exhorted his hearers to lay aside their prejudices, 
and arm themselves against the shafts of malice or mis­
fortune, by invulnerable patience ; concluding, that this 
state only was happiness, and that this happiness was 
in every one * s power.
(p. 240.)
This denigration of the passions and elevation of 
the reason is a form of stoicism, a theory of conduct cur­
rent in Johnson’s age. Johnson was familiar with the writings 
of the Stoics, for example. Rambler, No. 2 and No. 17 for
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citations of Epictetus; No. 28 for Seneca; and No, 52 for 
Lipsiusy the "great modern master of stoick philosophy."^
He even "approaches Christian stoicism" in his "praise of 
resolution and patience"^ but he found the stoic ideal of 
indifference inefficacious in life. He says in Raanbler,
No. 32, the "sect of ancient philosophers, . . .  the scholars 
of Zeno,"
removed pain, poverty, loss of friends, exile, and vio­
lent death, from the catalogue of evils ; and passed, in 
their haughty style, a kind of irreversible decree, by 
which they forbade them to be counted any longer among 
the objects of terrour or anxiety, or to give any dis­
turbance to the tranquillity of a wise man. This edict 
was, I think, not universally observed.3
For Johnson the truth was this:
The controversy about the reality of external evils 
is now at an end. That life has many miseries, and that 
those miseries are, sometimes at least, equal to all the 
powers of fortitude, is now universally confessed.4
The pain of life is not to be resisted or lightened
by declaring it non-existent, a method by which the stoics
"'endeavour to grow eminent by singularity, and employ their
strength in establishing opinions opposite to nature."5 One
should rather recognize that
The great remedy which heaven has put in our hands is 
patience, by which, though we cannot lessen the torments 
of the body, we can, in a great measure, preserve the 
peace of the mind, and shall suffer only the natural and 
genuine force of an evil, without heightening its acrimony,
Ijl, 250.
2Ao D. McKillop, English Literature From Dryden To 
Burns (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), p. 330.
3ll, 156. 4ibid.. p. 157. 5Ibid.
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or prolonging its effect.^
The popularity of the stoical position has been shown
by Gwin Kolb. As he says,
; the effectiveness of the whole series [the con­
version , the doubt, and then the disillusionment of Ras­
selas in his experience with the sag^ is enhanced by 
many reflections, in thought and diction, of positions 
set forth in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English 
translations and adaptations of classical stoic philosophy.
Kolb instances many examples of parallel phrasing and close 
resemblances in diction and metaphor between the sage*s com­
ments and stoical publications preceding Rasselas.
Now similar views of human nature, utilizing the same 
‘government* metaphor as that employed by Johnson*s 
sage, appear in at least eight stoical and neo-stoical 
works published between 1594 and 1 7 4 5 . 3
Johnson exposes the vitiating error in this current
philosophical stoicism through Imlac*s warning to Rasselas,
Be not too hasty . • . t o  trust, or to admire, the 
teachers of morality: they discourse like angels, but 
they live like men.
(pp. 240-41.)
'Rasselas does not approve of Imlac*s skeptical attitude, but
its truth is soon forced upon him. On his next visit to the
sage,, Rasselas finds him **'in a room half-darkened, with his
eyes misty, and his face pale.**
Sir, said he, your atrrival comes at a time when all human 
friendship is useless; what I suffer cannot be remedied, 
what I have lost cannot be supplied. My daughter, my
lib id.
^**The Use of Stoical Doctrine In Rasselas, Chapter 
XVIII,** Modern Language Notes, LXVIII (November, 1953), 440.
3lbid.
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only daughter, from whose tenderness I expected all the 
comforts of my age, died last night of a fever. My . 
views, my purpose,- my hopes are at an end: I am now a 
lonely being, disunited from society.1
(p. 241.)
Rasselas wonders that the sage does not practice the theory 
that he had preached so cogently in the hall. He tells the 
sage that ^mortality is an event by which a wise man can 
never be surprised: we know that death is always near, and 
it should, therefore, always be expected. . . .  Has; wisdom 
no strength to arm the heart against calauaity? Consider^ that 
external things sure naturally variable, but truth and reason 
are always the same.'*̂  (p. 241.) The answer Rasselas re­
ceives destroys the stoic doctrine he has so completely em­
braced.
What comfort, said the mourner, can truth and reason 
afford me? Of what effect are they now, but to tell me, 
that my daughter will not be restored?
(p. 241.) ■
The sage’s dejection and misery illustrate the be­
lief that Johnson made the basis of this important political 
principle. Msm cannot live by reason alone. He is imper­
fect, subject to passion’s force and appetite’s sway. His 
reason cam guide him, but it cannot compel him nor enable 
him to do what he knows is proper or right. The sage’s in­
ability to control his passions is only an analogue to the
^Kolb remarrks that death, of a ’’•friend or relative,” 
or even of ”the philosopher himself” was a **subject close 
to the hearts of earlier stoics . . .  in that it affords 
possibly the supreme test of fidelity to stoical principles.” 
(Kolb, MLN, p. 446.)
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infinite number of ways men are forced from the path of 
reason* In the political world, Johnson utilized this ob­
servation by setting up government and law as a necessity to 
control man, because man cannot always control himself* In 
terms of historical relevance, this episode places Johnson 
in opposition to the stoical doctrine which Kolb pointed 
out as prominent in his age. This episode also makes clear 
why Johnson rejected this doctrine: he saw that on the prac­
tical level of human affairs this theory would not work; it 
did not fit the facts of experience as they presented them­
selves to the eye of man.
Arthur Love joy in an article entitled •*'Pride* in
Eighteenth Century Thought** discusses what is in effect the
sin of the sage in this episode: pride. The invective
against this sin by so many eighteenth century writers
stems in part from certain ideas which Lovejoy shows to be
current in the age. The single most important idea he finds,
"the most characteristic and influential of all eighteenth
century ideas,** is the **so-called 'principle of continuity, *
lex continui, one of the components of the concept of the
Great Chain of Being.**^
According to this conception, the world is necessarily 
a plenum formarum, a system
Where all must full or not coherent be.
And all that rises, rise in due degree.
^Arthur Lovejoy. Essays in the History of Ideas 
(Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), p. 64.
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In other words, every logically possible kind of being, 
through all the infinite graded scale of conceivable 
"natures" between Deity and nonentity, must necessarily 
exist ; and between any two adjacent links in the chain 
there can be only infinitesimal differences.^
In ethics "the tradition of ethical naturalism which 
had been handed down especially through Erasmus and Mon­
taigne readily combined with the idea of the graded scale 
of being i.e., the principle of continuity *"2 Man should 
recognize the limitations of his nature and stay within 
them; he should not try to rise above his "nature," since he 
cannot and his failure is compounded by the sin of breaking 
the chain by leaving his appointed place in it.
"Pridey" then^ in an especially important sense, meant 
a sort of moral overstrain, the attempt to be unnaturally 
good and immoderately virtuous, to live by reason alone. 
Erasmus and Montaigne had come to have an antipathy to 
this lofty and strenuous moral temper through a direct 
revulsion against the revived Stoicism in fashion in 
the late Renaissance; and the Stoics passed in the eight- 
. eenth century for the proverbial embodiments of "pride" 
in this sense.3
Johnson is indicting the sage for the sin of **pride" 
through the sage’s inability to practice his superior stoical 
theory in his own life. An interesting point here is that 
Johnson had two years earlier in 1757 rejected the chain of 
being concept in his review of Jenyns’s Free Enquiry. Hence, 





Jenyns*s closeness to Pope's reasoning in the Essay on Man 
and calls Jenyns merely a "paraphrase" in one place) in his 
reasoning and his grounds for criticism of the stoic posi­
tion. It would seem that Johnson substituted experiential 
observation and testing for the theory of continuity in 
this, and other^ instances*-
To quote Lovejoy again:
Man must not attempt to transcend the limitations of his
"nature"'j and his nature, though not the same as that 
of the animals below him in the scale, is close to it, 
"Reason" has a paurt in the conduct of human life, but
it is an ancillary part. Pope devotes many lines of
versified argumentation to showing that the motive-pow- 
er and the principal directive force in man's life is-- 
and should be--not reasbn, but the complex of instincts- 
and passions which make up our "natural" constitution.1
Johnson, I think, would reject the subordinate role assigned 
to reason here, although he would agree to its inherent lim­
itations . But his agreement would arise from his observations 
of this weakness as it showed itself in the day to diay lives 
of men, as it showed itself in a sage who lost his daughter 
and found his reason incapable of comprehending or consoling 
him for the loss. Both Pope and Johnson are classicists, or 
neo-classicists to be more accurate, but this label seems to 
be hiding some significant differences (Swift could be coup­
led with Pope here, also, I think), A major one, if this 
instance is any indication, would be their approach to rea­
son, its significance and role, and its limitations in life. 
There is perhaps a need for an "On the Discriminations of
^Ibid;, p. 67,
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Neo-Classicisms,” just as there was for Lovejoy*s "On the
Discriminations of Romanticisms
Johnson gave his solution to the problem of man’s
misery on this earth its final form in the concluding lines
of The Vanity of Human Wishes, a solution he only hints at
in Rasselas. It takes the form, as all "final" solutions do
in this life for Johnson, of a "’religious" as opposed to a
"rational" stoicism. The lines are:
Where then shall Hope and Fear their objects find? 
Must dull Suspence corrupt the stagnant mind?
Must helpless man, in ignorance sedate.
Roll darkling down the torrent of his fate?
Must no dislike alarm, no wishes rise.
No cries attempt the mercies of the skies?
Enquirery cease, petitions yet remain.
Which heav’n may hear, nor deem religion vain.
Still raise for good the supplicating voice.
But leave to heav’n the measure and the choice.
Safe in his pow*r, whose eyes discern afar 
The secret ambush of a specious pray’r.
Implore his aid, in his decisions rest.
Secure whate’er he gives, he gives the best.
Yet when the sense of sacred presence fires.
And strong devotion to the skies aspires 
Pour forth thy fervours for a healthful mind. 
Obedient passions, and a will resign’d;
For love, which scarce collective man can fill;
For patience sov*reign o ’er transmuted ill ;
For faith, that panting for a happier seat.
Counts death kind Nature’s signal of retreat:
These goods for man the laws of heav’n ordain.
These goods he grants, who grants the pow’r to gain ; 
With these celestial wisdom calms the mind.
And makes the happiness she does not find.
(11. 343-368.)
One other episode is clearly related to Johnson’s 
concept of the limitations of reason and the corollary po­
litical principle drawn from it. This incident occurs in
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Chapter XXII, ’*The Happiness of a Life Led According to 
Nature.** In this chapter, Rasselas goes to an "assembly 
of leajrned men** where he relates the story of the hermit 
whom he and his party visited in the country. They found 
that the hermit not only was not happy, but rejected soli­
tude and returned to the city with them* One of the **’leaxn- 
ed men" commented:
. . .  Che3 thought it likely, that the hermit would, in 
a few years, go back to his retreat,, and, perhaps, if 
shame did not restrain, or death intercept him, return 
once more from his retreat into the world: **For the hope 
of happiness," said he, "is so strongly impressed, that 
the longest experience is not able to efface it. Of the 
present state, whatever it be, we feel, and are forced 
to confess, the misery ; yet, when the same state is 
again at a distance, imagination paints it as desirable. 
But the time will come, when desire will be no longer 
our torment, and no man shall be wretched,, but by his 
own fault.'*
(pp. 247—48.)
This passage states concisely two of Johnson's fundamental 
beliefs about life. One, the dream and desire of happiness 
never leave the minds of men; two, this longing will never 
be completely gratified on earth, but must await its per­
fect fulfillment in a later life. The reaction of another 
learned man to the above quoted statement expresses in a 
different form Johnson*s awareness of reason's weakness by 
ridiculing the growing popular belief in the innate goodness 
of man.
This ^he condition of happiness after deatlQ, said a 
philosopher, who had heard him with tokens of great im­
patience, is the present condition of a wise man. The 
time is already come, when none are wretched, but by 
their own fault. Nothing is more idle, than to inquire
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after happiness, which nature has kindly placed within 
our reach. The way to be happy is to live according to 
nature, in obedience to that universal and unalterable 
lawy with which every heart is originally impressed; 
which is not written on it by precept y but engraven by 
destiny,, not instilled by education, but infused at our 
nativity. He that lives according to nature will suffer 
nothing from the delusions of hope, or importunities of 
desire; he will receive and reject with equability of 
temper; and act or suffer, as the reason of things shall 
alternately prescribe. Other men may amuse themselves 
with subtle definitions, or intricate raciocinations.
Let them observe the hind of the forest, and the lin­
net of the grove; let them consider the life of animals, 
whose motions are regulated by instinct; they obey their 
guide and are happy. Let us therefore, at length, cease 
to dispute, and learn to live; throw away the incum­
brance of precepts, which they, who utter them, with so 
much pride and pomp, do not understand, and carry with 
us this simple and intelligible msocim: That deviation 
from nature is deviation from happiness.
(p. 248.)
There are actually two doctrines being expressed 
in this speech, which stem from the movements in literary 
history called sentimentalism and primitivism. Since I 
intend to discuss the rise of sentimentalism and Johnson*s 
position in relation to it in the last chapter of this dis­
sertation and since the primitivistic qualities are strongly 
expressed in this speech, I shall discuss here only the lat­
ter belief and its relation to Johnson* s attitude in his po­
litical theory.
Primitivism can be defined as **the exaltation of a 
state of life in which man depends upon his natural powers 
exerted in a simple society and an uncomplicated environ­
ment greatly modified by civilization.’*■! The desire to
^McKillop, p* 361.
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live according to ”T^ature*s Simple Plan,”^ **'the idealization 
of primitive lifef* was not of course new; "The Greeks and 
Romans had conceived of human history as beginning with a 
Golden Age and then progressively d e c l i n i n g . "2 %n the 
eighteenth century, one of the "slightly over-ripe stages 
of cultures . . .  in which one yearns for simplicity ; 
away from the corruptions of civilization to an imaginary 
primeval innocence,there were various reasons for the 
upsurge of this idea.
The classically oriented education and training of 
the age kept alive many of the primitivistic notions of an­
tiquity, which in turn served to sanction their application 
in the eighteenth century. As one well known student of 
the period remarks,
Even in the works of learned authors it is sometimes 
still possible to find indications of the supposition 
that primitivism was essentially a novelty in the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century ; . . .  The texts Cpf 
Greek and Roman classics^ in the following pages will 
at least suffice to show that most of the various as­
pects of primitivistic thought conspicuous in those cen­
turies had their counterparts in classical antiquity; 
and since most modern writers before the present century 
had more or less classical education, it may frequently 
be presumed--and is in numerous cases fairly evident
^The phrase "is from an anonymous poem on Otaheite, 
published in 1774." (C. B. Tinker, Nature* s Simple Plan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1922), p. vi.
^Louis Bredvold, The Literature of the Restoration 
and Eighteenth Century (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 
p .  1 9 7 .  : .
3Hoxic Fairchild, The Noble Savage (New York: Colum­
bia University Press,: 1928), p» 2.
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from similarities in particular expressions or turns of 
thought--that these counterparts were also the origi­
nals.^
Another force which encouraged and often quite erro­
neously heightened the bliss of primitive people was the 
great amount of travel literature that arose from the many 
voyages and discoveries of Johnson’s age.^ These voyages 
were expected to find
Man in a state of nature, the Indian with untutored 
mind* [whoQ was • • • a noble creature--indeed, the 
noblest work of God. Taice him untouched by the finger 
of civilisation, and you find in him a potential per­
fection.^
In the realm of politics* the social contract theory 
which Locke, among others, used as the basis of the state 
led sometimes to the praise of the earlier phases of man’s 
political union as opposed to the present corruption and 
injustice to udiich society had degenerated. Rousseau has 
been described as advocating a complete dissolution of the 
state and return to the state of nature in which man was 
most happy. Lovejoy has shown in an article entitled ”The 
Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality”^̂
^A. O, Lovejoy and George Boas, A Documentary His­
tory of Primitivism and Related Ideas (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press* 1935), p. xi.
^As C. B. Tinker points out, the 1760’s alone saw 
the ’’expeditions of Commodore Byron, Captain Cartwright, 
James Bruce, Captain Tobias Furneaux, Captain Wallis, and 
Lieutenant (later Captain) Cook.” (Tinker, pp. 5-6.)
^Tinker, p. 89.
4in Essays in the History of Ideas, pp. 14-37.
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that Rousseau was not advocating a complete return to the 
"state of nature," in effect the state of an animal or a 
brute, but a partial return to the "patriarchial stage of 
human society • • • 0»hereQ the only government was that of
the family*"
Men lived in loose, unorganized village groups, gaining 
their subsistence by hunting or fishing and from the 
natural fruits of the earth, and finding their amuse­
ment in spontaneous gatherings for song and dance.1
Even so, Rousseau’s formula was for a return to an 
earlier, less sophisticated, less "learned” and "educated" 
state, which is an integral element in primitivism, partic­
ularly of a variety that has been termed "cultural*"
Lovejoy and Boas distinguish between two kinds of 
primitivism--cultural and chronological* The latter is
a kind of philosophy of history, a theory, or a custom­
ary assumption, as to the time— past or present or 
future--at which the most excellent condition of humaui 
life, or the best state of the world in general, must be 
supposed to occur.2
Cultural primitivism, on the other hand, is
the discontent of the civilized with civilization, or 
with some conspicuous and characteristic feature of it* 
It is the belief of men living in a relatively highly 
evolved and complex cultural condition that a life far 
simpler and less sophisticated in some or in all 
respects is a more desirable life*3
The procedure for happiness prescribed by the con-
^Ibid., p* 29*
^Boas and Lovejoy, p. 1.
3lbid*. p. 7*
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fident sage is a variant of "cultural” primitivism. He 
sniffs at "precept" and "education"; he sneers at "subtle 
raciocination" and the "incumbrance" of maocims. His pre­
scription is the essentially primitivistic one of returning 
to the "simplicity" of the "natural" man or animal, by shed­
ding the cramping and deadening garments of civilized edu­
cation. At the bottom of this reasoning rests a belief in 
the innate goodness of man, for if a man can assure happi­
ness and contentment for himself by living according to the 
"universal and unalterable law, with which every heart is 
originally impressed," in accordance with his impulses and 
instincts ungoverned by civilized restrictions, then these 
same instincts and impulses must be inherently good. All 
man must do to achieve happiness is to live as his own 
nature dictates.
Johnson has thus juxtaposed two interpretations of 
the nature of man, the former served up in a few concise 
statements drawn from experience about the inaccessibility 
of permanent happiness, the unremitting desire for it, and 
the final resolution only after death, while the latter is 
expressed in vague terms and nebulous generalities about 
"following nature" and discarding "precept." The first 
philosopher's statement about man's insatiable desire re­
ceives political expression in Johnson's insistence that 
man must be ruled by government and law, because reason is 
not able to discern the true nature of reality. Imagination
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deludes reason and misguides man. His nature is variable, 
changeable. He always wants to change to something which 
experience has already proved to be no better than the 
present state (the "Lust for Innovation" that Johnson cited 
as a dangerous attitude if held by the people because it led 
to attacks on government, which led in turn to instability 
and disorder).1
Rasselas is naturally convinced that the second 
philosopher, has the answer to his search for "felicity." 
Through his further examination of this philosopher's theory 
of man, Johnson makes explicit his attitude toward cultural 
primitivism and its basis in a theory of innate goodness. 
Rasselas, already a believer, asks only one question of the 
sage: "Let me only know, what it is to live according to 
nature."
When I find young men so humble and so docile, said the 
philosopher, I can deny them no information which my 
studies have enabled me to afford. To live according to 
nature, is to act always with due regard to the fitness 
arising from the relations and qualities of causes and 
effects; to concur with the great and unchangeable 
scheme of universal felicity; to cooperate with the gen­
eral disposition and tendency of the present systems 
of things.
(pp. 248-49.)
The only intelligible thing said, or rather implied, here 
resides in the parody of the great chain of being concept 
and the "optimism" that was based on it especially in such
l"Of the present state whatever it be, we feel, and 
are forced to confess, the misery, yet, when the same state 
is again at a distance, imagination paints it as desirable." 
Rasselas, I, 247.
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phrases as ’’unchangeable scheme of universal felicity” and
’’general disposition and tendency of the present system of
things The most that can be deduced from the explanation
of the philosopher is something like this: things are as they
are and this is the way they should be. Johnson probably had
in mind when he wrote this chapter a criticism of Jenyns he
made in his review:
The shame j[6f a work like Jenyns’s]] is, to impose words, 
for ideas, upon ourselves or others. To imagine, that 
there is any difference between him that gives no reason, 
and him that gives a reason, which, by his own con­
fession, cannot be conceived.2
The failure of labels to. discriminate accurately 
occurs here again in this discussion. Johnson rejected the 
second philosopher’s analysis of man and his route to happi­
ness because the mistrust of emotions as a basis for ethical 
conduct and the insistence on reason, aided by religion, as 
a guide from them were essential beliefs in Johnson’s inter­
pretation of life. As one historian of sensibility says,
”He would not trust the conduct of either himself or of 
others to the guidance of mere inclinations of benevolence 
or mere feelings of sympathy for other people. Dr. Johnson, 
like Bishop Butler, insisted that the inclination to goodness 
needs the support of the idea of obligation involved in the
^See A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Chap­
ter VII: ’’The Principle of Plenitude and Eighteenth-Century 
Optimism,” and ’’Optimism and Romanticism,” PMLA, XXXXII, 
921-45, for his scholarly exposition of this belief.
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moral judgment.**^ In this sense,, he is* a rationalist,, a
believer in the use of reason to find the truth. Pope
would also reject the philosopher's analysis, or at least
a part of it, but in his case,, the rejection would be based
on the interpretation of the word **nature," Rasselas*s
philosopher uses ’’nature**̂  to refer to that part of the
world outside of man: the ajiimals, birds, and by implication,
primitive, uneducated man. Nature for Pope would primarily
meacn the immutable order of the universe, which was at all
times and in all places the same, and was discoverable by
any man through the use of reason, which is also the saune
in all men, Lovejoy describes this kind of **'nature” under
the heading of **Uniformitariauiism,**^
The reason, it is assumed to be evident, is identical 
in all men; and the life of reason therefore, it is 
tacitly or explicitly inferred, must admit of no di­
versity, Differences in opinion or in taste are evi­
dence of error, and universality of appeal, or of ac­
ceptance tends to be taken, not merely as an effect, 
but as in itself a mark or criterion, of truth, , , , 
That which is ""according to nature" meant, first and 
foremost, that which corresponds to this assumption 
of uniformity; it is perhaps still necessary to re­
peat that in the most frequent of the normative uses 
of the term "^nature" in the Enlightenment, the prin­
cipal element in the signification of the word ^  
uniformity,2
Thus for Pope, to look to nature for correct principles 
of conduct did not at all mean ""to observe the hind of
1Louis Bredvold, The Natural History of Sensibil­
ity (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p, 72,
^Lovejoy, Essays • • , , pp, 79-80
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the f o r e s t . I t  meant to look at man and his works through 
the ages to find what has endured^ that i?,, what is univer­
sal.
Now both Pope and Johnson are rationalistic in 
their rejection, since each uses the faculty of reason to 
achieve the objective--happiness,^ knowledge, ethical prin­
ciples— which the philosopher believes to be reached 
through intuition and emotion. But between Pope and John­
son there exists a gulf almost as wide as between them and 
the philosopher. For Johnson insisted that, even if some 
doctrine, principle, or belief had endured, its validity 
was still to be tested in the realm of practical experi­
ence. Pope, on the other hand, does not demand empirical 
validation of a theory, at least in the Essay on Man, so 
long as it is rational— logically symmetrical and coherent. 
There are two kinds of rationalism involved in this case 
and a distinction between them is necessary.
Johnson* s final rejection of the philosopher is 
presented through Rasselas * s reaction to the hopeless di­
rections for living according to nature.
The prince soon found that this was one of the sages 
whom he should understand less, as he heard him longer. 
He, therefore, bowed, and was silent, and the philos­
opher, supposing him satisfied, and the rest vanquished, 
rose up and departed, with the air of a man that coop­
erated with the present system.
(p. 249.)
Rasselas could not understand the sage’s theory when it 
was forced down into the world of experience and fact.
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Like many speculative theories--an earlier example is that 
of the would-be flier in the Happy Valley--this one sounds 
persuasive, but specific application proves it to be im­
possible of fulfillment « Rasselas*s inability to compre­
hend the instructions of the sage is Johnson*s way of in­
dicating what he considers the basic failure of this theory; 
it is meaningless because it is not based on reality, on 
the facts of life perceptible to all observers. Johnson*s 
rejection of this theory,, and his implicit affirmation of 
the first sage*s analysis, by extension logically rejects 
any belief that the civil institutions of society have cor­
rupted man, and that he need only free himself from them to 
attain complete happiness.
The converse is rather the more true. Whatever 
happiness man has attained has come about through govern­
ment and through law, and only an ignorant, a naive, or 
misguided man could think otherwise. For only these kinds 
of people would not be able to discern the true nature of 
man, its inconsistency, its unruliness, its unstable mix­
ture of passion and reason. Considering this evidence, 
Johnson insists on the necessity of law and government.
vi
The basic weakness of government lies in the abil­
ity of deceitful and sinful men to destroy it. Since this 
weakness has already been partially revealed in the 
discussion of the duties of the subjects of a state,! one
ISupra, Chapter Five, pp. 160-64.
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incident which occurs in Chapter XLVI^ "The Princess and 
Pekuah Visit the Astronomer," will adequately illustrate 
this concept» Nekayah and Pekuah desire to visit the mad 
astronomer,, whose story as told by Imlac has aroused their 
interest* Because the astronomer had never received women 
before, some stratagem was necessary for them to become ac­
quainted with him.
It was proposed to introduce them as strangers in 
distress, to whom the sage was laways acessiblef but, 
after some deliberation, it appeared, that by this ar­
tifice, no acquaintance could be formed, for their con­
versation would be short, and they could not decently 
importune him often, ”This," said Rasselas," is true; 
but I have yet a stronger objection against the mis­
representation of your state, I have always consid­
ered it as treason against the great republick of humain 
nature, to make any man*s virtues the means of deceiv­
ing him, whether on great or little occasions. All 
imposture weakens confidence, and chills benevolence» 
When the sage finds that you are not vdiat you seemed, 
he will feel the resentment natural to a maoi who, con­
scious of great abilities, discovers that he has been 
tricked by understandings meaner than his own, and, 
perhaps, the distrust,, which he can never afterwards 
wholly lay aside, may stop the voice of counsel, and 
close the hand of charity; and where will you find 
the power of restoring his benefactions to mankind, or 
his peace to himself?" (Italics mine.)
(p. 298»)
In the preceding chapter, Johnson’s rough treatment 
of critics of government was explained through his analy­
sis of the relationship of ruler and subject. Power, John­
son says, rests upon opinion. By that he means that only 
a few men are invested with the offices of government, but 
their orders and commands will affect many times their own 
number. Now the only reason those orders will be obeyed is 
that th^respect government— the ordinary citizens-- and
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obey it out of what Johnson calls "reverence.” If, then, 
they mistrust their governors, if they feel that they are 
not being ruled properly, their security, property, and 
freedom are not being cared for adequately, they will be­
come recalcitrant and unruly. If the unjust abuse of gov­
ernmental power continues, the people will either rebel 
or simply ignore the commands of government. Thus, those 
who criticize government tend to weaken it by undermining 
the reverence and confidence of the people in that govern­
ment. Any man who disregards the law, or encourages the 
same attitudes in others, is consequently a great enemy to 
the public peace and general good. The easy adaptibility 
of this course by unscrupulous men constitutes a continuing 
and incurable weakness of all good government.
Rasselas*s warning to Nekayah and Pekuah and the 
reason for that warning is an embodiment in minature of 
the above general principle. The sage trusts mankind; he 
has "confidence" in it, and practices **benevolence" towards 
it. Under a lawful government, the people have the same 
"confidence" and practice obedience and submission to offi­
cial authority, the equivalent of "benevolence** in private 
life. If they are tricked by false criticism and unjust 
contentions against government, however--as Nekayah and 
Pekuah think of deceiving the astronomer— they will lose 
some of their reverence for government. And as Johnson points 
out, once it is lost, it is difficult, if not impossible^ to
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regain it completely ever again. The final consequence of 
wealcening the sage* s belief in men would be the destruction 
of his charitable feelings towards them and the resultant 
misery for him of isolation and selfishness. In the state, 
the analogous process is the destruction of the people’s 
faith in government, and when government fails, order,sta­
bility, and harmony--the greatest benefits of government’s 
protection--are destroyed.
The benefits of society require that the imperfec­
tions of government be endured and its weaikness allowed 
for in the conduct of the individual. Johnson illustrates 
these benefits through the misery of solitude and pastoral 
life and the pleasure of civilized society (especially in 
the city). In Chapter XXI of Rasselas, ’’The Happiness of 
Solitude,”" Imlac, Rasselas, -Nekayah, and Pekuah arrive 
after a long journey to the hermit’s cell. The purpose of 
their visit was to discover whether a man by voluntarily 
retiring from society to solitude could find enduring 
happiness. After the introductory social amenities, they 
ask the hermit for directions in the choice of life. The 
hermit answers:
To him that lives well . . . every form of life is 
good; nor can I give any other rule for choice, than 
to remove from all apparent evil.
(p. 245.)
Rasselas suggests that the hermit’s solitude is a certain 
method for avoiding evil, but the hermit’s reply contradicts 
him.
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After becoming a successful officer, the hermit
tells them, he grew tired of the military life, "having
found the world full of snares, discord, and misery," and
retired fifteen years from the present time to this cell.
For some time after my retreat, I rejoiced, like a 
tempest-beaten sailor at his entrance into the harbour, 
being delighted with the sudden change of the noise 
and hurry of war^ to stillness and repose. . . .  I 
have been, for some time Qiowever^ ,, unsettled and dis­
tracted; my mind is disturbed with a thousand perplexi­
ties of doubt, and vanities of imagination, vâiich hourly 
prevail upon me, because I have no opportunities of re­
laxation or diversion. . . .  My fancy riots in scenes of 
folly, and I lament, that I have lost so much, and have 
gained so little. In solitude, if I escape the example 
of bad men, I want, likewise, the counsel and conver­
sation of the good. I have been long comparing the 
evils with the advantages of society, and resolve to re­
turn into the world tomorrow. The life of a solitary 
man will be certainly miserable, but not certainly de­
vout .
(p. 246.)
This hermit,, like the solitary astronomer, finds that his 
happiness lies in society, in associating and communicating 
with his fellow man. Later in the tale, Imlac warns Nekayah 
that her desire to retire from the world because of the pain 
of her separation from the kidnapped Pekuah will not nece­
ssarily advance her in the state of "goodness."
How: far solitude may admit goodness, or advance it, I 
shall not,, replied Imlac, dispute at present. Remember 
the confessions of the pious hermit.
(p. 275.)
The idea advanced here is a tentative one, but it 
is also one Johnson probably accepted without too much qual­
ification, for himself at least. Man needs society, needs 
to be raised, educated, trained, taught the patterns of
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civilized living to be happy* The innocence of solitude 
and simplicity of pastoral life are, to a high degree, 
myths y vaporous effusions of weak minds. In cities like 
Cairo in Rasselas, or in London in reality, an individual 
can find pleasure and entertainment and lose for a while 
the misery of life* In solitude, the means for this escape 
are definitely not readily available*
Johnson* s antipathy to pastoral poetry is notori­
ous , and he tended to carry this attitude over into life.
In Chapter XIX^ •*A Glimpse of Pastoral Life,’*̂ he delivers 
a short (’♦^glimpse’*) but telling blow to the life of the 
noble savage as it was supposedly passed in pastoral inno­
cence and serenity* On the way to the hermit*s cell, Ras­
selas and his party are forced to go through fields con­
taining sheep guarded by shepherds* Imlac points out that 
this kind of life **had been often celebrated for its inno­
cence and quiet,’* (p* 242*) and suggests they investigate 
**pastoral life** to see whether happiness is to be found 
there*
The proposal pleased them, and they induced the shep­
herds, by small presents and familiar questions, to tell 
their opinions of their own state: they were so rude 
and ignorant, so little able to compare the good with 
the evil of the occupation, and so indistinct in their 
narratives and descriptions, that very little could be 
learned from them* But it was evident that their hearts 
were cankered with discontent ; that they considered 
themselves, as condemned to labour for the luxury of 
the rich, and looked up, with stupid malevolence, to­
ward those that were placed above them.
(p. 242.)
These three separate incidents are implicitly and
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explicitly positive about mam’s ability to achieve happiness. 
Solitude, retirement, isolation--each has very little to 
gratify man’s insatiable desire for happiness. But the 
city, especially the larger ones like Cairo (or London), of­
fers much in the way of diversity and novelty that can pro­
vide some happiness. Imlac makes.this point during the rec­
itation of his history to Rasselas in the Happy Valley. After 
he roamed the world for a long time, he began to long for 
his home.
When this thought had taken possession of my mind, I 
considered every moment as wasted, which did not bring 
me nearer to Abissinia. I hastened into Egypt„ and, 
notwithstanding my impatience, was detained ten months 
in contemplation of its ancient magnificence, and in 
enquiries after the remains of its ancient learning. I 
found in Cairo a mixture of all nations; some brought 
thither by the love of knowledge, some by the hope of 
gain, and many by the desire of living, after their own 
manner, without observation, and of lying hid in the ob­
scurity of multitudes: for in a city, populous as Cairo, 
it is possible to obtain, at the same time, the grati­
fications of society, and the secrecy of solitude.
(p. 227.)
Imlac is not alone in finding happiness in cities. Both 
Rasselas and Nekayah find constant pleasure and enjoyment 
there and in company with the various levels of society.
They are always disappointed at not finding enduring happi­
ness y but they do experience some form of pleasure.
In this way, I believe, Johnson indicates or im­
plies how a person can find that ’’little to be enjoyed” 
that Imlac tells Rasselas exists on earth. It is found in 
companionship, in novelty, in friendship, in variety--in
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short, in a constant intercourse with the world, with civi­
lized society specifically.
Thus government, is not only essential to the pro­
tection of man and achievement and maintenance of order and 
peace within which man can search for happiness; it provides 
as well the framie, the foundation upon which society builds 
and through which it attains what happiness it can. Gov­
ernment is therefore extremely important and requires, if 
anyone is to partake of its benefits, patience and forbear­
ance on the part of its members for the inevitable defi­
ciencies, injustices, and failures that will occur as it 
functions.
Since the benefits of government are so great, it is 
imperative for the individual members of society to accept 
with patience its inevitable shortcomings. The complex task 
of controlling a country is beyond the capacity of any man 
or group of men to perform perfectly, so that government will 
inevitably incur some faults. The immense amount of detail 
and planning, the conflicting interests, the constant struggle 
over recalcitrant or even rebellious subjects, the ubiquitous 
demands of many for what can be granted to a few, all inev­
itably lead to shortcomings and errors in government.
Johnson makes this particular point through Rasselas 
first and then through Nekayah. In Chapter XXVII, "Disqui­
sition Upon Greatness," Rasselas rejects Nekayah’s description 
of the miseries of domestic life, since he has come to the
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conclusion that happiness must be there because "quiet is not
the daughter of grandeur, or of power." (p. 560.) He is sure
happiness does not reside in high places and his refusal to
accept Nekayah’s similar account of unhappiness in domestic
places stems from his need to find it somewhere. At least
he is sure it is not in the seats of power.
It is evident, that as any man acts in a wider compass 
he must be more exposed to opposition from enmity, or 
miscarriage from chance; whoever has many to please or 
to govern, must use the ministry of many agents, some of 
whom will be wicked, and some ignorant; by some he will 
be misled, and by others betrayed. If he gratifies one 
he will offend another : those that are not favoured will 
think themselves injured; and, since favours can be con­
ferred but upon a few, the greater number will be always 
discontented.
(p. 256.)
This description, based upon Rasselas’s investigations of 
"High Stations," corresponds to Johnson's statement that 
government is such a complex operation that some faults, as 
well as some discontent, are inevitable. In Rasselas’s 
statement, the complex nature of government he describes em­
bodies this belief. When it occurs in Nekayah’s speech, the 
focus is upon the limitations of the individual. This limi­
tation is the complement of the complexity of government, and 
together they are both an explanation and apology for the 
faults of government.
In Chapter XXVIII, "Rasselas and Nekayah Continue 
Their Conversation," Nekayah has just told Rasselas she is 
not sure "whether marriage be more than one of the innumerable 
modes of human misery." (p. 258.)
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Rasselas accuses her of a contradiction in logic.
You seem to forget . . .  that you have, even now, repre­
sented celibacy, as less happy than marriage. Both con­
ditions may be bad, but they cannot both be worst.
(p. 259.)
Nekayah’s answer to this accusation is a restatement of John­
son's political theory which concerns the complexity of gov­
ernment .
To the mind, as to the eye, it is difficult to compare, 
with exactness, objects, vast in their extent, and various 
in their parts. Where we see, or conceive, the whole at 
once, we readily note the discriminations, and decide the 
preference: but of two systems, of which neither can be 
surveyed, by any human being, in its full compass of mag­
nitude, and multiplicity of complications, where is the 
wonder, that, judging of the whole by parts, I am alter­
nately affected by one and the other, as either presses 
on my memory or fancy? We differ from ourselves, just 
as we differ from each other, when we see only part of 
the question, as in multifarious relations of politicks 
and morality; but when we perceive the whole at once, 
as in numerical computations, all agree in one judgment, 
and none ever varies his opinion.
(p. 259.)
The question in dispute is the relative superiority of the 
married and single state, but it embodies in small compass 
large political consequences. For no one, as Nekayah notes, 
is capable of seeing a complex political question or problem 
in its entirety. Each member of society can only see so 
much of his government in operation and judges from what he 
sees. Johnson’s point, made through Nekayah and Rasselas in 
the preceding chapter, is that each individual must recognize 
his limitations and the complicated nature of government, and 
further reserve both his judgment and his criticism until the 
evidence becomes overwhelming.
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If a man recognizes the problems involved in 
government y he is well on his way to recognizing the 
last statement in Johnson's political philosophy: hap­
piness is achieved through the mutual cooperation of 
ruler and subject. Each group must recognizie its duties 
and responsibilities--its privileges and rights did not 
seem to be in any danger of being forgotten, or so it 
seemed to Johnson— and fulfill them to the best of its 
ability. By proceeding in this fashion, society will not, 
it is true, attain permanent or immutable happiness, but 
it will achieve some happiness, some peace and order.
The price is high, since it involves for many the giving 
up of individual liberty, individual desires, personal 
hopes and wishes, wealth and property, but it is the only 
way.
This belief of Johnson's should not be considered 
a negative assertion about society's chances for happin­
ess. It is a positive utterance, qualified as all com­
plex things must be, but still a positive statement. Its 
corollary in Rasselas is equally positive and should 
serve to balance the too heavy weight that has been put 
upon Imlac's famous dictum, "Life is everywhere a state 
in which there is much to endure and little to enjoy."
Johnson uses Nekayah to express his positive be­
liefs about man and happiness. In Chapter XXIX, "The 
Debate on Marriage Continued,*' Nekayah has just finished
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describing the discontent that arises between parents and
children. She says,
I believe it will be founds that those who marry late, 
are best pleased with their children, and those who 
marry early with their paortners.
(p. 262.)
Rasselas wonders if *the union of these two affections**
might not produce **all that could be wished. Perhaps there
is a time, when marriage might unite them, a time neither
too early for the father, nor too late for the husband.**
(p. 262.) Nekayah*s answer embodies Johnson*s observation
concerning man* s ability to secure happiness for himself.
Every hour, answered the princess, confirms my preju­
dice in favor of the position, so often uttered by the 
mouth of Imlac, **That nature sets her gifts on the 
right hand and on the left.** Those conditions, which 
flatter hope and attract desire, are so constituted, 
that, as we approach one, we recede from another.
There are goods so opposed, that we cannot seize both, 
buty by too much prudence, may pass between them, at 
too great a distance to reach either. This is often 
the fate of long considerations; he does nothing, who 
endeavours to do more than is allowed to humanity. 
Flatter not yourself with contrarieties of pleasure.
Of the blessings set before you make your choice, auid 
be content. No man can taste the fruits of autumn, 
while he is delighting his scent with the flowers of 
the spring; no man can, at the same time, fill his cup 
from the source and from the mouth of the Nile.
(p. 263.)
To translate Nekayah*s speech into political real­
ities, one might say that no man can enjoy complete liberty 
and freedom and, at the same time, enjoy the security of 
government which requires the sacrifice of some liberty and 
freedom. The pain of deprivation and frustration that man 
must suffer to live in civilized society axe the lost fruits
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on the right hand which he must forgo^ if he is to taste 
the fruits on the left— the security and protection, the 
peace and order of a civilized community#
Rasselas thus embodies through many of its char­
acters and incidents the political principles discussed in 
the third division of Johnson’s theory# Government’s duty 
to secure property and individual freedom--the necessary 
conditions for happiness although not sufficient in them­
selves— was the first of these* The unhappy ’̂ master” of 
the "stately palace,** the equally unhappy prisoners of the 
Happy Valley and the rich young men who disappointed Ras­
selas illustrate this principle*
No government, however^ can promise complete se­
curity and freedom, since it must partake of the weak­
nesses and faults of the men who comprise it. Imlac re­
lates this fact to Rasselas, who passes it on later in the 
tale to his sister, Nekayah* It is also embodied in the 
incident of the "mad astronomer y" who informs Imlac that he 
cannot expect to govern the seasons perfectly* It is Neka­
yah, speaking about the family,, who reveals the best avail­
able solution for this problem The family, like the state, 
runs smoothest when each individual acts for the interest of 
both himself and the group of which he is a part#
The imperfections of man which lead to correspond­
ing imperfections in government can be traced to reason’s 
inability to control the appetites and passions. The "toad
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astronomer,** the "wise and happy” man whose reasonable 
theory proves untenable^ the sage who prescribes a primi­
tive **'life according to nature** which defies comprehension—  
all are examples of the limitations of reason. They fur­
ther illustrate the dangers in ignoring those limitations 
and the importance of institutions which will provide some 
objective rule to maintain order among men.
The weakness of government lies in the ease with 
which unjust men can disable it by undermining the ’•"rever­
ence** men have for it, Nekayah and Pekuah* s plan for de­
ceiving the astronomer and Rasselas*s criticism of that plan 
embody this point. This dainger to government must be rec- 
ognizedy otherwise the benefits of government are endangered. 
For within a civilised state, man can live with his fellow 
man in large numbers and avoid the misery of solitude and 
loneliness. The unhappiness of the hermit and the discon­
tent of the shepherd's maike this point in Rasselas.
Since these benefits are so great, each man must 
accept the inevitable shortcomings of government, which 
arise in part from the vast complexity of its task, John­
son used this particular idea when he had Rasselas explain 
to Nekayah that a governor cannot please everyone because 
his decisions must affect such large numbers of men at 
every level of society, Nekayah touches upon the converse 
of this belief when she explains to Rasselas, in another 
conversation, that the mind is so limited that it cannot
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taike in a large, complex object. The operations and effects 
of government are, of course, just such objects «
If all men recognize these difficulties in government, 
then they will understand the last principle of Johnson's 
politics: all happiness is dependent on the mutual coop­
eration of governors and governed. Pekuah translates this 
political principle into the life of the individual when 
she tells Rasselas that one cannot taste all the fruits of 




Having arrived at a basic formulation of Johnson 
theory of human nature as he expressed it through his polit­
ical writings and his imaginative productions, I think it 
would be desirable and profitable to try to define Johnson’s 
place in the main stream of intellectual thought of his day* 
The value of such an attempt was described by Louis Bredvold 
when he said.
The history of thought since 1700 can be written in 
many ways, as the history of metaphysics, of logic, of 
political theory, of ethical theory^ or of scientific 
discovery* But it can also be written as the history 
of theories of human nature, and to that central theme 
all these other modes of theorectical and practical in­
tellection can be related.1
He adds further.
Such an orientation offers this great advantage to us 
ordinary laymen in philosophy, untrained as we are in 
dialectic of the professional students, in that we can 
test and validate philosophical propositions by our own 
experience and our knowledge of the experience of man­
kind.^
^The Brave New World of the Enlightenment {Ann 




By following this method, one can test Johnson*s theory of 
human nature for its intrinsic validity and can, at the same 
time, discover his relationship--more often than not his 
opposition— to what were the basic theories of human nature 
in his day.
Probably the best place to begin a survey of the
popular or prevailing theories of human nature in Johnson’s
ages is with Thomas Hobbes. As Leslie Stephens says,
Hobbes’s writings . . .  were . . .  the most potent stim­
ulant to English thought in the last half of the seven­
teenth, and even during the first half of the eight­
eenth, century in England. He had, indeed, fewer dis­
ciples than antagonists; but the writer who provokes a 
reaction does as much in generating ideas as the writer 
who propagates his own ideas.^
The antagonists of Hobbes were legion. Their efforts re­
sulted in or helped create a belief about the nature of man 
which merged with several other forces to become the move­
ment known as sentimentalism. The basic tenet of this move­
ment and one which had tremendous effect on numerous think­
ers and writers as the eighteenth century wore on was the 
belief in the natural goodness of man. Such a belief was 
antithetical to Hobbes’s conclusion about man, but he and 
the sentimentalists were related closely, despite their con­
flicting principles, through their use of the scientific 
method. Each thought that man could be analyzed, understood, 
and, finally, controlled in Hobbes’s case or made anew in
^English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,, II 
(New York: Peter Smith, 1949), 5.
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the later sentimentalist theories of Godwin and Diderot.
But it was the conclusion reached by Hobbes that came first 
and stimulated others of his time into emphasizd-Jig and ex­
panding certain ideas which later blossomed more fully into 
sentimentalism. One authority describes the situation in 
this way:
British ethics of the period is a series of attempts to 
demolish Hobbism. He had reduced the moral laws to the 
jurisdiction of Leviathan; the Cambridge Platonists 
sought to show that moral laws are eternal and immu­
table, grounded in the very essence of human nature. He 
had pictured man as a natural insatiate egoist; his 
critics undertook to vindicate benevolence as a normal 
human attribute and once more to prove the truth of 
Aristotle*s conception of the inherently social char­
acter of man. He had conceived of human life, whether 
anarchic or social, wholly in terms of passions and ani­
mal motions, satisfaction of desires; against this nar­
row hedonism, the demand is raised in British philos­
ophy for a recognition of the morally sovereign sense 
of conscience and duty.^
Hobbes was a thorough going materialist. Everything
in existence **’is corporeal, that is to say,, body;
and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, 
breadth, and depth: also every part of body, is like­
wise body, and hath the like dimensions ; and conse­
quently every part of the universe, is body, and that 
which is not body, is no part of the universe: and be­
cause the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing ; and consequently n o w h e r e . **2
In his little treatise Human Nature, Hobbes argues this
proposition in such a way as to avoid giving grounds to
the dangerous charge of aetheism. He says,
^Radaslov A. Tsanoff, The Moral Ideals of Our Civili- 
zation (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1942), p. 162.
%ubted by Tsanoff, p. 153.
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Concerning other things ^ h a n  the spirit of Godi , 
which some men call spirits incorporeal, and some 
corporeal, it is not possible by natural means only, 
to come to knowledge of so much, as that there are 
such things* We that are Christians acknowledge that 
there be angels good and evil, and that there are 
spirits, and that'the soul of a man is a spirit, and 
that those spirits are immortal: but, to know it, that 
is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is 
impossible: for, all evidence is conception,, • • • and 
all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from 
sense. * . *1
Hobbes' s dismissal of the "spiritual" as opposed to the 
"sensual"^ world is not made through an irreligious or skep­
tical rationale, but on the basis of faith, of belief in 
the existence of the supernatural. By granting its exis­
tence, he can then dismiss it as irrelevant to his discus­
sion, since he is concerned only with "natural means" of 
knowledge®
What Hobbes finds left after the exclusion of the 
spiritual is simply "matter in motion." He had learned 
about Galileo's experiment with motion, and he thought by 
applying Galileo’s method to the study of man and by pre­
senting his results in as close a reproduction of the geo­
metrical reasoning of Euclid as possible, he would solve 
forever the problems that had plagued ®an and society since 
their beginnings. The value of the geometric method, the 
"only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow 
on m a n k i n d , "2 Hobbes made clear in the "Epistle Dedicatory"
Ijn The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir 
William Molesworth, IV (London: John Bohn, 1840), p. 61.
^Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 21.
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to De Cive*
Truly the Geometricians have very admirably performed 
their part* , . . If the moral philosophers had as 
happily discharged their duty, I know not what could 
have been added by human industry to the completion of 
that happiness, which is consistent with human life.^
In the long treatise. The Leviathan, Hobbes ex­
plicitly demonstrates his theory of man as **matter in mo­
tion.*^ In the ’̂ Introduction,^ he writes,
Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the 
world, is the art of man, as in many other things, so 
in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial 
animal (Jhat is, the Leviathan, the commonwealth*
For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning 
whereof is in some principal part within; why may we 
not say,, that all automata (engines that move them­
selves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an 
artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring ; 
and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, 
but so many wheels^ giving motions to the whole body, 
such as intended by the a r t i f i c e r . 2
This machine operates under the impact of sensations re­
ceived from the outside world. The origin of thought in 
man
is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception 
in a man’s mind, which hath not at first,, totally, or 
by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The 
rest are derived from that o r i g i n a l . ^
When a man reasons, ”lie does nothing else but con­
ceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a
remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another. . . .  
in what matter soever there is place for addition and
IPe Give, ed. Sterling P. Lamprecht (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), p. 3.
2Leviathan, ed, Oakeshott, p. 5.
3Ibid., p. 7.
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subtraction, there is also place for reason ; and where 
these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to 
do.^^1 Reasoning is thus a mechanical process and all that 
men know by reasoning is causal knowledge, the knowledge of 
mathematical or geometrical certainty.
The emotions are equally generated by matter in 
motion. The ^conceptions" or "apparitions," the ideas, 
which are "nothing really, but motion in some internal sub­
stance of the head," continue to the heart where they "must 
either help or hinder the motion which is called vital."
If they help, it is called ’delight"; if they hinder, it is 
called "pain."2 Both reason and emotion, experience and 
behaviour, are mechanical and determined.
Man is a machine which turns away from pain and 
toward pleasure. But ""felicity of this life, consisteth 
not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is not 
such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest 
good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philos­
opher s .
Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one 
object to another; the attaining of the former, being 
still the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, 
that the objec.t*-s of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once 
only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for 
ever the way of future desire. And therefore the vol­
untary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not 
only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a 
contented life.*̂ 3
1 Leviathan, ed. O alee shot t, pp. 25-26.
^Human Nature, ed. Molesworth, p. 31.
3Leviathan, ed. Oaleeshott, p. 63.
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There is thus in man a ^perpetual and restless desire of 
power after power, that ceaseth only in death."! This rest­
less craving in man that Hobbes saw led him to compare the 
life of man to a race which has "no other goal, nor other 
garland, but being foremost, said in it:
To endeavour, is appetite. To be remiss, is sensuality. 
To consider them behind, is glory. To consider them be­
fore, is humility. . . .  Continually to out-go the next 
before, is felicity. And to forsaice the course, is todie."2 -------
Each of these machines is equal. Some men are 
stronger than others, but even the weaJcest can kill the 
strongest by *̂“secret machinations" or by "confederacy" 
with others who suffer the same danger from the stronger.
In the faculties of the mind the equality of aptitude is 
even greater among men than is strength. For though a man 
"acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more elo­
quent ,: or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there 
be many so wise as t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s  belief in the supe­
riority of self is a proof of intellectual equality, there 
not being "ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distri­
bution of any thing, than that every man is contented with 
his share
Since men are equal, their hope of gain is equal
!lbid., p. 64.
^Human Nature, ed. Molesworth, p. 53.
^Leviathan, ed. Oakeshott, p. 80.
^Ibid., p. 81.
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also: all men desire and believe they can attain the pleas­
ures of this life. From this belief springs the natural 
state of man: war. Each man considers every other man an 
enemy who is competing with him, who is endeavouring to 
rob or kill him, and who refuses to acknowledge his infe­
riority.
So that in the nature of mam y we find three principal 
causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, dif­
fidence; thirdly, glory.
The first, maiketh men invade for gain ; the second, 
for safety ; and the third, for reputation.1
In this state, where there is no common power to 
control men, there can be no order, no rest, no content­
ment.
In such condition, there is no place for industry; be­
cause the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently 
no culture of the earth; . . .  no arts; no letters; no 
society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and 
danger, of violent death; and the life of man, soli­
tary, poor, nasty, brutish, and s h o r t *2
Since war is the natural condition of man and since 
he is governed by reason alone in this condition, every one 
has the right to everything and the right to use every pos­
sible means in pursuit of all things, there being no such 
thing as ethics or morality in the state of nature. No one, 
it is obviousy can have any security in this state of affairs 
in which all men's hands are raised against one another. The 
assurance of continuing satisfaction of present desires as
llbid.y p. 80.
2 i b i d . , p .  8 2 ,
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they shall occur in the future--security in brief--is the
essence of ’’felicity” and ’’’felicity” is the end of life;
consequently a general rule of reason is
that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he 
has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, 
that he may seek, and use^ all helps, and advaintages of 
war
From this precept can be drawn what Hobbes considered the 
’’first, and fundamental law of nature ; which is,, to seek 
peace y and follow This search after peace is there­
fore based on purely utilitarian, or selfish, grounds. ”By 
reducing the range of their desires they increase their 
chances of assured gratifications.”'3
From this fundamental law of nature, Hobbes derived 
the second laws
that a man be willing,, when others are so too, as far- 
forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall 
think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; 
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, 
as he would allow other men against himself.4
Hobbes not only justifies this approach to social life on Bib­
lical grounds, but also identifies it with one of the great 
precepts of the Gospel, when he says that unless all men 
agree to lay down their right to all things, then the person 




4Leviathan, ed. Oakeshott, p. 85.
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man is bound to; rather than to dispose himself to peace.
This is that law of the Gospel: whatsoever you require 
that others should do to you, that do ye to them.”"̂
It is not surprising that a host of divines and moralists 
arose to combat Hobbes, for he takes their favorite maxims 
and passages from the Bible and disconcertingly uses them 
to justify his own militantly materialistic approach to hu­
man nature.
Men have therefore joined together through a compact,
agreeing to renounce their destructive struggles for power
and to invest their rights in one authority. Leviathan, Wio
shall have irrevocable power over them henceforth. Only then
do law and order become a reality and with them, justice
and injustice, good and evil, morality and immorality. Such
words otherwise are what Hobbes calls an ^'absurdity a
word with no referment, a meaningless sound.
The final "cause, end, or destiny of men
who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in 
the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in 
which we see them live in commonwealths, is the fore­
sight of their preservation, and of a more contented 
life thereby."'^
For such a design to succeed, there must be the erection of
a common power, as may be able to defend them from the 
invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another.3
Such a power can be created if men agree 
libid.
^Ibid., p . 109 o 
3lbid., p. 112.
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to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or 
upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their 
wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will.^
Sovereignty is thus placed in one man, or group of men, and 
once placed there, is absolute. Such were the final re­
sults of the application of the scientific method to the 
problems of man and society.
ii
Although Hobbes's theory was congenial to Charles II 
and his followers^ perhaps as much for his cynical wit as 
for his justification of the absolute sovereignty of the 
king on scientific principles, it was not congenial to the 
majority of Englishmen • Hobbes carried to their logical 
end the basic premises he started with,, aund while his prem­
ises may have been acceptable, his procedure was not* A 
man who started with much the same method and even beliefs 
of Hobbes, but a man who stopped short of his rigorous ap­
plication and thereby endeared himself to Englishmen for 
the next hundred years was John Locke*
Locke also thought that the new scientific methods 
developed in the preceding years could be applied to the 
difficult problems of man and society. In discussing the 
possible limits of man's knowledge, Locke says that,
it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of 
such discoveries tjpf new relations between ideas, that 
is, of new knowledge^ ; and when reason has all the
llbid*
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helps it is capable of, for the finding of proofs, or 
examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas*1
Hard as it is, however, ""they that are ignorant of algebra 
cannot imagine the wonders in this kind that are to be done 
by it*"^ This attitude towards mathematicsthe king of 
the sciences,, is an example of the ’̂ expressions of a new 
temper of mind, of a new conception of the universe, and of 
a new approach to the problems of humanity. . . .  The sci­
entific spirit was beginning to permeate the mind of Eu­
rope. . . .  what the world awaited was the Newton of the 
science of ethics and human society.**^ In the eighteenth 
century Locke was sometimes assumed to be this phenomenon, 
and he himself thought the application of the Newtonian 
spirit offered great hope for mankind.
The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, good­
ness,. and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom 
we dependj and the idea of ourselves, as understanding 
rational beings; being such as are clear in us,, would,
I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such 
foundations of our duty and rules of action as might 
place morality amongst the sciences capable of demon­
stration: wherein I doiibt not but from self-evident 
propositions by necessary consequences, as incontest­
able as those in mathematics, the measure of right and 
wrong might be made out to any one that will apply him­
self with the same indifferency and attention to the 
one as he does to the other of these sciences.4
Ân Essay on Human Understanding in The Philosoph­
ical Works of John Locke, ed. J. S. St* John, II (London: 
George Bell and Sons, Bohn Standard Library, 1892), p. 154.
^Ibid.
^Bredvold, Brave New World . . . , pp. 39-40.
4Locke, p. 154.
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Locke does not explicitly maintain, like Hobbes, 
that man can be understood as **matter in motion,**" that he 
is determined in all his activities and emotions by the im­
pact of motion on the head and heart. At the beginning of 
his Essay Concerning Humain Under standi ng, he explicitly re­
nounces any specific investigation into the nature of man.
This, therefore, (^e saysj being my purpose, to inquire 
into the original, certainty, and extent of human know­
ledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, 
opinion, and assent, I shall not at present meddle with 
the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble my­
self to examine wherein its essence consists.1
But Locke does go on to intimate where he does think the
answers to this kind of inquiry would be found, when he
says that he will not speculate on
what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies 
we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any 
ideas in our understandings ; and whether those ideas 
do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on 
matter or not.2
As the editor notes, Locke is here echoing Hobbes.
Locke, though he does not here name Hobbes, nevertheless 
refers to his speculations, almost making use of the 
very language of that philosopher in his treatise on 
Human Nature;, where he says, **Image or colour is but an 
appaorition unto us of the motion, agitation, or altera­
tion which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, 
or some internal substance of the head.**^
Locke's general application of the scientific theory to man





materialistic terms, although he refused to follow through 
completely the materialistic premises of this method* Both 
he and Hobbes admit the existence of God but Locke made His 
Existence a strong influence on the conduct of man, both in 
the state of nature and in civil society*
One commentator on Locke analyzes this distinction 
when he discusses the hedonistic basis of Locke’s and 
Hobbes’s ethicalism* Granting that both philosophers often 
identified good and evil with pleasure and pain, this critic 
points out that Locke’s concept of pleasure and pain in­
cluded more than just Hobbes’s materialistic conception: it 
included the pleasure that comes from ’’'reputation, from the 
possession of knowledge, from doing good to others, and 
from the expectation of future bliss* And these other 
sources of pleasure were not traced back by Locke to any 
necessary bodily conditions*”^ The ’’'expectation of future 
bliss” which Locke made one source of pleasure signalizes 
a division between natural good and evil and moral good and 
evil which Hobbes did not recognize*
Locke agrees with Hobbes when he says.
Good and evil, as hath been shown * • . are nothing but 
pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures 
pleasure or pain to us*2
But he leaves Hobbes when he says,
^Sterling Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philos- 




Moral good and evil, then, is only the conformity or 
disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, 
whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and 
power of the law-maJcer; which good and evil, pleasure 
or pain, attending our observance or break of the law 
by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward 
and punishment•^
Locke recognized three standards or laws by which men judge
of the morality of their actions: 1) the divine law; 2) the
civil law; 3) the law of opinion and reputation.
By the relation they bear to the first of these, men 
judge whether their actions are sins or duties ; by the 
second, whether they be criminal or innocent: and by 
the third, whether they be virtues or vices.2
The ""rewards and punishments^’ for obeying or dis­
obeying any of these three sets of law are necessary.
It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a 
rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his 
power to reward the compliance, and punish deviation 
from his rule, by some good and evil that is not the 
natural product and consequence of the action itself.3
The rewards and punishments that are conferred by the divine 
law make trivial all other pleasures and pains that the 
other two kinds of law can bestow. By enlarging the hedon­
istic ethics of Hobbes to include future rewards and pun­
ishments, Locke "remove the emphasis from the present 




3lbid., pp. 485-86. 
^Lamprecht, p. 92.
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The divine law which is the measure of true morality 
existed prior to all civil society, for '*we are under ob­
ligations antecedent to all human constitutions.”  ̂ Thus it 
is that man did not exist in the same state of nature, that 
is, "the status of human individuals or groups who in their 
relations to one another are not subject to the authority 
of any g o v e r n m e n t ,"2 for Locke as he did for Hobbes.
The state that ”all men are naturally in” for Locke
is characterized by a
perfect freedomto order their actions, and dispose of 
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within 
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, 
or depending upon the will of any other m a n . 3
Since all men live in a state of perfect freedom, they live
in
a state also of equality, wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than 
another; there being nothing more evident, than that 
creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously 
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use 
of the same faculties, should also be equal one aonongst 
another without-subordination or subjection.^
All being equal, all therefore possess certain fundamental
rights, the most fundamental of which is the preservation of
life. Following closely upon this right are two others,
1Locke, II, 256.
ZLovejoyy p. 15.
^John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, in 
The World* s Classics, Social Contract, Essays by Locke, Hume, 
and Rousseau, ed. Sir Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1948), p. 5.
4ibid.
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usually called by Locke liberty and property. Liberty 
means the right to do as one pleases, so long as one does 
not infringe upon the rights of others,, while property re­
fers to man's right to his labor and to the fruits of his 
labor.
The possession of rights implies the existence of a 
law, in this case a law of nature. Hobbes recognized and 
defined the law of nature as a "precept or general rule, 
found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, 
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means 
of preserving the same ; and to omit that, by which he 
thinketh it may be best preserved.!
From this law, he derived the sum of the right of . 
nature; which is, "by all means we can, to defend o u r s e l v e s . "2 
Defined in this manner, the law of nature not only condones 
all vicious and savage actions of man to man, but actually 
commands their use for the preservation of self. But Locke 
constructed the law of nature quite differently.
Although men in nature are in a
state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license: 
though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty 
to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not 
liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature 
in his possession, but where some nobler use than its 
bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has 
a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one, 
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who
1Leviathan, ed. Oakeshott, p. 84.
2lbid., p. 85.
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will but consult it, that being all equal and inde­
pendent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty, or possessions.!
The law of nature is a morally binding one upon men both 
before and after their entrance into a political union, even 
though men in both conditions sometimes fail to live up to 
their obligation under that law.
The state of nature is not a state of "war of all 
men against all men"2 for Locke. There is "a plain difference 
between the state of nature and the state of war, which how­
ever some men have confounded [jHobbes in particula^ , are as 
far distant as a state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, 
and preservation; and a state of enmity, malice, violence and 
mutual destruction are one from another."3 The state of 
nature consists of the following:
Men living together according to reason without a common 
superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, 
are properly in the state of nature.4
The state of war, on the other hand, is composed of
force, or a declared design of force upon the person of 
another, where there is no common superior on earth to 
appeal to for relief.^
So long as men obey the law of nature, the state of nature
remains peaceful and harmonious, but when man ignores or
!Locke, Second Treatise, p. 6-7.
^Hobbes, De Cive, p. 29.
Q Locke, Second Treatise, p. 17.
"̂ Ibid. , pp. 17-18.
3Ibid., p. 18.
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violates that law, he brings into being the state of war and
all its accompanying miseries.
The primary, although not the sole, motive for civil
society is the desire of men to escape the wretchedness and
pain of a state of war.
To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal 
but to heaven, and wherein even the least difference is 
apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between 
the contenders) is one great reason of men’s putting 
themselves into society, and quitting the state of 
nature.1
Locke agrees with Hobbes here in finding the origin of society 
in man’s desire to escape from the dangers of a state outside 
of society.
I easily grant [he s a y ^  that civil government is the 
remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, 
which must certainly be great where men may be judges in 
their own c a s e . 2
But he disagrees with Hobbes on the conditions upon which man 
leaves the state of nature and enters the state of society.
In Hobbes’s theory, man entered society by giving up 
his power to attack others in order to gain security from 
the same kind of attack. His investment of this power in one 
sovereign was final and made that sovereign absolute. Other­
wise, this sovereign would not be capable of permarnently abol­
ishing the state of war which naturally exists between men 
and which can always revive to overwhelm civil government, 




invested in the sovereign. Locke also believed that men must
give up their "natural" power and right of making war in
order to create and enter society.
But because no political society can be, nor subsist, 
without having in itself the power to preserve the 
property, and in order thereunto to punish the offences 
of all those of that society: there, and there only, is 
political society, where every one of the members hath 
quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands 
of the community in all cases that exclude him not from 
appealing for protection to the law established by it.1
But if the power conferred upon the governing body by men 
entering civil society be abused, then these men are justi­
fied in rebelling.
In all states and conditions the true remedy of force 
without authority is to oppose force to it,2
Locke was able to justify revolution because he did 
not maike the natural state, which is the opposite of a poli­
tical society, a state of war as did Hobbes. Men, therefore, 
could dissolve their present form of government if it 
violated the contract upon which it was based. This contract 
was simply the agreement of the people who made up any given 
society to relinquish certain of their powers for the sake 
of security, of preserving "his property, that is, his life, 
liberty, and e s t a t e . "2 when any of these "natural rights" 
were violated or unlawfully attacked, men had the right to 





But Locke did not make the desire to escape from the
disorder of the state of nature turned war the only motive
for the creation of civil society. He also believed that
man had a social instinct which moved him toward alliance
with other men,
God, having made such a creature that, in his own 
judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him 
under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and 
inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted 
him with understanding and language to continue and en­
joy it «I
Locke had earlier in the same work quoted the "judicious
Hooker" in support of such a position.
• • • but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient 
to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, 
needful for such a life as pur nature doth desire, a life 
fit for the dignity of man ; therefore to supply those de­
fects and imperfections which are in us, as living singly 
and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek 
communion and fellowship with others: this was the cause 
of men uniting themselves at first in politic societies.^
Locke does not dwell on this feature of human nature, 
perhaps because it might be construed as an "innate idea," 
and all such entities Locke had, of course, banished from the 
mind of man. The mind is at first like a "white paper, void 
of all characters, without any i d e a s . I t  is furnished 
with ideas from experience: "Our observation employed either
about external sensible objects, or about the internal op­
erations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by
^Ibid., p. 64.
^Ibid., p. 15.
3Locke, Essay, I, p, 205.
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ourselves. • • • These are the two fountains of knowledge 
from whence all the ideas we have or can naturally have do 
spring,’*’̂  These first •*’ideas^ are ^simple”' but through the 
use of certain mental faculties can be turned into •*̂ com- 
plex’̂ ideas,, all of whose elements, however, can be broken 
up into the "'simple**' ideas from which they spring.
If the human mind is a "'tabula rasa, a clean slate
for experience to write on,. • • , then as we grow up we be­
come what our experience, our education, our environment, 
combine to make us. Our slates are written full as we 
live."’̂  Locke did not go this far in his theorizing about 
human nature, but others— for exanple. La Mettrie in his
Man a Machine, 1749, and David Hartley in Observations On
Man, also published in 1749— were not so reticient. The 
advocates of sentimentalism utilized Locke's basic epis- 
temological premise but joined with it a theory of natural 
goodness which became extremely popular during the eighteenth 
century.
iii
Locke neither affirmed nor denied the natural good­
ness of man.
Is man by nature good or bad? Locke's epistemology 
implies that he is neither. Although, as his own 
writing on the social contract shows, he had a rather 
optimistic view of human potentialities, his conception
^Ibid., p. 202.
%redvold. Brave New World . . . ,p. 44.
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of the mind represents it as, intrinsically, neither 
moral nor immoral.1
Locke hoped that man could be both good and rational, but 
in a state of nature there existed numberless possibilities 
for quarrel and conflicts. Such conflicts meant that man 
could be evil, just as Locke’s interpretation of the social 
contract was also based upon the belief that the-men grant­
ed power could use it unjustly and thereby justify revolu­
tion. Hence the distinct possibility of natural depravity 
in both a state of nature and a state of society is im­
plied in Locke’s writings.
The sentimental view,, on the other hand, veered off 
from Locke after talcing over his mechanical view of human 
nature. If man was naturally good and was also the sum, 
more or less, of his experiences, then man was evil only 
because his education and experiences had warped his natural­
ly good and benevolent impulses.
The beginnings of the sentimentalist movement are
complex. R . S. Crane has shown that certain Latitudinaurian
divines of the Restoration,
Without shutting their eyes to the great amount of 
actual selfishness and inhumanity in the world, . . .  
devoted much effort, nevertheless, to picturing the 
heart of man as ’̂ naturally” good in the sense that 
when left to its own native impulses it tends invar­
iably to humane and sociable feelings— and this
^Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of 
Grace, Locke and the Aesthetics of Romanticism (Berkeley: 
The University of California Press, 1960), p. 44.
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“Without the Discipline of Reason, or the Precepts of 
Religion.
These Anglican ministers were opposing several enemies at 
once in preaching this gospel. They were attacking the 
belief in total depravity advocated by the Puritans, the 
deep distrust of the passions and the exaggerated trust in 
the reason embodied in stoic doctrine and preached by .lat­
ter day Stoics, and the everpresent and what they believed 
malignant influence of Hobbes, who maintained that “with­
out a government possessed of complete power the natural 
passions of man would lead to a state of constant social 
war
A sermon of Isaac Barrow provides a good example of 
the traits in man that these divines were emphasizing in 
their disputes with their opponents, both within and with­
out the Anglican church.
We are indispensably obliged to these duties Q^f benev­
olence^ , because the best of our natural inclinations 
prompt us to the performance of them, especially those 
of pity and benignity, which are manifestly discernible 
in all, but most powerful and vigorous in the best na­
tures ; and which, questionless, by the most wise and 
good Author of our beings were implanted therein both 
as monitors to direct, and as spurs to incite us to the 
performance of our duty. . . .  Antipathies may be nat­
ural to wild beasts; but to rational creatures they are wholly unnatural.3
’̂•Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of 
Feeling, ELH, I (December, 1934), 220. The quotation 
used by Crane is from A Sermon, 1739, by Thomas Herring, 
Bishop of Bangor.
^Ibid., pc 221.
Quoted by Crane, p. 223.
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Another early influence which shaped the sentimen­
tal interpretation of human nature was the Cambridge Pla­
tonists. These men— Benjamin VJhichcote, Henry More, Ralph 
Cudworth and others— ’̂ wanted to moderate the Calvinistic 
doctrine of man’s total depravity, in the English Puritan­
ism of their time."l Their desire to temper the harsh Cal­
vinistic doctrine led them to such statements as. the follow­
ing.
Nothing is more certainly true than that all Vice is 
unnatural, and contrary to the Nature of Man. All that 
we call Sin, which is nought and contrary to the Reason 
of Things, is destructive of Human Nature; and a Man 
forceth himself when he doth it.
The Good Man is an Instrument in Tune; Excite a good Man, 
give him an Occasion, you shall have from him savoury 
Speeches out of his Mouth, and good Actions in his Life.^
The Cambridge Platonists, as well as the Latitudinarian di­
vines before them, did not believe that man was perfect, 
free from sin and corruption. But this part of their teach­
ing was left generally unremarked while their insistence 
upon man’s natural inclination to sociability and goodness 
was emphasized.
Sentimentalism received a new force and populariza­
tion that spread throughout the eighteenth century in the 
publication of the third Earl of Shaftesbury’s Character­
istics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc. (1711),
^Louis Bredvold, The Natural History of Sensibility 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1.962), p. 8.
ZCited by Bredvold from The Cambridge Platonists, 
ed. E. T. Campagnac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901), 
pp. 25y 46.
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Shaftesbury was tutored at home by John Locke^ but he did 
not become a disciple of his tutor. On the contrary^ he 
thought Locke’s theory of human understanding reduced mo­
rality and virtue to a matter of custom and fashion, a 
proposition thoroughly distasteful to him. He believed and 
attempted to prove in his three volumes of essays that man 
has an innate disposition to virtue, a natural goodness 
that needs only cultivation to make him happy. This nat­
ural goodness could be corrupted by unnatural or evil cus­
toms and education, but if properly trained it could become 
a strong feeling, a powerful taste actually, for the good, 
the true, and the beautiful. ”Be persuaded,** he writes Mi­
chael Ainsworth,
that wisdom is more from the heart than from the head. 
Feel goodness, and you will see all things fair and 
good.1
Shaftesbury was an aristocrat with the education of
an aristocrat. He tended to identify, naturally enough,
morality and wisdom with aristocratic good breeding.
To philosophize, in a just Signification, is but to 
carry Good-breeding a step higher. For the Accomplish­
ment of Breeding is. To learn whatever is decent in 
Company or Beautiful in Arts ; and the Sum of Philosophy 
is. To learn what is just in society and beautiful in 
Nature, and the Order of the World.^
Wisdom is taste raised to higher degree, while virtue ceases
Quoted by Lois Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of 
Progress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), p. 32.
^Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 
etc., 3rd edition,' III (London, 1732), 161.
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to be the goal of authoritarian conscience in conduct, but 
becomes the natural result of the proper cultivation of the 
sajne innate "taste,called by Shaftesbury's disciple Fran­
cis Hutcheson the "moral sense," and later described by 
Adam Smith as "moral sentiments»" This taste, sense, or 
sentiment is actually a Lockean "innate idea" and is per­
haps the basic issue which divides Locke and Shaftesbury » 
Aesthetic appréciâtion--a taste for the beautiful; philo­
sophic sophistication— a taste for the true; moral conduct-- 
a taste for the good; all three attributes, three functions 
of the same faculty in reality,, are innate, inborn, inher­
ent within the heart of man, and lay waiting for cultiva­
tion to unfold and blossom.
. After all, . . .  it is not merely what we call Prin­
ciple, but a TASTE that governs men. They may think 
for certain, "This is right, or that wrong." They 
may believe "This a Crime, or that a Sin ; This pun­
ishable by Man, or that by God:" yet if the SAVOUR of 
things lief cross to HONESTY; if the Fancy be florid^ 
and the Appetite high towards the subaltern Beauties 
and lower order or worldly symmetries and s^oportjons; 
the _conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.
Shaftesbury explicitly affirms his belief in this inward
taste as a constituent faculty in the creation of human
nature when he says.
That in the, very nature of Things there must of neces­
sity be the Foundation of a right and wrong TASTE, as 
well in respect of inward Characters and Features, as 




Thus the natural goodness of man inclines him to 
benevolence and goodness, while it also, properly condi­
tioned by perusal of the best models in literature, phi­
losophy and the arts, provides him with his most profound 
pleasure and happiness » The good man, then, is
A man of finely cultivated tastes, in morals as well 
as in art, whose personality is so harmoniously de­
veloped that the unfolding of it reveals the good that 
is naturally in his nature.^
Shaftesbury was neither the originator of these 
ideas, nor the only promulgator. Addison and Steele ad­
vocated a similar cause and purpose in their periodical.
The Spectator » Steele in his first important publication. 
The Christian Hero (1701), attempted to impress upon his 
own mind the superiority of Christianity over the stoical 
and pagan virtues taken from classical antiquity and held 
up as ideals of conduct. Rationalism as a guide to conduct, 
particularly as preached by the Stoics, needed to be trans­
formed by an admixture of Christian feeling, piety, moral 
feeling, and regularity if a man was to live a life of 
moral integrity. In the Conscious Lovers (1723), Steele 
is openly sentimental, embodying there in dramatic form 
the principles which led him in The Tatler to censure the 
lewdness and cynicism of Restoration comedy. In this play, 
Bevil, Junior tells Indiana, an orphaned young girl who 
has been receiving aid from some unknown gentleman (actually
^Bredvold, The Brave New World . . . , p. 91.’
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Bevily Junior) and who is afraid that this gentleman per­
haps has dishonorable intentions y that she is wrong to sus­
pect such disinterested generosity.
Ind. But still I insist his having no private interest 
in the action, makes it prodigious, almost incred­
ible.
Bev. Dear Madamy I never knew you more mistaken: why, 
who can be more an usurer, than he who lays out 
his money in such valuable purchases? If pleas­
ure be worth purchasing, how great a pleasure is 
it to himy who has a true taste of life, to ease 
an aching hearty to see the human countenance 
lighted up into smiles of joy, on the receipt of 
a bit of orey which is superfluous, and otherwise 
useless in a man's own pocket? What could a man 
do better with his cash?^
The closeness to Shaftesbury's thought and even phrasing
indicates how far sentimentalism had spread in the popular
literature of the age.
The examples multiply as the century wears on. In 
the dramay Nicholas Rowe's The Fair Penitent (1703)y Jane 
Shore (1714)y and Lady Jane Grey (1715) are either senti­
mental in inspiration or contain strong sentimental in­
cidents. George Lillo's bourgeous bragedy The London Mer­
chant (1731) was intended to move the audience to tears by 
the pathos of the tragic situation in which George Barn­
well y its hero y finds himself. He is more victim than sin­
ner, more an honest merchant apprentice destroyed by a se­
ductress than an intense Elizabethan hero creating his own 
tragic destiny; his story was intended to draw tears, not
^Richard Steele, The Conscious Lovers in The The- 
atre. Tragic and Comic, IX (Edinburgh: J. Robertson, 1776), 
49.
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to inspire pity and fear.
In nature poetry, James Thomson in ^Summer* of The 
Seasons acknowledges the influence of Shaftesbury^ '•gen­
erous Ashley,amd his theory of the ’•moral sense” which 
could be awakened and cultivated by nature. Mark Akenside, 
the Warton brothers, and a variety of other poets could be 
cited as examples of the increasing popularity of this move­
ment at mid-century, as could Richardson and Fielding in 
the novel. By the end of the century sentimentalism had 
achieved more or less of a complete victory and had paved 
the way for the arrival of the great Romantics.
iv
Johnson’s basic affinities with certain elements in 
these conflicting and contradictory positions are generally 
clear. In the first division of the political theory, 
Johnson’s closeness to Hobbes in the analysis of human nature 
and the necessity for civil society as opposed to the state 
of nature if man is to achieve any happiness is apparent.
Both men believed that the only chance anyone had for avoid­
ing misery and securing peace and order lay in civilized 
society, in a political union. Furthermore, both men 
thought that power and uthority must be granted to estab­
lished government,. which in turn meant that power was "the 
central fact of government.”  ̂ If this power was not granted
^Donald J . Greene, The Politics of Samuel Johnson 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 246.
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then government would fail and man would revert to his nat­
ural state of war and misery.
If Johnson’s analysis of human nature was similar 
to Hobbes, he made quite different inferences from it.
Where Hobbes insisted that government must be absolute to 
be effective, Johnson knew that it was possible for any 
government to grow so corrupt that revolution would inevi­
tably destroy it. He did not, however, justify revolution 
on the Lockean grounds of "’inalienable rights," just as he 
did not justify the investment of great power in government 
through an indissoluble "contract" as did Hobbes, Both of 
these arguments were in essence "speculation," and therefore 
destined to be either nullified or impoverished by their 
first contact with experience. Johnson thought power neces­
sary and revolution inevitable in some cases for the same 
practical reason. Without power, government could not en­
force the obedience necessary for the effectual performance 
of its duties ; people would rebel when government no longer 
exercised its power to provide a minimum of satisfactory 
protection and security. In each case, the utilitarian 
standared of performance decides how people and government 
will act, or survive, not any metaphysical theory of rights 
or contract.
Although Johnson took from Hobbes, or at least ar­
rived at the same conclusions that Hobbes did, the natural 
state of war and the equally savage nature of man, he added
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to these beliefs more humane ingredients found in Locke 
and in one of Locke’s favorite sources, Thomas Hooker.
Thus Johnson found in human nature a desire for sociabil­
ity that pushed the individual toward society. This desire, 
as well as the pleasures and benefits conferred through gov­
ernment, were responsible for man’s subduing the equally 
natural tendencies in his nature to wage war and to take 
by force that which he desired. Donald Greene points out 
that Johnson made this belief one of his basic principles in 
his theory of the state.
Where Johnson chiefly follows Hooker is in basing his 
scheme of society on the two postulates, that man is 
naturally a social animal, and that obedience to author­
ity is the essence of society.1
A student of Johnson’s ethical position has pointed out
also that this insistence upon the sociability of man can
be used to matke a ’’broad and fundamental division between
the two schools ^ f  Hobbes and of Cumberland, a member of
the anti-HobbistsJ.
No matter how deeply .pessimistic Johnson, and those 
proponents of natural law to whom I am comparing him, 
may seem concerning man’s selfishness . . .  they also 
feel that man has some natural affinity for his fellows, 
an affinity which Hobbes believes to be nonexistent.”2
Johnson refused, however, to allow these ’’social 
passions” or ’’affections” to become man’s natural condition 
as did the sentimentalists. To believe that proposition
-̂Ibid.
2Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson The Moralist (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 65.
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was to be blinded by a theory, and to base conduct on that 
theory, without positing a conscience in morality or 
strongly enforced law in society, was to follow the shortest 
path to moral degeneracy and political anarchy.
Johnson was thus on the side of Hobbes in the ar­
gument between Hobbes and his many opponents about the na­
ture of humanity. But he left Hobbes when Hobbes left the 
empirical observations accessible to all men’s judgments. 
Hobbes turned to a ’’’contract” as the basis of society, and 
from that basis he deduced the nature and function of gov­
ernment. Johnson turned to religion for his final judgment 
of all institutions, acts, and customs, but he did this not 
in terms of practical consequences but in t erms of eternal 
happiness for the individual. He agreed with Locke that 
the practical consequences of good government should gen­
erally be life, liberty, and property, for these things 
were essential int he pursuit of temporal happiness. But 
temporal happiness should not be confused with eternal 
happiness, which in turn meant that government,; for all its 
importance, could not finally assume the primary place in 
the life of man. It was a tool for man, and like any tool, 
its shape and form were trivial matters if it did the job.
Since man was not naturally good, as was believed 
by the followers of the sentimental movement, he could not 
hope to create a perfect government by correcting all faults 
and irregularities in his present one. Such tampering in
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accordance with a mere speculative scheme was, at best, ir­
responsibility. Government would always be imperfect, just 
as man would always be imperfect. Government depended, 
therefore,, upon each person's willingness to suffer the in­
evitable weaknesses and insufficiences of government for 
the sake of the undeniable benefits it provided. Such a 
compromise was never completely satisfactory, as the per­
fection hoped for by the sentimentalists would be, but such 
a compromise had this great advantage over its opponent, it 
had already proved itself capable of madLntaining public or­
der and peace--the prime requirements of all governments.
These ideas and beliefs about man and society have 
been examined in several literary pieces studied in this 
work. The value of observing them in Rasselas, in Irene, 
in the allegories, and The Vanity of Human Wishes lies in 
the concreteness, in the specific examples of human conduct 
which give substance and depth to what in the political 
philosophy might seem obscure, arbitrary, or untenable. 
Johnson* s purpose was to analyze human conduct so as to de­
duce from it generalized inferences which could stand as 
ethical laws. The generalization, the aphorism, or apo­
thegm which were the end results of this process depended 
upon the cogency of consolidation for their effectiveness. 
The application of Johnson’s ethical insights have gener­
ally been approved and gained for him in the eighteenth cen­
tury the title of **Moralist.'* The political principles are
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a result of the Scone kind of empirical process, only they 
refer not to moral conduct but to political. In a larger 
. sense, of course, political conduct must finally be seen 
as moral, but this necessity did not cancel the obligation 
to investigate political behavior as political behavior 
first, before turning to.these larger considerations. In 
the political world, the validity of application cannot be 
tested so easily or so completely as it can in the indi­
vidual life. One way of avoiding this difficulty is to 
find or to trace these political generalizations to their 
source in specific human conduct. The clarification of 
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